9/17/2008                    FY08 FOURTH quarter Editorial updates             8900.1 CHG 0

Volume 3  General technical administration

chapter 19  TRAINING PROGRAMS AND AIRMAN QUALIFICATIONS

Section 4  Flightcrew General Emergency Training Curriculum Segments

3-1166       GENERAL. There are two types of emergency training that Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) parts 121 and 135 operators must provide to flight crewmembers. One type is “aircraft specific.” This type of emergency training includes instruction and practice in emergency and abnormal procedures associated with aircraft systems, structural design, and operational characteristics. This training provides pilots and flight engineers with the knowledge and skills necessary to perform the emergency or abnormal procedures specified in the approved Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) or those AFM procedures incorporated in the operator’s aircraft operating manual. Examples of such procedures are those used when engine, landing gear, flight control, and/or pressurization problems occur. “Aircraft specific” also includes training on the location of specific items of emergency equipment on the aircraft, such as fire extinguishers, oxygen bottles, life rafts, life vests, and first aid kits. Aircraft‑specific training must be included in the aircraft ground and flight training curriculum segments as described in sections 4 and 5 of this chapter. The other type of emergency training is referred to as “general emergency training.” General emergency training is required for crewmembers on each item specified in part 121 § 121.417 and § 135.331. This section provides direction and guidance on the content, methods of presentation, evaluation, and approval of flightcrew general emergency training.

A.     Two distinct subject areas of training are required in the conduct of general emergency training. These areas of training are “emergency drill” training and “emergency situation” training.

1)      The general emergency training curriculum segment must contain training modules that provide for training in both subject areas.

Note:   “Emergency drill” training provides instruction and practice in the actual use of certain items of emergency equipment, such as fire extinguishers, life vests, oxygen bottles, and first aid equipment.

Note:   The discharge of Halon extinguishing agents during firefighting drills is not appropriate unless a training facility is used that is specifically designed to prevent harm to the environment from the discharged Halon. When such facilities are not used, other fire extinguishing agents that are not damaging to the environment should be used during the drills.

2)      “Emergency situation” training consists of instruction on the factors involved, as well as the procedures to be followed, when emergency situations occur. Examples include passenger evacuations, ditching, rapid decompressions, aircraft fires, and persons needing first aid.

B.     The training modules for general emergency training must address the type of operation performed by an operator. For example, if a company operates aircraft above 25,000 feet, crewmembers must receive instruction in subjects such as respiration, hypoxia, decompression sickness, and any related procedures. As another example, a company that does not conduct extended overwater operations does not need to conduct training in the use of life rafts.

3-1167       JOINT PILOT/FLIGHT ATTENDANT EVACUATION TRAINING.

A.     Background.

1)      During a study, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) asked flightcrews who had participated in real, actual evacuations that received detailed investigations what changes could be implemented to improve emergency evacuation of passengers. Four flight crewmembers mentioned joint training with flight attendants. In addition, two flight attendants recommended joint training with the flightcrew on evacuation procedures. Although many crewmembers had participated in joint Crew Resource Management (CRM) training, a much smaller percentage indicated that it included joint evacuation drills. NTSB recommendations A‑92‑74 and A‑92‑77 recommended joint evacuation and/or wet ditching drill training and joint CRM training that included group exercises to improve crewmember communication and coordination.
2)      The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) agreed with the intent of these safety recommendations. On February 8, 2001, the FAA issued Advisory Circular 120‑51D, Crew Resource Management Training, which states that flight attendants should conduct CRM training with flightcrews covering shared issues such as evacuations and ditching. In addition, on February 12, 1995, the FAA issued Flight Standards Information Bulletin FSAT 95‑04, Emergency Evacuation and Ditching Drills, which expired on February 29, 1996. The bulletin directed principal operations inspectors (POI) to ensure that their assigned certificate holders are aware of the performance benefits that result when flightcrews and flight attendants perform emergency evacuation and ditching drills together.

B.     Policy. Giving crewmembers the opportunity to experience crew coordination and teamwork during required training drills is highly desirable. This is not always possible because of the difference in the numbers, the training schedules, and the training facilities of flight attendants and flight crewmembers. Regardless of these challenges, airlines have used a variety of methods to ensure that crewmembers understand the procedures and actions of other crewmembers during emergency situations. These methods have included the use of videos that show the procedures for both flightcrew and flight attendants during a simulated emergency situation and the timeframes required to complete those procedures. The simulation is especially helpful when followed by a discussion in which crewmembers are encouraged to discuss the role of fellow crewmembers.

1)      FAA recognizes the value of all activities that encourage communication and coordination between crewmembers. This would include joint CRM training, joint evacuation training, schedules that allow pilots and flight attendants to remain together as a crew for the duration of their trip sequence, preflight briefings that occur between the captain and the flight attendant crew, and coordination between flightcrew and flight attendant training departments to ensure standardization of procedures. As evidenced in previous guidance that FAA has published, these activities are strongly encouraged and air carriers routinely integrate one or more of these items into their operational procedures or training programs.
2)      POIs and cabin safety inspectors (CSI) (if applicable) should ensure that their assigned certificate holders are aware of the desirability of flightcrew and flight attendants performing emergency evacuation and ditching drills together. Further, they should ensure that when this is not possible, air carriers are aware of the desirability of training programs that include information addressing the roles of other crewmembers during emergency evacuations and ditchings.

3-1168       GENERAL EMERGENCY TRAINING CURRICULUM SEGMENTS.

A.     Part 121. All part 121 operators must develop and obtain approval of a general emergency training curriculum segment for the initial new‑hire category of training. Part 121 operators using both Group I (propeller driven) and Group II (turbojet) aircraft must develop a general emergency training curriculum segment for flight crewmembers required to receive initial equipment training on an aircraft in a different group for the first time. Part 121 operators may elect (or POIs may require them) to develop a separate general emergency training curriculum segment for flight crewmembers required to receive initial equipment training on an aircraft in the same group. In this situation, the decision to develop a separate general emergency training curriculum segment should be based on the complexity of the operation, the extent of the differences in the flight regimes of the aircraft involved, and the extent of differences in the emergency equipment and procedures associated with the aircraft involved.

B.     Part 135. All part 135 operators must develop and obtain approval of a general emergency training curriculum segment for the initial new‑hire category of training. Part 135 operators may elect (or POIs may require them) to develop a separate general emergency curriculum segment for flight crewmembers required to receive the initial equipment category of training. In this situation, the decision to develop a separate general emergency training curriculum segment should be based on the complexity of the operation, the extent of the differences in the flight regimes of the aircraft involved, and the extent of differences in the emergency equipment and procedures associated with the aircraft involved. For example, an operator who operates both reciprocating‑powered and turbojet‑powered aircraft may need to develop separate general emergency training curriculum segments for incorporation into the initial equipment category of training appropriate for these types of aircraft.

C.     Transition and Upgrade Training—Parts 121 and 135. There is not a requirement for a separate general emergency curriculum segment for the transition and upgrade categories of training. For these categories of training, flight crewmembers will have previously received the appropriate general emergency training during initial new‑hire training or, when appropriate, initial equipment training. Aircraft‑specific emergency training must be included in the transition or upgrade aircraft ground and flight training curriculum segments.

D.    Recurrent Training—Parts 121 and 135. Part 121 and 135 operators must develop and obtain approval of a separate general emergency training curriculum segment for the recurrent category of training. Usually, it will be appropriate to have two general emergency curriculum segments, one that reflects a 12‑month cycle of emergency situation training and another that reflects a 24‑month cycle of emergency drill (actual hands‑on) training (see paragraph 3‑1169 below). However, it is acceptable to incorporate the emergency drill “hands‑on” training into a single curriculum segment provided it clearly requires that flight crewmembers receive the emergency drill (hands‑on) training at least once each 24 months.

E.     Requalification Training—Parts 121 and 135. Whether a general emergency curriculum segment is required for the requalification category of training is dependent on the purpose of the requalification training. In general, if the purpose of the requalification training is to requalify flight crewmembers that have been unqualified for more than one year, a general emergency training curriculum segment should be required.

3-1169       RECURRENT GENERAL EMERGENCY TRAINING. Part 121 and 135 operators are required to conduct recurrent general emergency training. This curriculum segment is separate from the aircraft ground recurrent training curriculum segment. Recurrent general emergency training consists of “emergency situation” and “emergency drill” training modules.

A.     Recurrent general emergency training for part 121 and 135 operators consists of all the items contained in §§ 121.417 and 135.331, respectively. This training must be conducted every 12 months, usually at the same time that aircraft ground recurrent training is conducted.

B.     The emergency situation training modules that are part of the recurrent general emergency training curriculum segment must include at least the following:

·        Rapid decompression (if applicable);

·        In‑flight fire (or on‑the‑surface) and smoke control procedures;

·        Ditching and evacuation situations; and

·        Illness, injury, the proper use of first aid equipment, and other abnormal situations involving passengers or crewmembers.

C.     The emergency drill training modules, which require the crewmember to actually operate the items of emergency equipment (hands‑on), must be conducted at least every 24 months. During the alternate 12‑month periods, the emergency drill training may be accomplished by pictorial presentation or demonstration. The emergency drill training modules that are part of the recurrent general emergency training curriculum segment must include at least the following:

·        Operation of emergency exits (such as floor level, overwing, and tail cone) in the normal and emergency modes;

·        Operation of each type of hand‑held fire extinguisher;

·        Operation of each type of emergency oxygen system;

·        Donning, use, and inflation of life preservers and other flotation devices (if applicable); and

·        Ditching procedures (if applicable), including cockpit preparation, crew coordination, passenger briefing, cabin preparation, the use of life lines, and boarding of passengers and crew into a life raft or slide raft, as appropriate.

D.    The following illustration serves to clarify the chronological order of recurrent general emergency training requirements:

Table 3-44,  Chronological Order of Recurrent General Emergency Training Requirements

TYPE OF RECURRENT GENERAL EMERGENCY TRAINING REQUIRED

MONTHS SINCE FIRST EMERGENCY TRAINING CURRICULUM SEGMENT WAS COMPLETED

12 MONTHS

24 MONTHS

36 MONTHS

48 MONTHS

Emergency Situation Training

X

X

X

X

Emergency Drill (either hands‑on or pictorial presentation/demo)

X

X

X

X

Emergency Drill (hands‑on required)

 

X

 

X

3-1170       GENERAL EMERGENCY TRAINING MODULES.

A.     A general emergency training curriculum segment must include as many training modules as necessary to ensure appropriate training. Each module outline must provide at least:

·        A descriptive title of the training module, and

·        A list of the related elements or events that will be presented during instruction on the module

B.     The training module outline must contain sufficient elements or events to ensure that a student will receive training on the emergency equipment and procedures common to all of the operator’s aircraft and the type of operation being conducted.

C.     It is unnecessary to include detailed descriptions of each element within a training module outline. Such detailed descriptions are appropriate when included in the operator’s courseware, such as lesson plans. During the approval process, the POI should review courseware as necessary to ensure that the scope and depth of the training modules are adequate. The following table is an example of an acceptable method of presenting a general emergency training module outline:

Table 3-45,  An Acceptable Method of Presenting a General Emergency Training Module Outline

3. AIRCRAFT FIRES

  1. Principles of combustion and classes of fires
  2. Toxic fumes and chemical irritants
  3. Use of Halon, CO2, and water extinguishers
  4. Lavatory fires
  5. Smoke masks and goggles

Note:   In the preceding illustration, such items as engine fire procedures, electrical fire procedures, and the location of each fire extinguisher are intentionally not included. These elements or events are included in the aircraft ground and flight training curriculum segments.

D.    The following table example illustrates the interrelationship of training modules in the flight crewmember general emergency training curriculum segment:

Table 3-46,  

 

Title of Curriculum

 
The Interrelationship of Training Modules in the Flight Crewmember General Emergency Training Curriculum Segment

IV. FLIGHT CREWMEMBER GENERAL EMERGENCY

Statement of Training Objectives

 
TRAINING CURRICULUM SEGMENT

Title of Subject Area

 
A. Training Objective:

B. Emergency Situation Training:

1. Crewmember Duties and Responsibilities

2. Crewmember Coordination and Company Communication

Training Modules Within a Curriculum Segment

 
3. Aircraft Fires

4. First Aid Equipment

5. Illness, Injury, and Basic First Aid

6. Ground Evacuation

7. Ditching

8. Rapid Decompression

9. Previous Aircraft Accidents/Incidents

10. Crewmember Incapacitation

11. Basic Survival Training

8. Rapid Decompression

Elements Within a Training Module

 
(a) Respiration

(b) Hypoxia, Hypothermia, and Hyperventilation

(c) Time of Useful Consciousness

(d) Gas Expansion/Bubble Formation

(e) Physical Phenomena and Actual Incidents

3-1171       TRAINING HOURS. A minimum number of training hours for general emergency training curriculum segments is not specified in parts 121 and 135. When approving these curriculum segments, FAA must consider the complexity of the type of operation and the complexity of the aircraft used. When approving general emergency training curriculum segments, POIs should use Table 3‑47 as a guide. The table includes a list of national norms for the initial new‑hire general emergency training hours. The training hours for a complex type of operation may need to exceed the national norm while training hours below the national norm may be acceptable for a less complex type of operation. National norms have not been established for initial equipment or recurrent general emergency training.

Table 3-47,  Initial New‑Hire Flight Crewmember General Emergency Training Hours

AIRCRAFT FAMILY

TYPE OF OPERATION

TRAINING HOURS

Part 121 and 135 Transport and Commuter Category

All

8

General Purpose Multi‑Engine Airplane

Land Operations

4

Extended Overwater

6

Uninhabited Environment

6

Single‑Engine Airplanes

Lands Operations

2

Extended Overwater

4

Uninhabited Environment

6

Helicopters

Land Operations

4

Extended Overwater

6

Uninhabited Environment

6

3-1172       COURSE COMPLETION REQUIREMENTS. Completion of the curriculum segment must be documented by an instructor’s or supervisor’s certification that the student has successfully completed the course. The certification is usually based on the results of a written examination given at the end of the course. With some training methods, the certification may be based on student progress checks administered during the course.

3-1173       CONTENT OF FLIGHT CREWMEMBER GENERAL EMERGENCY TRAINING CURRICULUM SEGMENTS. A general emergency training curriculum segment must indicate that training will be given, appropriate to the operator’s type of operation, in two distinct areas. These areas of training are “emergency situation” and “emergency drill.”

3-1174       EMERGENCY SITUATION TRAINING MODULES. Emergency situation training modules provide instruction, demonstration, and practice in the handling of emergency situations. The following are examples of recommended training modules for the emergency situation subject area:

A.     Flight Crewmember Duties and Responsibilities.

·        Emergency assignments,

·        Captain’s emergency authority, and

·        Reporting incidents and accidents.

B.     Crew Coordination and Company Communication.

·        Cabin crew notification procedures,

·        Ground agency notification procedures (FAA, Airport Authority), and

·        Company communication procedures.

C.     Aircraft Fires.

·        Principles of combustion and classes of fire,

·        Toxic fumes and chemical irritants,

·        Use of appropriate hand‑held extinguishers,

·        Lavatory fires, and

·        Smoke masks and goggles.

D.    First Aid Equipment.

·        Contents of first aid kit,

·        Requirements for first aid kit integrity, and

·        Use of individual items.

E.     Illness, Injury, and Basic First Aid.

·        Principles of CPR,

·        Ear and sinus blocks,

·        Seeking medical assistance,

·        Treatment of shock, and

·        Heart attack and pregnancy situations.

F.      Ground Evacuation.

·        Aircraft configuration,

·        Directing passenger flow,

·        Blocked or jammed exit procedures,

·        Fuel spills and other ground hazards, and

·        Handicapped persons.

G.    Ditching.

·        Cockpit and cabin preparation,

·        Passenger briefing,

·        Crew coordination,

·        Primary swells, secondary swells, and sea conditions,

·        Ditching heading and water landings, and

·        Ditching at night.

H.    Rapid Decompression.

·        Respiration;

·        Hypoxia, hypothermia, hyperventilation;

·        Time of useful consciousness;

·        Gas expansion/bubble formation; and

·        Physical phenomena and actual incidents.

I.       Previous Aircraft Accidents/Incidents.

·        NTSB accident report reviews,

·        Human factors/considerations, and

·        NASA reporting system.

J.      Crewmember Incapacitation.

·        Company procedures,

·        Reporting requirements (NTSB), and

·        Interference with crewmembers.

K.    Hijacking and Other Unusual Situations.

·        Hijack procedures,

·        Bomb threat procedures,

·        Security coordinator responsibilities, and

·        In‑flight intercept signals and procedures.

3-1175       SITUATIONS REQUIRING EMERGENCY EVACUATIONS.

A.     Background.

1)      In a study, the NTSB examined what situations would cause a flightcrew to require an emergency evacuation, according to their company procedures. The most frequent event leading to an evacuation was an engine fire, accounting for 18 of the 46 evacuations (39 percent). At some air carriers, checklist procedures direct the flightcrew to initiate or consider ground evacuation procedures for emergency landing, fire (engine, auxiliary power unit (APU), avionics, and cargo), smoke (in cabin equipment, in air conditioning, and smoke removal), abnormal landing gear, ditching, and aircraft sabotage. However, other air carriers direct flightcrews to initiate or consider evacuation only for gear‑up landings, ditchings, or forced landings.
2)      Based on this information, the NTSB concluded that pilots are not receiving consistent guidance, particularly in flight operations and safety manuals, on when to evacuate an airplane. The NTSB believes that FAA should require flight operations manuals and safety manuals to include in abnormal and emergency procedures checklists, a checklist item that directs flightcrews to initiate or consider emergency evacuation in all emergencies that could reasonably require an airplane evacuation (for example, a cabin fire or an engine fire).

B.     Policy. Air carriers should evaluate the guidance and training that is given to their flightcrews regarding a crew’s decision to initiate or consider an emergency evacuation and ensure that it addresses the majority of situations for which an emergency evacuation may be warranted, including smoke or fire in the cabin. In addition, each carrier should consider a checklist item that directs flightcrews to initiate or consider an emergency evacuation in all emergencies that could reasonably require an airplane evacuation.

3-1176       EMERGENCY DRILL TRAINING MODULES. The area of a general emergency training curriculum segment referred to as emergency drill training provides instruction, demonstration, and practice in the actual operation of certain items of emergency equipment. Examples of recommended training modules for the emergency drill training subject area are as follows:

A.     Hand‑Held Fire Extinguishers.

·        Inspection tags, dates, and proper charge levels,

·        Removal and stowage of extinguishers,

·        Actual discharge of each type of extinguisher, and

·        Maintenance procedures and minimum equipment list (MEL).

B.     Portable Oxygen Systems.

·        Inspection tags, dates, and pressures;

·        Removal and stowage of oxygen bottles; and

·        Actual operation of each type of bottle and each type of mask.

C.     Emergency Exits and Slides.

·        Actual operation (open and close) of each exit in the normal and emergency modes;

·        Instruction on slide or slide raft deployment, transfer from one door to another, and detachment from the aircraft or training device of each type of slide or slide raft (if applicable); and

·        Actual use of slide or slide raft (this requirement needs to be accomplished only once during initial new‑hire or initial equipment training).

D.    Ditching Equipment (if applicable).

·        Actual donning, use, and inflation of individual flotation means (life preservers);

·        Instruction on life raft removal from the aircraft and inflation of each type of life raft;

·        Instruction on the use of life lines;

·        Actual boarding of a life raft or slide raft; and

·        Instruction on survival equipment.

3-1177       PLANNED EMERGENCY BRIEFINGS.

A.     Background. During a study, the NTSB reviewed both planned and unplanned evacuations. The majority of cases (31) in the study were reported to be unplanned evacuations and 14 were carried out following crew planning for a possible evacuation. For the planned evacuations, the amount of planning varied from case to case. Prior to landing in an A‑320 that had an unsafe nose gear, the flight attendants completed a comprehensive preparation for landing that included relocating the passengers and a detailed passenger briefing to prepare them for the evacuation. No passengers received injuries during the successful evacuation. In another case, passengers were informed that a maintenance problem had occurred and the airplane would be returning to the airport. Flight attendants calmed and reassured the passengers but did not prepare the cabin for an emergency evacuation. In this case, 11 passengers sustained minor injuries.

1)      Planning for evacuations involves more than just keeping passengers calm. Reviewing brace positions improves the chance that passengers will be properly braced for the emergency landing. Planned evacuations also allow the flight attendants to inform the passengers of what to expect, thereby avoiding surprises that could possibly delay the evacuation. For example, passengers who were flying on a Beech 1900 reported that they were surprised there were no slides at the exits.
2)      Inadequate time to prepare, no procedures for abbreviated briefings, and lack of communication from the flightcrew regarding the possibility of an evacuation prevented adequate passenger briefings in several cases studied.

B.     Policy. Passengers who are informed and briefed regarding the possibility of an evacuation are better prepared to handle an evacuation, should one occur. Air carriers should ensure that they have procedures in place to encourage communication from the flightcrew to the flight attendants regarding the possibility of an evacuation. In addition, air carriers should have procedures in place to ensure that passengers are provided with precautionary briefings when flightcrews anticipate an eventual evacuation.

1)      Further, air carriers should develop procedures that are designed to accommodate abbreviated timeframes for cabin preparation for a planned evacuation or ditching. They should establish guidance and procedures for their flight attendants that specifically address reduced timeframes for cabin preparation and give their flight attendants the opportunity to practice these procedures during emergency training. These procedures should prioritize the cabin preparation tasks and critical elements of passenger information that can have a maximum positive effect on an evacuation and can be delivered in an abbreviated timeframe. For example, a review of the brace position and a reminder to review the safety information card for exit location and operation provides passengers with information that they can use to prepare for a safer and more efficient evacuation.
2)      There are several methods that an air carrier may employ to accomplish this. For example, an air carrier could have one announcement/checklist and structure it so that tasks are completed in order of importance. Even an abbreviated timeframe would allow the most critical tasks to be completed first. Another method could be to have two different announcements/‌checklists to accomplish specific timeframes such as “over 10 minutes to prepare/under 10 minutes to prepare.” Regardless of the method the air carrier chooses, POIs and CSIs (if applicable) should ensure that their assigned operators have procedures in place that are able to accommodate abbreviated timeframes for cabin preparation for an emergency landing.

3-1178       RECURRENT GENERAL EMERGENCY TRAINING MODULES. Recurrent general emergency training consists of emergency situation training elements and emergency drill training events (in the form of training modules) that are selected by the operator and approved by the POI.

A.     During alternate 12‑month periods, when (actual hands‑on) emergency drill training is not required, operators may use approved pictorial presentations or demonstrations. When approving pictorial presentations, the POI must ensure that the presentation meets the following criteria:

1)      The equipment shown in each pictorial presentation must be functionally identical to the equipment on board the aircraft;
2)      The pictorial display of equipment must be large enough to be properly viewed by the whole class;
3)      All procedures must be accurately and logically presented; and
4)      All emergency equipment not actually demonstrated during the course of instruction must be presented pictorially.

B.     Every 24 months each crewmember must receive (actual hands‑on) emergency drill training. This means that each crewmember must actually perform each drill or procedure and must actually operate each piece of emergency equipment specified in paragraph 3‑1176. Certain hands‑on emergency drill events must be conducted in a static aircraft or in an approved cabin/exit mock‑up training device.

3-1179       CABIN AND EXIT MOCKUPS. Hands‑on emergency drill training for items such as emergency exits and passenger oxygen systems should be conducted in a static aircraft, in an approved cabin mock‑up training device, or by use of an approved exit mock‑up training device. Cabin and exit mock‑up training devices should be representative of a full‑scale section of an aircraft. Cabin mock‑ups should include operational doors, window exits, slides, rafts, and other equipment used in emergency drill training. POIs should not approve cabin or exit mock‑up training devices without an inspection to determine the adequacy of the devices. Generally, cabin and exit mock‑up training devices are acceptable if they meet the following criteria:

·        Cabin mock‑ups should be representative of the operator’s aircraft with appropriate equipment installed;

·        Cabin mock‑ups should be full‑scale, except for length;

·        The forces required to open the exit mock‑ups should duplicate normal and emergency conditions with the slides or slide raft installed; and

·        The mechanisms and instructions required to operate the exits should be representative of the operator’s aircraft.

3-1180       EVALUATION OF FLIGHT CREWMEMBER GENERAL EMERGENCY TRAINING CURRICULUM SEGMENT OUTLINES FOR INITIAL APPROVAL. When evaluating a general emergency training curriculum segment for initial approval, inspectors must determine that the training modules contain information of sufficient quality, scope, and depth to ensure that the flight crewmember can perform emergency duties and procedures without supervision. Inspectors should use the job aid in this section when evaluating the proposed curriculum segment outline.

3-1181       FLIGHT CREWMEMBER GENERAL EMERGENCY TRAINING JOB AID.

A.     The flight crewmember general emergency training job aid (Table 3‑48) is provided to assist the inspector when evaluating this curriculum segment. The regulatory requirements of part 121 and 135 general emergency training are contained in this job aid. The job aid covers the two subject areas of general emergency training, “emergency situation” and “emergency drill” training, and is intended to assist the inspector in evaluating individual training modules.

B.     When using this job aid, the inspector should make a side‑by‑side comparison of the operator’s proposal to make the following determinations:

·        Whether training modules provide for training on the required elements and events in terms of flight crewmember duties and procedures; and

·        Whether sufficient training module elements and events are outlined to ensure that the appropriate depth and scope of the material will be presented.

Note:   Although some elements and events in general emergency training are “aircraft‑specific” (such as exits and slides or slide rafts), the majority of the elements and events should apply to the operator’s aircraft fleet.

C.     The job aid is organized with the training subjects listed in the left column and evaluation criteria listed horizontally across the top. Inspectors may use the spaces within the matrix for items such as notes, comments, dates, and checkmarks. There are also blank columns and rows in the job aid that permit inspectors to add other training modules or evaluation criteria.

Table 3-48,  Flight Crewmember General Emergency Training Job Aid

SUBJECT AREA 1: EMERGENCY SITUATION TRAINING

TRAINING SUBJECTS

EVALUATION CRITERIA

ADEQUACY OF ELEMENTS/
EVENTS

ADEQUACY OF COURSEWARE TRAINING

AIDS AND FACILITIES

 

Duties and Responsibilities

 

 

 

 

Crew Coordination

 

 

 

 

Aircraft Fires

 

 

 

 

First Aid Equipment Illness, Injury, and Basic First Aid

 

 

 

 

Ground Evacuation Ditching Procedures

 

 

 

 

Rapid Decompression Previous Accidents and Incidents

 

 

 

 

Basic Survival Training

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SUBJECT AREA 2: EMERGENCY DRILL TRAINING

TRAINING SUBJECTS

EVALUATION CRITERIA

ADEQUACY OF ELEMENTS/
EVENTS

ADEQUACY OF COURSEWARE TRAINING

AIDS AND FACILITIES

 

Hand‑Held Fire Extinguishers

 

 

 

 

Emergency Oxygen System

 

 

 

 

Emergency Exits and Slides*

 

 

 

 

Life Preservers

 

 

 

 

Ditching Procedures**

 

 

 

 

Note:   *Each crewmember is only required to participate in one emergency evacuation using a slide during initial new‑hire or initial equipment training.

Note:   **Crewmembers are not required to deploy, remove, detach, transfer, or inflate slides or slide rafts on the aircraft or training device.

3-1182       SMOKE GOGGLES AND OXYGEN MASKS.

A.     POIs should:

1)      Discuss with each certificate holder the extreme importance of revising certificate holder’s checklists and expanded procedures in the appropriate Operations Manual to require that both smoke goggles and oxygen masks be donned at the first indication of any unidentified odor.
2)      Determine that each certificate holder’s approved training program provides sufficient hands on training for all Protective Breathing Equipment (PBE). In addition each training program must ensure that each flight crewmember is proficient in donning the oxygen mask and smoke goggles. Flight crewmembers must be able to don the smoke goggles and oxygen mask within the timeframe established in Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C99 and Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) Aerospace Standard (AS) 8031.

Note:   The design objective is that the device shall be capable of being donned within 15 seconds.

3)      Determine that each certificate holder’s training program, checklists, Operations Manual, and amendments to those manuals and training program’s are in compliance with part 121, § 121.337(c) that states, before each flight, each item of PBE at flight crewmember duty stations must be checked by the flight crewmember who will use the equipment.
4)      Work with the certificate holder to determine which PBE is universal-fit and which is not. This information must then be made available to flightcrews.
5)      Ensure that each certificate holder locates flight crewmember PBE (i.e., smoke goggles and oxygen mask), in a ready position at each flight crewmember duty station in a manner that is immediately available. Smoke goggles must not impair the wearer’s vision and must allow corrective glasses to be worn without impairment of vision or loss of protection as required by § 121.337.

B.     ASI (Operations) conducting en route inspections, should actively emphasize compliance with § 121.337.

RESERVED. Paragraphs 3‑1183 through 3‑1195.


9/13/07                                                                                                                         8900.1 CHG 0

Volume 5  airman certification

chapter 1  DIRECTION, GUIDANCE, AND PROCEDURES FOR title 14 CFR PARTS 121/135 AND GENERAL AVIATION

Section 3  Phases of Certification

5-51               GENERAL. Any certification function, that might affect a pilot certificate or rating, requires the airman requesting the action (e.g., a practical test for a pilot certificate or rating, a pilot proficiency check, or knowledge and skill test) to fill out Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Form 8710‑1, Airman Certificate and/or Rating Application.

5-52          COMPLETING FAA FORM 8710‑1.

A.     Instructions. Instructions for accurate completion of this form (Figure 5‑1) are included on a tear‑off sheet at the top of the form.

B.     Special Emphasis Items. Particular attention should be paid to the following items:

1)      In section I, block A on the application, ensure the correct order of the applicant’s legal name (e.g., Brown, Michael William).
2)      In section I, block B on the application, the Social Security Number (SSN) is optional. If the SSN is unavailable for FAA use, enter “DO NOT USE.” If the applicant does not have a SSN, enter the word “NONE.” Do not leave this area blank.
3)      In section I, block C on the application, ensure the month and day are in the correct order (e.g., 08-30-1948).
4)      In section I, block D on the application, if the applicant’s place of birth is outside the United States (U.S.), ensure the applicant has identified the city and country (e.g., Mexico City, Mexico).
5)      In section I, block F on the application, if the applicant claims dual citizenship, ensure the applicant’s primary country is listed in this section. The temporary pilot certificate will show the second country in the limitation field (e.g., “Dual citizenship includes the country of France”).
6)      In section I, block H of the application, the applicant must indicate height in inches. Foreign applicants must convert to U.S. measurements (1 in = 2.54 cm; 1 cm = 0.3937 in).
7)      In section I, block I of the application, the applicant must indicate weight in pounds. Foreign applicants must convert to U.S. measurements (1 lb = 0.4536 kgs; 1 kg = 2.20 lbs).
8)      In section III of the application, Record of Pilot Time, the applicant must list at least the aeronautical experience required for the airman certificate and rating sought. Graduates of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 141 pilot schools or part 142 training centers must provide their aeronautical experience in section III, even though the graduation certificate is evidence of having completed the course of training. If aeronautical experience has no bearing on the airman certification action sought, it is not necessary for an applicant to complete section III. For flight instructor renewal applications, ground instructor qualification applications, and pilot type rating applications, aeronautical experience would not have a bearing on the airman certification action; thus, the applicant would not be required to complete section III of the application. However, all applicants are encouraged to complete section III because the application remains on file with the FAA and can be used to substantiate past aeronautical experience in the case of a lost logbook.
9)      The instructor’s recommendation on the application should be accepted as meeting the required endorsements prescribed under 14 CFR part 61, § 61.39(a)(6).
10)  In the Aviation Safety Inspector or Technician Report section, the inspector checks “Approved” or “Disapproved,” as appropriate.
11)  The inspector indicates the certificate or rating for which the applicant was tested, the type of aircraft used, and its registration number. If more than one aircraft was used, all aircraft must be listed and all registration numbers provided.
12)  The inspector must check all applicable boxes on the application. Inspectors must include the location of the test and the duration of both ground and flight tests.
13)  In the Aviation Safety Inspector or Technician Report section of the application, the aviation safety inspector (ASI) or aviation safety technician (AST) dates and signs the application and enters his or her own pilot certification number (requirement for ASIs) and district office acronym (requirement for ASIs and ASTs). If the ASI or AST is accepting the recommendation of a designated pilot examiner (DPE), ensure the “Designated Examiner’s Report” is completed in its entirety and mark the Examiner’s Recommendation and Accepted/Rejected boxes.
14)  In the attachments section, the inspector must check all applicable boxes on the application.

C.     Revisions. The Airman Certification Branch, AFS‑760, is advised to accept FAA Form 8710‑1 with either clearly legible pen and ink changes to the boxes provided on the form or a legible attachment to the form, that shows the required flight experience, certified to by the applicant. This includes the entries for second in command (SIC) time. ASIs should ensure that DPEs and aircrew program managers are made aware of this procedure.

D.    Clarification Criteria and to Highlight Changes to FAA Form 8710‑1.

1)      DPEs are required to check the block in the Designated Examiner’s Report section of FAA Form 8710‑1, which states, “I have personally reviewed this applicant’s pilot logbook, and certify that the individual meets the pertinent requirements of 14 CFR part 61 for the pilot certificate or rating sought,” for applicants with part 141 school graduation certificates. Checking this block confirms that the DPE has validated the part 141 school graduate’s compliance with part 61, § 61.71.
2)      Under the provisions of § 61.71, an applicant who graduates from an approved training program under part 141 meets the applicable aeronautical experience, aeronautical knowledge, and areas of operation requirements of part 61, if the applicant presents the graduation certificate and passes the required practical test within the 60‑day period after the date of graduation.
3)      The DPE’s review of the records of practical test applicants with part 141 school graduation certificates is equivalent to the DPE’s personal verification that the instructor’s signature on FAA Form 8710‑1 correctly indicates that the applicant meets all applicable requirements.
4)      Flight Standards District Offices (FSDO) should remind district DPEs of the requirement to check the three applicable blocks in the Designated Examiner’s Report section of FAA Form 8710‑1 for practical test applicants with part 141 school graduation certificates. FSDOs should also ensure that DPEs understand the format changes in the current edition of FAA Form 8710‑1.
5)      The following changes were made to the form regarding alcohol‑related offenses.
a)      Section I, block U of FAA Form 8710‑1, omits reference to motor vehicle operations involving alcohol‑related offenses. However, in the instructions for completing the form, the reference to alcohol was inadvertently left in. The reference to alcohol will be deleted from the instructions in future editions and should be disregarded in the interim.
b)      Although motor vehicle operations involving alcohol-related offenses were purposely removed from block U on FAA Form 8710‑1, an applicant’s compliance with part 61, § 61.15 must still be determined. This should be adequately ensured by the medical examiner through the issuance of the airman’s medical and/or information to be reported by the airman and available to the FAA through the National Driver Registry.
6)      Block E, Completion of Air Carrier’s Approved Training Program, is added to section II of FAA Form 8710‑1. For applicants applying for a certificate or rating on the basis of the completion of an air carrier’s approved training program, the name of the air carrier, the date of completion for the program, and the appropriate category of training must be indicated in section II, block E.

5-53          VERIFICATION OF APPLICANT’S IDENTITY. The FAA recognizes the need for increased scrutiny of applicant identification. This ensures the actual identity of the pilot certificate applicant and helps the inspector establish the applicant’s eligibility. The inspector should require positive identification from each person presenting FAA Form 8710‑1.

A.     Deficiencies. The FAA Drug Enforcement Assistance Act of 1988 identified the following deficiencies with regard to issuance of airmen certificates:

·        The use of fictitious names and addresses by applicants for certification;

·        The use of stolen or fraudulent identification in applying for certificates and ratings;

·        Use of a post office box or mail drop as a return address for the purpose of evading identification of the applicant’s address;

·        The use of counterfeit and stolen airman certificates; and

·        The absence of information concerning physical characteristics of holders of certificates.

B.     Applicant Identification Procedures. To ensure proper identification of pilot certificate applicants, and address deficiencies specified in the Drug Enforcement Assistance Act, the FAA has implemented the following procedures for field offices and DPEs:

1)      All applicants for airman certificates must apply in person and present positive identification at the time of application. Such identification must include an official photograph of the applicant, the applicant’s signature, and the applicant’s residential address, if different than the mailing address. This information may be presented in more than one form of identification.
2)      An examiner or inspector should not accept a post office box address on an airman certificate application from an applicant who resides on a rural route, boat, or in some other location that requires the use of a post office box, mail drop, or rural route number for an address, unless the applicant provides the geographical location of his or her residence on a separate piece of paper and attests by signature the preference or need for the use of a post office address. In the case of an applicant that resides on a boat, the boat document number or vessel registration number must be provided. The examiner attaches this paper to FAA Form 8710‑1.
3)      FAA Form 8710‑1 provides a space for the inspector or examiner to record the type of identification and number submitted (e.g., Virginia driver’s license number 123‑45‑6789).
4)      When an airman cannot provide a permanent residence address (i.e., as in the case where the person resides in a motor home or is in the process of moving), it is permissible to allow the airman to use his/her parent’s or friend’s permanent address as his/her permanent address. However, the airman should be reminded of the requirements of part 61, § 61.60 for change of address.

C.     Acceptable Methods of Identification. Acceptable methods of identification include, but are not limited to, driver’s licenses, government identification cards, passports, and other forms of identification that meet the requirements of subparagraph B1) above.

D.    Alternative Methods of Identification. Some applicants may not possess suitable identification as described above. In the case of an applicant under age 18, the applicant’s parent or guardian may have to accompany the applicant and identify themselves as described above. The parent or guardian may then attest to the applicant’s identity. For all other applicants, the identification procedures employed must be such that the inspector or examiner can positively identify the applicant in a manner acceptable to the inspector or examiner. In such cases, the identification procedures employed must be disclosed by the inspector or examiner on the application or, if necessary, in a separate statement. Furthermore, if the applicant appears before a designated examiner, the examiner must obtain approval from the supervising FAA district office for the identification procedure employed. If necessary, applicants may need to apply in person at the FAA field office, complete the required identification procedures, and then obtain an authorization to appear before the examiner for the practical test.

E.     Flight Instructor Renewals. If a certificated flight instructor is unable to appear in person before a representative of the Administrator, that instructor may establish his or her identity before either a notary public, a consular official of the U.S. State Department, or the airman’s U.S. Armed Forces commanding officer. The procedure described in the following paragraphs is not meant to preclude the FAA from exercising its prerogative to require an instructor applicant to demonstrate his or her qualifications to hold the certificate, if deemed appropriate.

1)      The applicant and certifying official must complete an appropriate identification affidavit, and the affidavit must be attached to FAA Form 8710‑1. Care must be taken to use the same document(s) for identification on both the affidavit and the bottom of the reverse side of FAA Form 8710‑1.
2)      The applicant must send FAA Form 8710‑1, the identification affidavit, a valid flight instructor refresher clinic (FIRC) graduation certificate, and an unexpired flight instructor certificate to the FSDO of the applicant’s choice. The documents must arrive at the FSDO before the flight instructor certificate expires to be accepted for renewal.
3)      The receiving FSDO will process the application for renewal in the normal fashion. FAA Form 8710‑1, the identification affidavit, superseded flight instructor certificate, and temporary airman certificate will be forwarded to AFS‑760. Provided that the application package is complete and the FAA has no reason to require a demonstration of proficiency by the airman, the flight instructor certificate will be issued and mailed to the applicant. The FSDO will return the FIRC graduation certificate and the temporary certificate to the applicant.

F.      Applicant Identification Anomalies. When pilot certificate applicants present forms of identification that are unacceptable, inspectors and examiners should be alert for any indication of fraudulent or altered forms of identification or other irregularity that may indicate an attempt by the applicant to falsely represent his or her identity. Any such indication should be reported immediately to the nearest Civil Aviation Security Field Office or Regional Civil Aviation Security Division. Title 49 of the United States Code (49 U.S.C.) § 46306 (formerly § 902(b) of the FA Act), was amended to make willful or fraudulent misrepresentation for the purpose of applying for any FAA certificate grounds for criminal penalties of up to $15,000 and 3 years imprisonment or, if connected with transportation of controlled substances by aircraft, fines of up to $25,000 and 5 years imprisonment.

G.    Notification of Examiners. Regional Flight Standards division (RFSD) managers should ensure that all FSDOs provide copies of this information to all DPEs. District offices should also brief examiners on these procedures during regular examiner surveillance, annual examiner meetings, or other examiner contacts.

H.    Public Notification. Public notice of these procedural changes should be made by FAA headquarters. Field offices are authorized to describe the contents of this information to the public. Any questions that cannot be resolved may be directed to FAA Headquarters, Certification and General Aviation Operations Branch, AFS‑810.

5-54          DRUG CONVICTIONS AND APPLICATION. FAA Form 8710‑1 asks in block U, “Have you been convicted for violation of any Federal or State statutes relating to narcotic drugs, marijuana, or depressant or stimulant drugs or substances?” The applicant must check “Yes” or “No,” as appropriate (refer to § 61.15).

A.     “No” Checked. If the “No” box is checked, the inspector conducts the practical test and, if appropriate, issues the airman certificate as usual. If it is determined later that the applicant should have checked “Yes,” the inspector should follow established procedures in Volume 7, Chapter 6, Conduct an Investigation of FAA Flight Operations to Determine Compliance, and FAA Order 2150.3, Compliance and Enforcement Program, regarding falsification of application.

B.      “Yes” Checked. If the applicant indicates “Yes,” the applicant must indicate the date of conviction.

1)      If the date of final conviction is more than 1 year before the date of application, the inspector should conduct the practical test and, if appropriate, issue the airman certificate as usual.
a)      An inspector must attach a note to the airman’s application before it is sent to AFS‑760 to indicate that there has been a narcotics conviction more than 1 year before the date of application. AFS‑760 should advise the appropriate regional flight surgeon.
b)      An examiner must contact an operations inspector in the nearest district office and advise the inspector that the file indicates a narcotics conviction more than 1 year before the date of application. The operations inspector receiving this notification should advise the appropriate regional flight surgeon of the situation.
2)      If the applicant checks the “Yes” box and the date of final conviction is less than 1 year before the date of application, the inspector must deny the application and issue a notice of disapproval. No practical test should be conducted. The notice of disapproval should state that the application was denied because of a narcotics conviction.

5-55          INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING APPLICATION FORMS FOR PARTS 121 AND 135. Applicants should follow the instructions for completing FAA application forms carefully to preclude an excessive number of airman certification paperwork files from being returned by the AFS‑760 for correction. Application forms are designed for computer processing of information. Applicants should be aware that character limitations are imposed in some areas. Inspectors should ensure that applicants use FAA Form 8710‑1 for the airline transport pilot (ATP) certificate (see Figure 5‑2) and FAA Form 8400‑3, Application for an Airman Certificate and/or Rating, for the flight engineer, flight navigator, and aircraft dispatcher certificates (see Figure 5‑3). Inspectors should use the procedures and guidance that follow when reviewing an application form.

A.     Front Side of Application Form. Inspectors should review the front side of the application form as follows:

1)      Ensure that the block designating the type of certificate for which application is being made is checked.
2)      When an applicant already holds the basic certificate and is applying for a rating to be added to the basic certificate, ensure that the “Additional Aircraft Rating” (FAA Form 8710‑1) or the “Additional Rating” (FAA Form 8400‑3) block is checked. This should only be checked when a rating is being added to an existing certificate.
3)      When the applicant already holds the certificate and is applying for the certificate to be reissued, ensure that the “Reissuance of ____________Certificate” (FAA Form 8710‑1) or “Reissuance of Certificate” (FAA Form 8400‑3) block is checked.
4)      On FAA Form 8400‑3, ensure that both the make and model of the aircraft to be used are entered in the “Type of Aircraft to Be Used” block. This entry should be identical to the current designation listed in either Figure 5‑5 or 5‑6. Since aircraft type designations are frequently changed, a current listing of the designations may be obtained through the Flight Standards Automation System (FSAS). This current information may be obtained by selecting the airworthiness/‌Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) subsystem at the main FSAS menu. When the broadcast message page appears, press “enter” or “go” until the MMEL main menu appears. At the MMEL menu, select “type rating.”
5)      On FAA Form 8400‑3, ensure that the time accrued in the make and model of aircraft to be used in the flight test is entered in the “Time in This Aircraft” block. Simulator time must not be entered. If the flight test will be conducted in two segments (simulator and aircraft), the block should be left blank until the applicant takes the aircraft portion of the test.

B.     “Application Information” (8710‑1) or “Applicant Identification” (8400‑3) Block. Inspectors should ensure that applicants complete this block and the appropriate subsequent blocks as follows:

1)      Name: Enter legal name but not more than one middle name. Do not change the name on subsequent applications unless it is done in accordance with part 61, § 61.25. The last name is limited to 17 characters. The first and middle names should not exceed 26 characters, including spaces between names. Hyphenated names should be shortened so that the number of characters allowed is not exceeded. If the applicant does not have a middle name, enter “NMI.” If the applicant has only a middle initial, add the note “initial only.” The name on the application should be the same as the name on the superseded certificate, unless the applicant’s name has been changed in accordance with § 61.25.
2)      Social Security No. or SSN: The SSN is optional; however, this block should not be left blank. If the SSN is not available for FAA use, enter “Do Not Use.” If the applicant does not have an SSN, enter “None.” In either case, AFS‑760 will issue a nine-digit pilot certificate number.
3)      Date of Birth: Enter six numeric-character digits in this space. For example, enter 07‑09‑65 instead of July 9, 1965. Compare the date of birth on the application form with the date of birth on the applicant’s medical certificate to verify that they are the same and accurate.
4)      Place of Birth: If the applicant was born in the U.S., enter the city and state. If the city is unknown, enter the county and state. If the applicant was born outside of the U.S. or its territories, enter the city and country.
5)      Permanent Mailing Address or Address: Enter the address to which the permanent certificate is to be sent. Check for accuracy. Make sure numbers are not transposed. The number and street or the P.O. Box should not exceed 17 characters, including spaces.
6)      Nationality: Enter the applicant’s country of citizenship. Citizens of the United States should enter “USA.” All others should spell out the full name of the country.
7)      Height: Enter height in inches. For example, 5' 9" should be entered as 69 inches. Enter whole inches only. Do not enter fractions. Foreign applicants must convert to U.S. measurements (for height, 1 inch = 2.54 cm; 1 cm = .3937 inches).
8)      Weight: Enter weight in pounds. Enter whole pounds only. Do not enter fractions. Foreign applicants must convert to U.S. measurements (for weight, 1 lb = .4536 kg; 1 kg = 2.20 lb).
9)      Hair: Spell out the color of hair or use an abbreviation that cannot be confused with another color. If bald, enter “bald.” If wearing a toupee, enter color of hair under the wig or toupee.
10)  Eyes: Enter the true color of the eyes, regardless of whether tinted contact lenses are worn. Spell out the color or use an abbreviation that cannot be confused with another color.
11)  Sex: Enter male or female (“M” or “F” may be used).
12)  Block M on FAA Form 8710‑1: Ensure that the applicant checks either “Yes” or “No.”
13)  Grade Pilot Certificate (on FAA Form 8710‑1): Enter the grade of pilot certificate (such as student, recreational, private, commercial, or ATP) currently or previously held, not the grade for which application is being made. Flight instructor certificate information should not be entered into this block.
14)  Certificate Number (FAA Form 8710‑1): If the applicant already holds or has previously held a pilot certificate, enter that certificate number.

C.     Drug-Related Convictions. Inspectors should use the following guidance when reviewing an application for drug-related information concerning the applicant.

1)      On November 29, 1990, a final rule affecting pilots convicted of alcohol- or drug-related motor vehicle offenses became effective. An airman’s conviction of a motor vehicle offense involving either alcohol or drugs is to be evaluated by the Aeromedical Certification Division, AAM‑300. An alcohol- or drug-related conviction is not necessarily grounds for disqualification. A medical judgment relative to the condition involved must be made by the Federal Air Surgeon, the Manager of the Aeromedical Certification Division, or a regional flight surgeon. Under this new rule, an airman certificate or rating may be denied to an individual who has had two or more alcohol- or drug-related motor vehicle convictions or state motor vehicle actions within a 3‑year period. The information requested on the old FAA Form 8710‑1 exceeded the requirements currently outlined in 14 CFR. As a result of this problem, the language on the form was revised to comply with the new rule. When the Federal Air Surgeon reissues a medical certificate to a drug- or alcohol-convicted airman, the airman may then exercise the privileges of the new airman certificate. The inspector or examiner should inspect the applicant’s current medical certificate to ensure that it is valid.
2)      Block U on FAA Form 8710‑1 contains the statement, “Have you been convicted for violation of Federal or State statutes relating to narcotic drugs, marijuana, or depressant or stimulant drugs or substances?” The applicant must check either “Yes” or “No.”
a)       If the applicant checked “No,” the inspector or examiner should conduct the practical test and, if appropriate, issue the airman certificate. If it is determined later that the applicant should have checked “Yes,” the inspector should conduct an investigation to determine compliance (see FAA Order 2150.3, Compliance and Enforcement, regarding falsification of application).
b)       If the applicant checked “Yes,” the applicant must indicate the date of final conviction. In this case, the inspector or examiner may not continue with the examination. The examiner should notify the appropriate FSDO of the decision to terminate the examination and forward the application to the FSDO. The FSDO should contact regional counsel to determine what action to take.

D.    “Certificates Held By Applicant” (on FAA Form 8400‑3). Check the appropriate certificates currently held by the applicant.

E.     Section II, “Certificate or Rating Applied For on Basis of” (on FAA Form 8710‑1). Check the appropriate block: A, B, C, D, or E.

1)      In block A1, “Aircraft to be used,” enter the make and model of the aircraft to be used. This should be identical to the current designation listed in either Figure 5‑5 or 5‑6. AFS‑760 double checks this with the attached Temporary Airman Certificate (FAA Form 8060‑4) (see Figure 5‑4) to ensure that the proper aircraft type rating is issued.
2)      In block A2a, “Total time in this aircraft,” enter the time accrued in the make and model of aircraft to be used in the flight test, including flight training time. Do not enter simulator time. If the flight test will be conducted in two segments (simulator and aircraft), leave the space blank until the applicant takes the aircraft portion of the test.
3)      In block A2b, “Pilot-in-command,” enter total pilot in command (PIC) time in the aircraft to be used. For the ATP type rating, this block may be, and normally is, zero.
4)      In block B, “Military Competence Obtained in,” enter the applicant’s branch of service, date rated as a military pilot, current or last grade and service number, and the military aircraft flown as PIC for 10 hours or more in the last 12 months.
5)      Complete block C, “Graduate of Approved Course,” as follows:
a)      In block 1, “Name and Location of Training Agency or Training Center,” enter the name as shown on the graduation certificate. Be sure the location is entered.
b)      In block 1a, “Certification Number,” enter as shown on the graduation certificate.
c)      In block 2, “Curriculum From Which Graduated,” enter as shown on the graduation certificate.
d)      In block 3, “Date,” enter the date of graduation from the indicated course. An approved course graduate must also complete “Completion of Required Test” in block A.
6)      For block D, “Holder of Foreign License Issued By,” verify the entry accurately reflects the information on the foreign pilot license. See Volume 5, Chapter 2, Section 14, Issue a Title 14 CFR Part 61 U.S. Pilot Certificate on the Basis of a Foreign Pilot License, for guidance on issuing a certificate based on a foreign license.
7)      In block E, “Completion of Air Carrier’s Approved Training Program,” enter the name of the air carrier and the date that the last segment of the operator’s training program required for certification was completed. Then, enter the appropriate category of training (such as initial, upgrade, or transition).

Note:   The intermediate stages of the training will be reflected in the applicant’s training record.

F.      Section III, “Record of Pilot time” (FAA Form 8710‑1). Ensure that applicants have entered at least the minimum flight experience required by the appropriate regulation for the certificate or rating sought. If flight experience has no bearing on the certificate action, such as exchange of certificate, it is not necessary to include flight experience on the application. Applicants should, however, be encouraged to enter flight experience for historical purposes any time an applicant completes this form. The “Instruction Received” blocks of the “Airplanes,” “Rotorcraft,” “Gliders,” and “Lighter than Air” lines refer to instruction in an aircraft in flight. The time entered in the “Training Device/Simulator” column is for instruction in simulators and training devices only.

G.    Section IV, “Have You Failed a Test for This Certificate or Rating?” Check the appropriate box. Inspectors and examiners must ensure that applicants who check “Yes” meet the requirements of 14 CFR part 61, § 61.49 (pilots), part 63, §§ 63.41 (flight engineers) and 63.59 (flight navigators), or part 65, § 65.19 (aircraft dispatchers).

Note:   The Air Transport Association of America (ATA) holds exemption number 3474 that requires flight crewmembers employed by an ATA member air carrier (or similarly situated operator) to apply for re-testing provided the flight crewmember has been re-trained by the operator and endorsed for the re-test.

H.    Section V, “Applicant’s Certification.” Enter the date that the application was signed. The applicant must certify to the accuracy and truth of the information on the application by signing in this space.

I.       Reverse Side of FAA Form 8710‑1. The reverse side of this form is used for recommendations, reports, records and attachment notes, when required.

1)       The “Instructor’s Recommendation” block does not need to be signed for an ATP certificate or for a type rating (see 14 CFR part 1, § 1.39(a)(6)(iii)); however, when an applicant has received instruction in an approved 14 CFR part 121 or 135 training program, an instructor, supervisor, or check airman must certify (in the applicant’s training record) that the applicant’s knowledge and proficiency is satisfactory in accordance with §§ 121.401(c) and 135.323(c) before the applicant may take the test.
2)       The “Air Agency’s Recommendation” block is only used by part 141 pilot schools and their examining authority.
3)       The “Designated Examiner’s Report” block is used by aircrew program designees (APD), air carrier airman examiners, and general aviation pilot examiners. The APD or examiner who issues the Temporary Airman Certificate or Notice of Disapproval of Application (FAA Form 8060‑5) is required to sign this block, and must check the “I have personally tested and/or verified this applicant . . . ” block and the “Approved” or “Disapproved” block. The APD or examiner must then complete the information requested in the boxes titled, “Location of Test”; “Certificate or Rating for Which Tested”; “Type(s) of Aircraft Used” (with level of simulator used); and “Registration No.(s)” of aircraft, if used. The remaining blocks need to be completed with date, examiner’s signature, certificate number, designation number and expiration date. The “Duration of Test” block should contain an indication of the approximate duration of the oral, simulator, and flight check. The level of simulator used must be noted in the “Type(s) of Aircraft Used” block of the examiner’s report.
4)       The “Evaluator’s Record for Airline Transport Certificate/Rating Only” block must be used by inspectors, designated examiners, and APDs who administer multiple-phase testing for an ATP certificate or a type rating added to an ATP certificate. The inspector, designated examiner, or APD who administers each phase of the test must sign on the appropriate line and enter the date. Inspectors should enter their organizational identifier. Designated examiners and APDs should enter their designee number.

J.      “Inspector’s Report.” This section is to be completed only by FAA ASIs.

1)      If the inspector has personally tested the applicant and is issuing or denying a certificate, the inspector should check the appropriate box: “Approved-Temporary Certificate Issued” or “Disapproved-Disapproval Notice Issued.” Inspectors should complete the information requested in the boxes titled “Location of Test;” “Certificate or Rating for Which Tested;” “Type(s) of Aircraft Used” (with level of simulator used); and “Registration No.(s)” of aircraft, if used. If the inspector did not issue the Temporary Airman Certificate or the Notice of Disapproval of Application, all of these boxes must be left blank. The inspector completes this section by dating, signing, and identifying the inspector’s permanently assigned FSDO.
2)      Inspectors reviewing applications completed by examiners should check the block titled “Examiner’s Recommendation” and either “Accepted” or “Rejected.” If the inspector rejects the examiner’s recommendation, the inspector must attach a brief statement containing both an explanation and any intended further actions (such as a reexamination). The inspector should then date, sign, and enter the FSDO designation.
3)      Inspectors renewing a part 121 or 135 flight crewmember’s flight instructor rating must check the “Certificate or Rating Based on” block, the “Certificate Issued” block, the “Instructor” block, the “Flight” block, the “Renewal” block, the “Approved” block, and the “Instructor Renewal Based on ‘Activity’ or ‘Acquaintance’” block. The inspector should complete this section of the form by dating, signing, and identifying the inspector’s permanently assigned FSDO (such as ASO‑FSDO‑19); regional office (such as ASO‑260); or headquarters office (such as AFS‑250); into the “FAA District Office” block.

K.    “Attachments.” This section of the form is used for recording the method of documenting the applicant’s identity and the documents attached to the application.

5-56          ORAL TEST PHASE FOR PARTS 121 AND 135. Oral testing is conducted to determine whether the applicant has acquired adequate practical knowledge to safely and competently exercise the privileges of the certificate.

A.     Location. The preferred locations for conducting oral tests for airman certificates are in ground training devices, flight training devices, or flight simulators. The interactive logic available in these devices provides an effective method of testing the applicant’s knowledge of normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures.

B.     Question Phrasing. Questions should be phrased in simple, focused, and specific terms. Applicants should be encouraged to answer in the same manner. An example of a simple, focused, and specific question is, “What is the maximum allowable exhaust gas temperature (EGT) limit during a normal engine start?” An example of an abstract, ambiguous, and confusing question is, “Tell me everything you know about starting an engine.” Inspectors and examiners should encourage applicants to ask for clarification, before answering, when they are unsure of the meaning of a question.

C.     Length and Scope. The scope of oral tests is defined by regulation. The items that should be evaluated on each type of oral test are specified in the applicable regulations, practical test standards (PTS), and job aids. Inspectors and examiners should choose their questions from the entire range of appropriate topics rather than concentrate on only a few topics. Questions should be related to the specific characteristics of the aircraft involved. The length of the oral test depends on the complexity of the aircraft involved. For simpler aircraft with uncomplicated systems, the oral test can normally be accomplished in approximately 1 hour. For large, complex aircraft, the oral test can normally be accomplished in approximately 2 hours.

D.    Standards of Performance. Part 121, § 121.403(b)(3) and part 135, § 135.327(b)(3) require that operators publish “detailed descriptions or pictorial displays of the approved normal, abnormal, and emergency maneuvers, procedures and functions that will be performed during each flight training phase or flight check, indicating those maneuvers, procedures and functions that are to be performed during the in-flight portions of flight training and flight checks.” Operators must use Airline Transport Pilot and Type Rating Practical Test Standard (FAA‑S‑8081‑5), any applicable Flight Standardization Board (FSB) reports, and the manufacturer’s recommendations. Inspectors and examiners should use the standards approved by the principal operations inspector (POI) for the operator when conducting oral tests.

1)      Applicants are expected to possess a broad understanding of the aircraft and its systems rather than a highly detailed knowledge of component design and construction. They should be able to demonstrate an understanding of the essential features of system design and how various systems interrelate. Applicants must be able to demonstrate such knowledge by interpreting cockpit indications and describing the condition of aircraft systems from these indications. Applicants are not expected to have memorized specific facts that are immediately available in reference manuals and checklists that are required to be in the cockpit. Applicants must, however, be able to state memory items on emergency checklists (in the correct sequence) and flight manual limitations from memory.
a)      When a limitation is presented in terms of a gauge marking, the applicant should be able to state the operational significance of the marking but does not need to have memorized the appropriate value the marking represents. When a limitation is not clearly presented by such a marking, the applicant must be able to state the appropriate value from memory.
b)      To illustrate the standards described, the following example is provided. Assume the aircraft involved requires a specific fuel burn sequence. The applicant should be able to describe in general terms the fuel burn sequence and to detect correct and incorrect conditions from gauge indications. The applicant should be aware of any checklist or procedure that corrects an improper condition and where that checklist or procedure is located. The applicant is not expected to memorize the sequence of steps necessary to correct the condition. On the other hand, the applicant should be able to state from memory the flight manual limitation concerning allowable fuel imbalance between pairs of tanks.
2)      An applicant may not be able to give entirely correct answers to some of the questions in an oral test; however, that applicant may still meet an acceptable standard. Inspectors and examiners must base their decisions on whether applicants pass or fail on the soundness of the applicants’ overall command of basic principles. Inspectors and examiners should avoid commenting on an applicant’s performance until after the oral test is complete.

E.     Debriefing. Immediately after the oral test, the applicant will be debriefed on performance and informed of the results of the test.

5-57          FLIGHT TEST PHASE. Sections 121.403(b)(3) and 135.327(b)(3) require that operators publish “detailed descriptions or pictorial displays of the approved normal, abnormal, and emergency maneuvers, procedures and functions that will be performed during each flight training phase or flight check, indicating those maneuvers, procedures and functions that are to be performed during the in-flight portions of flight training and flight checks.” Operators must use Airline Transport Pilot and Type Rating Practical Test Standard (FAA‑S‑8081‑5), any applicable FSB reports, and the manufacturer’s recommendations. Inspectors and examiners should use the standards approved by the POI for the operator when conducting flight tests.

A.     Purpose. The purpose of the flight test is to evaluate the applicant’s ability to operate safely and effectively in a real-time environment. Inspectors and examiners should determine whether applicants have achieved an acceptable level of physical manipulation skills, positional orientation abilities, flight management skills, and crew coordination skills. Flight tests can normally be conducted in 2‑1/2 hours.

B.     Separation of Oral Phase from Flight Test Phase. For all flightcrew airman certificates, the oral and flight test phases should not be conducted simultaneously. The purpose of the oral test phase is to examine an applicant’s depth of knowledge while the purpose of the flight test phase is to observe and evaluate an applicant’s skills. An inspector’s or examiner’s presence in the cockpit can affect the normal interaction of the flightcrew. Inspectors and examiners should endeavor to minimize this effect by maintaining a passive role and by not becoming involved in normal crew operation. Questions that require explanations and probe the applicant’s depth of knowledge are appropriate during the oral test phase but not during the flight test phase.

C.     Normal, Abnormal, and Emergency Procedure Test Events. The events that must be evaluated on each flight test are specified by regulation or determined by the Administrator. The events have been listed on appropriate job aids for the convenience of inspectors and examiners. The regulations require inspectors to evaluate normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures that appear in the operator’s manual but are not specifically identified by regulation. Inspectors and examiners should evaluate on each flight test as many of these events that the inspector or examiner “finds are necessary to determine that the person being checked has an adequate knowledge of, and ability to perform, such procedures . . .” (see part 61, appendix A, VI and VII). Examples of these events include flight instrument and display failures, operations in ice and rain, emergency descent, and emergency ground evacuation. Inspectors should vary these events on subsequent flight tests so that the effectiveness of the operator’s manual and training program can be evaluated.

D.    Flight Management and Crew Coordination Skills. Inspectors and examiners should observe and evaluate crew coordination and flight management skills. The applicant must demonstrate good judgment, continual spatial and situational awareness, and cockpit management throughout the flight test.

E.     Briefings. Before the flight simulator segment and aircraft segment of a flight test, inspectors and examiners should brief applicants on what will be expected of them during the flight test. Before the flight test, inspectors and examiners should determine by agreement with the applicant whether or not to continue the flight test after a failed event. When other crewmembers are involved, they should be briefed on their roles. Suggested briefing outlines are included on the job aids. Inspectors and examiners should avoid commenting on the applicant’s performance during the flight test.

F.      Debriefings. After the test, the applicant should be informed of the results and debriefed in a timely manner. If the applicant is unsuccessful, the inspector or examiner should ensure that the applicant clearly understands specifically what was unsatisfactory about each event that was failed. Inspectors and examiners should use judgment and discretion when inviting other crewmembers to attend these debriefings. It is important that company instructors or check airmen receive direct feedback on their students’ performances. Instructors or check airmen who participate in flight tests (as copilots or safety pilots) should usually be invited to attend these debriefings. An inspector or examiner may choose to limit attendance at the debriefing to only the applicant. If an instructor or check airman who participated in the flight test is not at the debriefing, the inspector or examiner should debrief that person at a later time.

G.    Termination of Flight Tests Before Completion. When the inspector or examiner determines that an applicant’s performance is unsatisfactory, the inspector or examiner may then either terminate the flight test immediately or, with the consent of the applicant, continue with the flight test until the remaining events are completed. Usually, graduates of approved training programs are well prepared. Although a single event is failed, retraining and retesting in all events of the flight test is normally unnecessary. In such cases, it is usually better for the inspector or examiner to continue with the flight test to complete the other events. When the inspector or examiner determines that the entire flight test must be repeated, the flight test should not be continued but should be immediately terminated. Whether the flight test is continued or not after a failure, the inspector or examiner must issue the applicant an FAA Form 8060‑5, Notice of Disapproval of Application. Safety pilots should immediately terminate any maneuver or an entire flight test whenever flight safety is in question.

H.    Inconclusive Events. When the inspector or examiner is unable to determine whether the objectives of an event have been met, the inspector or examiner may require the applicant to repeat the event or a portion of the event. This provision has been made in the interest of fairness and does not mean that instruction or practice is permitted during the certification process. Inspectors and examiners should not repeat completed, failed maneuvers.

Note:   If the check must be terminated (for mechanical or other reasons) and there are events which still need to be repeated, a Letter of Discontinuance, valid for 60 days, should be issued listing the specific areas of operation that have been successfully completed (see Figure 5‑7).

Figure 5-1, FAA Form 8710‑1, Airman Certificate and/or Rating Application

Sample completed FAA Form 8710-1, Airman Certificate and/or Rating Application, front side.

Figure 5-2, FAA Form 8710‑1, Airman Certificate and/or Rating Application

Blank FAA Form 8710-1, Airman Certificate and/or Rating Application, front side.

Blank FAA Form 8710-1, Airman Certificate and/or Rating Application, reverse side.

Figure 5-3, FAA Form 8400‑3, Application for Airman Certificate and/or Rating

Blank FAA Form 8400-3, Application for an Airman Certificate and/or Rating, front side.

Blank FAA Form 8400-3, Application for Airman Certificate and/or Rating, reverse side.

Figure 5-4, FAA Form 8060‑4, Temporary Airman Certificate

Blank FAA Form 8060-4, Temporary Airman Certificate

Figure 5-5, Pilot Certificate Aircraft Type Designations—Airplanes

Page 1 of Pilot Certificate Aircraft Type Designations for Airplanes (shows manufacturer, model designation, prior designation, and current designation).

Page 2 of Pilot Certificate Aircraft Type Designations for Airplanes (shows manufacturer, model designation, prior designation, and current designation).

Page 3 of Pilot Certificate Aircraft Type Designations for Airplanes (shows manufacturer, model designation, prior designation, and current designation).

Page 4 of Pilot Certificate Aircraft Type Designations for Airplanes (shows manufacturer, model designation, prior designation, and current designation).

Page 5 of Pilot Certificate Aircraft Type Designations for Airplanes (shows manufacturer, model designation, prior designation, and current designation).

Figure 5-6, Pilot Certificate Aircraft Type Designations—Rotorcraft

Page 1 of Pilot Certificate Aircraft Type Designations for Rotorcraft (shows manufacturer, model designation, prior designation, and current designation).

Page 2 of Pilot Certificate Aircraft Type Designations for Rotorcraft (shows manufacturer, model designation, prior designation, and current designation).

Page 3 of Pilot Certificate Aircraft Type Designations for Rotorcraft (shows manufacturer, model designation, prior designation, and current designation).

Page 4 of Pilot Certificate Aircraft Type Designations for Rotorcraft (shows manufacturer, model designation, prior designation, and current designation).

Sample Letter of Discontinuance

FAA Letterhead

[date]

[applicant’s name and address]

Dear [applicant’s name]:

On this date, you successfully completed the oral portion of the practical test for a [indicate grade] certificate with an [indicate category] and [indicate class] class rating. The practical test was discontinued because of [indicate reason].

If application is made by [indicate date 60 days from date of letter], this letter may be used to show the following portions of the practical test which have been completed satisfactorily:

[Indicate areas of operation completed on the test.]

After [indicate expiration date], you must repeat the entire practical test.

Sincerely,

[signature of inspector conducting practical test of examiner candidate]

RESERVED. Paragraphs 5‑58 through 5‑75.

 


7/22/08                                                                                                                         8900.1 CHG 0

Volume 5  airman certification

chapter 2  Title 14 CFR PART 61 CERTIFICATION OF PILOTS AND FLIGHT INSTRUCTORS

Section 19  Conduct a Pilot Type Rating Certification

5-726           PROGRAM TRACKING AND REPORTING SUBSYSTEM (PTRS) ACTIVITY CODES.

A.     Oral: 1514.

B.     Simulator: 1515.

C.     Aircraft: 1516.

5-727      OBJECTIVE. This task provides background and policy information to enable the aviation safety inspector (ASI) (Operations) to determine if an applicant is eligible to receive an initial or additional type rating for a private, commercial, or airline transport pilot (ATP) certificate under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 61. Successful completion of this task results in the issuance of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Form 8060‑4, Temporary Airman Certificate (with a type rating), FAA Form 8060‑5, Notice of Disapproval of Application, or a letter of discontinuance.

5-728      GENERAL. An aircraft type rating may be added to a private pilot, commercial pilot, or Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate. However, type rating practical tests are conducted to a single standard for all certificate levels. Regardless of the grade of certificate held, an applicant must meet the standards for a type rating in the ATP and/or type rating practical test standards (PTS). All type ratings within category and class held on a superseded certificate are carried forward to the new certificate level without further testing. For military pilots applying under the provisions of part 61, § 61.73, a type rating may be upgraded to the ATP level. Type ratings limited to visual flight rules (VFR) also may be upgraded to the ATP level without further testing. A type rating for a single‑place (single pilot station) airplane may not be upgraded to the ATP level.

A.     Flight Instructor Recommendation. For an applicant applying for a type rating only, the Instructor’s Recommendation section of FAA Form 8710‑1, Airman Certificate and/or Rating Application, does not need to be signed unless the applicant is retesting due to a previously failed practical test for the rating.

1)      If the applicant is applying for a type rating to be added to an ATP certificate or for the original issuance of an ATP certificate in an airplane requiring a type rating, the applicant must have an endorsement in the applicant’s logbook or training records, from an authorized instructor, certifying satisfactory completion of the training required by the appropriate provisions of part 61, subpart G.
2)      If the applicant is applying for a type rating to be placed on a private or commercial pilot certificate, the airman must have an endorsement in the airman’s logbook or training records, from an authorized instructor, certifying satisfactory completion of the training required by part 61, § 61.63.

B.     Evaluator’s Record. The Evaluator’s Record for Airline Transport Certificate/Rating Only section of FAA Form 8710‑1 must be signed on the appropriate lines, even if the type rating practical test is conducted for the holder of a private or commercial pilot certificate.

C.     Aircraft Undergoing Certification. For type ratings in aircraft that are undergoing type certification and which have not been issued a type designation, refer to Volume 5, Chapter 9, Section 3, Issue a Letter of Authorization in Lieu of a Type Rating

D.    Medical Certificate. The requirements for a medical certificate for a practical test are addressed in § 61.23. An applicant is not required to hold a medical certificate if the practical test is given in a flight simulator or flight training device.

E.     Type Rating Limited to VFR. A type rating bearing the limitation “VFR ONLY” may be added to an existing pilot certificate under the provisions of §§ 61.63(d)(5) and 61.157(b)(3). However, this option is available only for those aircraft, such as certain types of vintage airplanes, which require a pilot type rating, and are not capable of demonstrating instrument procedures because of the aircraft’s type certificate (TC). This paragraph applies to type ratings being added to an ATP certificate only. There is no provision for taking an initial practical test for an existing pilot certificate in an airplane that would require a VFR limitation.

F.      Amphibian Aircraft. An amphibian type rating must bear the limitation “LIMITED TO LAND” or “LIMITED TO SEA” as appropriate, unless the applicant demonstrates proficiency in both land and sea operations

5-729      PILOT TYPE RATING THAT MAY BE PERFORMED AS EITHER A SINGLE PILOT OR WITH A SECOND IN COMMAND (SIC). Practical tests for pilot type ratings may be performed as either a single pilot or with an SIC in accordance with part 61, § 61.43(b).

A.     General. This policy guidance shows how to record whether the pilot type rating practical test was performed as a single pilot or by using an SIC crewmember.

1)      In a previous version of this order, the FAA had established policy that clarified the intent of 14 CFR part 91, § 91.531(a) and (b) for allowing practical tests for some pilot type ratings to be performed as either a single pilot or with an SIC.
2)      This policy addresses performing pilot type rating practical tests as a single‑pilot crew composition or with an SIC pilot crewmember in:

·        Large airplanes that were certificated under Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 41 where the airplane’s TC authorizes single pilot operations. Although SFAR 41 expired on September 13, 1983, many of the large airplanes that were certificated under SFAR 41 are still in active service (i.e., per § 91.531(a)(1)).

·        Turbojet airplanes where the airplane’s TC or airplane flight manual (AFM) allows for both single‑pilot and two pilot operations (i.e., per § 91.531(a)(2) and (b)).

·        Commuter category airplanes that have a passenger seating configuration, excluding pilot seats, of nine seats or fewer where the airplane’s TC authorized single‑pilot operations (i.e., per § 91.531(a)(3)).

·        Situations where the FAA may issue a letter of authorization (LOA) for authorizing single‑pilot operations if that airplane is designed for and TCd with only one pilot station (i.e., per § 91.531(b)).

·        Situations where the FAA has issued grants of exemption from part 91, §§ 91.9(a) and 91.531(a)(1) (2) to some training providers that give single‑pilot training.

3)      The following are some makes and models of airplanes where applicants may perform the pilot type rating practical test as either a single pilot or with an SIC. In the future, this list of airplanes may expand when more turbojet airplanes (that are commonly referred to as very light jets) receive certification with both single‑pilot and two‑pilot crew compliments.

·        Cessna 501.

·        Cessna 525.

·        Cessna 551.

·        Raytheon 390.

·        Beech 300 airplanes that were certificated under SFAR 41.

·        Beech 1900 and Beech 1900C airplanes that were certificated under SFAR 41;

·        Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica EMB 110 airplanes that were certificated under SFAR 41.

·        Beech 2000.

·        Swearingen Fairchild Aircraft Corporation SA‑227‑CC and SA‑227‑DC airplanes, certificated in the commuter category.

·        Certain large airplanes that were certificated under SFAR 41, if the airplane’s TC authorizes single‑pilot operations.

·        Certain turbojet airplanes, if the airplane’s TC authorizes single‑pilot operations.

·        Certain commuter category airplanes if the airplane’s TC authorizes single‑pilot operations.

4)      If an applicant obtains a pilot type rating by accomplishing one of these approved single‑pilot training programs and a pilot type rating practical test, that applicant will be issued an LOA for single‑pilot operations by the training provider. Currently, the training providers that hold this kind of grant of exemption and the airplanes authorized under their grant of exemption are:

·        Cessna Aircraft Company for its Cessna 550, Cessna S550, Cessna 552, and Cessna 560.

·        Beech B300, B300C, and 1900D certificated under commuter category.

·        Sierra Industries, Inc. for the Cessna 500 series airplanes, serial Nos. 0001 through 0349 only; those are equipped with STC No. SA8176SW or STC No. SA09377SC and either STC No. SA2172NM or STC No. SA645NW.

·        M. Shannon and Associates for the Cessna 500, Cessna 550, and Cessna S550.

·        Pan Am International Flight Academy for the Cessna 550, Cessna S550, Cessna 552, and Cessna 560.

5)      When the airplane’s TC data sheet (TCDS) or AFM specifically requires the crew composition to be a single pilot, an applicant for that pilot type rating must perform the practical test as a single pilot. The applicant must be tested on all of the applicable PTS areas of operation and tasks as a single pilot. This requires the pilot to demonstrate, without assistance, the required PTS areas of operation and tasks as a single pilot.
6)      Where the FAA has provided for a crew composition with either a single‑pilot crew or an SIC, the applicant may elect to perform the practical test as a single pilot or with an SIC. The FAA has several ways of noting whether the practical test was performed as a single pilot or with an SIC. This provision is provided for in accordance with §§ 61.43(b) and 91.531(b).
7)      Questions about what aircraft are permitted to be operated with either of these pilot compositions may be directed to the FAA’s General Aviation and Commercial Division, AFS‑800, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, (202) 267‑8212.

B.     Recording Procedures for Authorizing Single Pilot Operations or Requiring the SIC Limitation on the Applicant’s Pilot Certificate and Logbook.

1)      An applicant who satisfactorily accomplishes the practical test as a single pilot: the ASI (Operations) will issue the applicant the appropriate pilot type rating on the temporary airman certificate, and will record the results of the practical test in the applicant’s logbook as: “[DATE] I certify that [Name of applicant, certificate level and number] satisfactorily accomplished the [the pilot type rating] practical test as a single pilot in a [make and model of aircraft].”
Example of an endorsement for recording the results of the practical test as a single pilot in the applicant’s logbook:
2/14/2008‑ I certify that Dean Chamberlain, ATP Certificate No. 1111111 satisfactorily accomplished the CE‑525 pilot type rating practical test as a single pilot in a Cessna 525.
Christine Clark, ASI, WP FSDO No. 7
2)      An applicant who satisfactorily accomplishes the practical test with an SIC crewmember: the ASI (Operations) will issue the applicant the appropriate pilot type rating on the pilot’s temporary airman certificate with the limitation “[make and model of aircraft] Second in Command Required” and will record the results of the practical test in the applicant’s logbook as: “[DATE] I certify that [Name of applicant, certificate level and number] satisfactorily accomplished the [the pilot type rating] practical test in a [make and model of aircraft] with an SIC pilot crewmember.”
Example of an endorsement for recording the results of the practical test with an SIC pilot crewmember in the applicant’s logbook:
2/14/2008‑ I certify that Dean Chamberlain, ATP Certificate No. 1111111 satisfactorily accomplished the CE‑525 pilot type rating practical test in a Cessna 525 with a SIC pilot crewmember.
Christine Clark, ASI, WP FSDO No. 7

Figure 5‑85, Sample FAA Form 8060‑4, Temporary Airman Certificate—Pilot Type Rating with the SIC limitation (this example is for the CE-525 pilot type rating with the SIC limitation)

C.     Removal of the “Second‑in‑Command Required” Limitation from a Pilot Type Rating on the Pilot Certificate. To remove the limitation, it is not necessary to complete the entire practical test as a single pilot.

1)      All areas of operations/tasks approved for a flight simulator may be accomplished in that flight simulator for the purpose of removing the “Second‑in‑Command Required” limitation. However, this does not change any flight simulator requirements for the original issuance of the pilot type rating.
2)      Satisfactory completion of an approved single‑pilot training program and an end‑of‑course test of that program meet the requirements for removal of the “Second in Command Required” limitation.
3)      Areas of operation include the following:

·        Preflight preparation tasks: none;

·        Preflight procedures tasks: all;

·        Takeoff and departure phase tasks: all;

·        In‑flight maneuvers tasks: c, e, f;

·        Instrument procedures tasks: all;

·        Landings and approaches to landing tasks: all;

·        Normal and abnormal procedures;

·        Emergency procedures; and

·        Postflight procedures tasks: all.

4)      Additional areas include:

·        Collision avoidance;

·        Communication management; and

·        Instrument flight rules (IFR) cross‑country flight plan avionics loading.

5-730      BEECH MODEL 200 HEAVY AIRCRAFT. By letter of August 5, 1994, to the Small Aircraft Directorate, ACE‑100, Kansas City, Missouri, the Department of the Army, Headquarters, United States Army Aviation Center, Fort Rucker, Alabama, requested that aircraft type rating data applicable to Beech Model 200 aircraft eligible to be operated at more than 12,500 pounds gross weight, be amended as necessary to include all currently eligible aircraft. Accordingly, a consolidated list of all Beech Model 200 and derivative military aircraft eligible to be operated at more than 12,500 pounds gross weight is provided in Figure 5‑92.

5-731      PREREQUISITES AND COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS.

A.     Prerequisites. This task requires knowledge of the part 61 rules and FAA policies, and qualification as an ASI (Operations). . In addition, the ASI (Operations) should have completed the appropriate initial pilot type rating course or be considered “best qualified” by the regional office. The ASI (Operations) must have completed an initial or recurrent pilot type rating course within the previous 12 months or hold an LOA or waiver authorizing that ASI (Operations) to conduct the practical test.

B.     Coordination. This task requires coordination with the airworthiness unit and with the airmen records section of the Airmen Certification Branch, AFS‑760.

5-732      REFERENCES, FORMS, AND JOB AIDS.

A.     References (current editions):

·        Title 14 CFR parts 1, 61, 91, 141, and 187 (appendix A, Fees);

·        PTRS Procedures Manual (PPM);

·        FAA‑S‑8081‑5, Airline Transport Pilot and Type Rating Practical Test Standards;

·        FAA‑S‑8081‑12, Commercial Pilot Practical Test Standards, if applicable; and

·        FAA‑S‑8081‑14, Private Pilot Practical Test Standards, if applicable.

B.     Forms:

·        FAA Form 8060‑4, Temporary Airman Certificate (Figure 5‑91);

·        FAA Form 8060‑5, Notice of Disapproval of Application (Figure 5‑87); and

·        FAA Form 8710‑1, Airman Certificate and/or Rating Application.

C.     Job Aids. Sample figures.

5-733      PROCEDURES.

A.     Schedule Appointment. Advise the applicant to bring the following documents to the appointment:

·        A properly completed FAA Form 8710‑1;

·        A private, commercial, or ATP certificate;

·        An appropriate class of medical certificate Statement of Demonstrated Ability (SODA), if applicable;

·        A knowledge test report, if applicable;

·        An FAA‑approved pilot school graduation certificate, if applicable;

·        Personal logbook or other records substantiating the flight experience shown on the application form;

·        The aircraft maintenance records;

·        The aircraft airworthiness certificate;

·        The aircraft registration;

·        The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) aircraft station license, if applicable; and

·        An acceptable form of photo identification.

B.     Applicant Arrives for Appointment.

1)      Collect and review the documents listed above.
2)      Open PTRS file.

C.     Review Application. Verify that the information on the application (FAA Form 8710‑1) is presented accurately and completely.

1)      In section I, ensure that the applicant has checked “Additional Aircraft Rating” and “Private,” “Commercial,” or “ATP,” as appropriate. Ensure that the applicant has checked any other applicable boxes.
2)      Ensure that the remainder of the application is completed in accordance with the instructions attached to the form and the information in Volume 5, Chapter 1, Section 3, Phases of Certification.
3)      If the applicant is applying for a private or commercial pilot certificate in conjunction with the type rating, ensure that the flight instructor has signed an endorsement no more than 60 days before the application was submitted.
4)      In section III of the application, Record of Pilot Time, the applicant must list at least the aeronautical experience required for the airman certificate and rating sought. Graduates of 14 CFR part 141 pilot schools or part 142 training centers must provide their aeronautical experience in section III on the application even though the graduation certificate is evidence of having completed the course of training. If aeronautical experience has no bearing on the airman certification action being sought, it is not necessary for an applicant to complete section III. Flight instructor renewal applications, flight instructor reinstatement applications, ground instructor qualification applications, and pilot type rating applications would be examples where aeronautical experience would not have a bearing on the airman certification action and thus the applicant would not be required to complete section III. However, all applicants are encouraged to complete section III because FAA Form 8710‑1 remains on file with the FAA and can be used to substantiate past aeronautical experience if a person were to ever lose his or her logbook.

D.    Verify Applicant’s Identity. Inspect acceptable forms of identification to establish the applicant’s identity (see volume 5, chapter 1, section 3). Compare the identification with the personal information provided on FAA Form 8710‑1.

1)      If the applicant’s identity can be verified, proceed with the practical test.
2)      If the applicant’s identity cannot be verified because of lack of identification or inadequate identification, explain what types of identification are acceptable. Advise the applicant to return with appropriate identification to reapply.
3)      If the applicant’s identity appears to be different from the information supplied on FAA Form 8710‑1, or it appears that an attempt at falsification has been made, do not continue this task. (See Volume 7, Chapter 6, Conduct an Investigation of FAA Flight Operations to Determine Compliance.)

E.     Establish Eligibility. Determine if the applicant meets the type rating requirements of § 61.63(d)(1) through (7), as appropriate.

1)      If the applicant is upgrading a pilot certificate, ensure that the applicant meets the general eligibility, aeronautical knowledge, aeronautical experience, and flight proficiency requirements for the grade of certificate sought.
2)      Verify that the applicant holds an airman medical certificate appropriate to the certificate/rating sought.
3)      Inspect the medical certificate to ensure that it does not bear any limitation that would make a special medical flight test necessary. (See volume 5, chapter 8, Conduct a Special Medical Test—Title 14 CFR Part 67.)
4)      Check the record of flight time in section III of the application to determine if the applicant has the minimum flight experience required for the type rating/grade of pilot certificate sought.
5)      If the applicant is applying for a test based on graduation from an approved pilot school, inspect the applicant’s graduation certificate to verify that the applicant meets the requirements of § 61.71.
6)      Examine the applicant’s logbook and/or other reliable record(s) to verify that all aeronautical knowledge, aeronautical experience, and the required instructor endorsements for ground and flight training are recorded.
7)      If the applicant is upgrading a certificate or concurrently obtaining an instrument rating, examine the knowledge test report or test report from an approved school with knowledge test authority, as applicable.
8)      If the applicant has checked the “Yes” box of section IV of the application, verify that the applicant meets the requirements of § 61.49.
9)      Several questions have been raised concerning the standards and the testing to determine whether an applicant can read, speak, write, and understand the English language. While there are no practical test standards established to ascertain the applicant’s English language ability, the following examples may be used as guidelines in this evaluation:
a)      An ASI (Operations) may ask the applicant to listen to a tape recording of an air traffic control clearance or instructions, and then ask the applicant to speak and explain the clearance or instructions back to the ASI (Operations) in the English language.
b)      An applicant may be asked to write down in English the meaning of an air traffic control clearance, instructions, or a weather report, then asked to speak and explain the clearance, instructions, or weather report back to the ASI (Operations) in the English language.
10)  The intent is not to require the applicant to read, speak, write, and understand the English language at college level standards. A common sense approach should be used in evaluating an applicant for this requirement (reference § 61.153(b)).

F.      Aircraft Requirements. Review, or arrange for an ASI (Airworthiness) to review, the applicant's aircraft maintenance records, logbooks, airworthiness certificate, and aircraft registration to determine if the aircraft is airworthy and suitable for this practical test. Ensure that a type rating exists for the aircraft and determine if the aircraft is certificated under SFAR 41 for single‑pilot operation. After review, return the documents to the applicant.

G.    Discrepancies. If a discrepancy that cannot be immediately corrected exists in any of the documents, return the application and all submitted documents to the applicant. Inform the applicant of the reasons for ineligibility, and explain how the applicant may correct the discrepancies.

H.    Conduct Practical Test. After determining the applicant is eligible and meets all prerequisites for the type rating/certificate sought, accept the application and conduct the practical test. A preflight briefing must be conducted before the practical test. (Refer to Volume 5, Chapter 1, Section 4, Considerations for the Practical Test.)

1)      Use the procedures and maneuvers outlined in the ATP and/or Type Rating PTS for the category of aircraft for which a type rating is sought.
2)      The ASI (Operations) may give an applicant who is retesting credit for those areas of operation successfully completed on the previous practical test, provided the test was conducted within 60 days before the retest. If the previous test was conducted more than 60 days before the retest, the applicant must be tested in all areas.
3)      When conducting type rating practical tests in turbojet airplanes for which a single pilot is authorized, ensure that the single‑pilot applicant satisfactorily performs all pilot duties without assistance.
4)      Require applicants for type ratings on aircraft not listed in Figure 5‑88 or 5‑89 to present evidence that at least one aircraft of the type concerned has been issued a U.S. TC in accordance with part 21, § 21.175 (as a standard airworthiness certificate or a Special Airworthiness Certificate).
5)      The aircraft, if type‑certificated under § 21.175(b), will not be operated for any purpose other than the purpose for which the Special Airworthiness Certificate was issued.

I.       Discontinuance. If the practical test is not completed for reasons other than unsatisfactory performance, issue the applicant a letter of discontinuance (see Figure 5‑90).

1)      Return the application and all other submitted documents to the applicant.
2)      Close PTRS.

J.      Unsatisfactory Performance. If the applicant did not meet the applicable standards for the certificate sought, inform the applicant of the reasons for the unsatisfactory performance.

1)      Prepare FAA Form 8060‑5 in duplicate as per Volume 5, Chapter 1, Section 6, Issuance of Notices of Disapproval of Application. An example of a correctly completed form is found in Figure 5‑87. In addition to those instructions:
a)      Record areas of operation that were unsatisfactory or not completed. If specific procedures and flight maneuvers need to be repeated, record them on the form.
b)      Indicate the number of the applicant’s practical test failures for this certificate or rating.
2)      Sign, date, and check the appropriate boxes on the form. Give the applicant a copy of the Notice of Disapproval of Application and retain the original for the certification file.
3)      Retain the FAA Form 8710‑1 and return all other submitted documents to the applicant.

K.    Satisfactory Performance. When the applicant has satisfactorily met all requirements for the type rating/certificate sought, prepare FAA Form 8060‑4, Temporary Airman Certificate (see Figure 5‑91), in accordance with the guidance in Volume 5, Chapter 1, Section 5, Issuance of Temporary Certificates.

1)      Use Figure 5‑88 or 5‑89, as appropriate, for guidance on how to enter the type rating on FAA Form 8060‑4.
2)      Enter all previous category, class, and type ratings, including any limitations held by the applicant.
3)      Enter the type rating under the appropriate airman certificate privileges.
4)      Enter any required operating limitations such as “CV‑PBY5 LIMITED TO SEA” or “N‑B25 VFR ONLY.”
5)      For type ratings issued for SFAR 41 or commuter category aircraft when single‑pilot competency was not demonstrated, enter the limitation “[insert appropriate aircraft type] SECOND‑IN‑COMMAND REQUIRED.”
6)      Verify all information on the form is correct. Sign the certificate and direct the airman to sign line VII of the form.
7)      Retain the original for the file and give the applicant the copy of the temporary certificate.
8)      If the pilot certificate is issued in a foreign country, see § 61.13(a) and part 187, appendix A.

L.     Complete the Certification File. Complete the certification file and return to the applicant all submitted documents not forwarded to AFS‑760.

M.  PTRS. Complete PTRS in accordance with the PPM.

5-734      TASK OUTCOMES. Completion of this task results in the issuance of one of the following:

·        Temporary airman certificate;

·        Notice of disapproval of application; or

·        Letter of discontinuance.

5-735      FUTURE ACTIVITIES.

A.     Applicant may return for another type rating.

B.     Applicant may return for an upgraded certificate.

Figure 5‑87, Sample FAA Form 8060‑5, Notice of Disapproval of Application for Aircraft Type Rating

Sample completed FAA Form 8060-5, Notice of Disapproval of Application, for aircraft type rating.

Figures 5-88 and 5-89

The pilot type rating designations have been moved to the Web site at: http://162.58.35.241/e.gov/airmen/Type_Rating_Table.pdf. This Web site is maintained by the FAA Airmen Registry, AFS-760.

Figure 5-90, Letter of Discontinuance

FAA letterhead

[date]

[applicant’s name and address]

Dear [applicant’s name]:

On this date you successfully completed the oral portion of the practical test for a [grade] certificate with a [category] category and [class] class rating. The practical test was discontinued because of [reason].

If application is made by [date 60 days from date of letter], this letter may be used to show that the following portions of the practical test have been completed satisfactorily.

[Pilot operations completed on the test]

After [expiration date] you must repeat the entire practical test. This letter does not extend the expiration date as shown on the knowledge test results, medical certificate, or required endorsements.

Sincerely,

[signature of the Aviation Safety Inspector (Operations) conducting practical test]

Figure 5‑91, FAA Form 8060‑4, Temporary Airman Certificate—Type Rating

Sample completed FAA Form 8060-4, Temporary Airman Certificate, for type rating.

Figure 5‑92, Beech Model 200 and Military RC/FWC(Heavy Aircraft)

The following list identifies all current Beech Model 200 and Military RC/FWC (Heavy Aircraft) by either model and serial number, or by model, serial number, and Army Tail number for which a type rating is authorized. The maximum gross weight of these aircraft exceeds 12,500 pounds.

The BE‑200 pilot type rating designation may be placed on the pilot certificate of airmen who successfully complete the appropriate practical examination in the listed aircraft or who can provide documentary evidence of eligibility under applicable provisions of § 61.73 based on flight experience in one of the model number/serial number aircraft listed below.

COMMERCIAL AIRPLANES

MODEL NUMBER

SERIAL NUMBER

B200

BB‑1114, BB‑1204, BB‑1205, BB‑1206, BB‑1314, BB‑1315, BB‑1434, BB‑1436, BB1441, BB‑1443

B200CT

BN‑1, BN‑2, BN‑3, BN‑4

B200C

BL‑65, BL‑128, BL‑130

200T

BT‑1, BT‑2, BT‑3, BT‑4, BT‑5, BT‑6, BT‑7, BT‑8, BT‑9, BT‑10, BT‑11, BT‑12, BT‑13, BT‑14, BT‑15, BT‑16, BT‑17, BT‑18, BT‑19, BT‑20, BT‑21, BT‑22, BT‑28

B200T

BT‑23, BT‑24, BT‑25, BT‑26, BT‑27, BT‑29, BT‑30, BT‑31, BT‑32, BT‑33, BT‑34, BT‑35, BT‑36, BT‑37, BT‑38

MILITARY AIRPLANES

MODEL NUMBER

SERIAL NUMBER

RC‑12D

GR‑1 thru GR‑13 (Army Tail #’s 80‑233778, 78‑23144, 78‑23145, 80‑23373, 80‑23374, 78‑23141, 80‑23371, 78‑23142, 78‑23143, 80‑23376, 80‑23377, 80‑23542, 80‑23375)

RC‑12F

BU‑11, BU‑12, Supplement NAVAIR RC‑12 FFF‑1

RC‑12G

FC‑1, 2, 3 (Army Tail #’s 80‑23372, 80‑23379, 80‑23380)

RC‑12H

GR‑1114 thru GR‑19 (Army Tail #’s 83‑24313 thru 83‑24319)

PWC‑12D

BP‑7 thru BP‑11

RC‑12K and RC‑12N

FE‑1 thru FE24* (Army Tail #’s 85‑0149 thru 85‑0155, 88‑0325 thru 88‑0327, 89‑0268 thru 89‑0276, 91‑0516, 91‑0517) *Army designated FE‑10 thru FE‑24 as RC‑12N’s

RC‑12P

FE‑25 and after

The following policy will be made applicable to the issuance of BE‑200 pilot type ratings for Beech Model 200 aircraft authorized to be operated at weights above 12,500 pounds gross weight: Pilots of the United States Armed Forces who provide acceptable documentary evidence of eligibility under applicable provisions of 14 CFR part 61, § 61.73, may be issued a BE‑200 type rating provided that:

In addition to the documentary evidence of eligibility required under § 61.73, the pilot applicant is able to present an FAA‑approved Flight Manual Supplement or military flight manual (i.e., Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) Flight Manual, USAF‑1, or other acceptable military document) authorizing operations at weights above 12,500 pounds.

The applicant’s qualifying flight experience was acquired in a Beech Model 200 aircraft that is eligible for operation at weights above 12,500 pounds gross weight, according to the Kansas City AEG (MKC/AEG).

RESERVED. Paragraphs 5‑736 through 5‑750.


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Volume 10  AIR TRANSPORTATION OVERSIGHT SYSTEM

CHAPTER 1 GENERAL

Section 1  Air Transportation Oversight System Doctrine

10-1               PURPOSE. This section explains the underlying policy, concepts, and principles for the Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS).

10-2          STATUTORY AUTHORITY. Title 49 of the United States Code (49 U.S.C.) and Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) provide the statutory and regulatory authority for ATOS, respectively. Title 49 U.S.C. is broad in scope and contains the codified provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, which prescribes the powers and authorities of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Title 14 CFR is prescriptive in nature and contains the specific requirements to obtain an air carrier operating certificate and standards for conducting related operations. ATOS is not a separate safety standard and does not impose additional requirements on air carriers. ATOS imposes only requirements that are either explicit or implicit in the statute or the regulations. ATOS provides FAA inspectors with standardized protocols to evaluate air carrier programs required by regulations to be approved or accepted by the Administrator. The following requirements in 49 U.S.C. subtitle VII, Chapter 447, Safety Regulation, are particularly pertinent to ATOS.

A.     Title 49, Section 44702. Issuance of Certificates. “When issuing a certificate under this part, the Administrator shall consider the duty of an air carrier to provide service with the highest possible degree of safety in the public interest….”

B.     Title 49, Section 44705. Air Carrier Operating Certificates. “The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall issue an air carrier operating certificate to a person desiring to operate as an air carrier when the Administrator finds, after investigation, that the person properly and adequately is equipped and able to operate safely under this part and regulations and standards prescribed under this part.”

10-3          POLICY STATEMENT OF THE FAA AS IT PERTAINS TO PROMOTING AVIATION SAFETY FOR AIR CARRIERS. ATOS is based on the explicit policy of the FAA, which states: “The FAA will pursue a regulatory policy, which recognizes the obligation of the air carrier to maintain the highest possible degree of safety.” ATOS implements FAA policy by providing safety controls (i.e., regulations and their application) of business organizations and individuals that fall under FAA regulations. Under ATOS, FAA’s primary responsibilities are: (1) to verify that an air carrier is capable of operating safely and complies with the regulations and standards prescribed by the Administrator before issuing an air carrier operating certificate and before approving or accepting air carrier programs; (2) to re‑verify that an air carrier continues to meet regulatory requirements when environmental changes occur by conducting periodic reviews; and (3) to continually validate the performance of an air carrier’s approved and accepted programs for the purpose of continued operational safety.

10-4          ATOS CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES. ATOS relies on the following concepts and principles:

A.     Definitions of Safety and Risk. Safety is the state in which the risk of harm to people or property damage is reduced to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing process of hazard identification and risk management. In this context, an air carrier’s duty to provide service with the highest degree of safety in the public interest means that the air carrier must identify hazards in its operating environment and manage associated risks. Similarly, an air carrier’s ability to manage risk is an important part of the FAA’s determination to ensure that that the air carrier is equipped to operate safely under 49 U.S.C. and the regulations and standards prescribed by 49 U.S.C.

B.     System Safety. Properly designed systems control hazards by eliminating or mitigating associated risks before they result in accidents or incidents. In an operational context, air carriers fulfill their duties to provide service with the highest degree of safety in the public interest by designing their operating systems to manage hazard‑related risks in their operating environments. These concepts are fundamental to ATOS.

C.     Safety Attributes. The key to safety lies in managing the quality of safety‑critical processes. This is a primary responsibility of an air carrier in meeting its regulatory obligations. ATOS employs six safety attributes to evaluate the design of air carrier operating systems:

1)      Procedures—Documented methods to accomplish a process.
2)      Controls—Checks and restraints designed into a process to ensure a desired result.
3)      Process Measures—Used to validate a process and identify problems or potential problems in order to correct them.
4)      Interfaces—Interactions between processes that must be managed in order to ensure desired outcomes.
5)      Responsibility—A clearly identifiable, qualified, and knowledgeable person who is accountable for the quality of a process.
6)      Authority—A clearly identifiable, qualified, and knowledgeable person who has the authority to set up and change a process.

The attributes are not standards in and of themselves, but provide a structure for the tools used to collect data for principal inspectors so that they can make informed judgments about the design of an air carrier’s operating systems (1) before approving or accepting them when required to do so by the regulations, and (2) during recurring assessments for continued operational safety.

D.    Focus on an Air Carrier’s Organization and Processes. In addition to issuing certificates, monitoring compliance, investigating noncompliance, and administering sanctions for noncompliance, FAA oversight must also focus on an air carrier’s organization and process management. Outputs and outcomes are still monitored, but the emphasis is on maintaining a safe process or correcting deficiencies. Performance assessments must supply objective evidence of both the adequacy and inadequacy of processes.

E.     Open System Perspective. A successful open system adapts to the needs of the environment and its resources. Safe operation in the modern aviation environment requires constant adaptation. Air carriers are obligated to provide systems that defend against the hazards of their operating environments, including adapting to changes in the environment. Data Collection Tools (DCT) should provide information on current environmental risks and on the air carrier’s efforts to control them.

F.      Data Sharing. The FAA is responsible for reaching an independent assessment of an air carrier’s qualification to hold an operating certificate and its continuing ability to comply with regulations and standards. The FAA may accomplish its independent assessments using data provided by an air carrier or a third party. Data sharing and open communication optimize the function of the oversight system and leverage resources to advance safety.

G.    Primary Stakeholder and Beneficiary. The United States public is the primary stakeholder and beneficiary of ATOS. The FAA carries out its safety mission with due regard to its accountability to the public. The high level of safety required by statute is in the interest of the public. FAA employees involved in ATOS are responsible to determine on behalf of the public that air carriers can provide service with the highest possible degree of safety.

H.    Freedom of Information Act. Requests for records made under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) are processed in accordance with FAA, Department of Transportation and government wide directives and guidance. FAA Order 1270.1, FOIA Program, provides guidance that governs processing requests for FAA records under FOIA.

RESERVED. Paragraphs 10-5 through 10-19.


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Volume 10  Air Transportation Oversight System

Chapter 1  General

Section 2  Introduction to ATOS Business Process and Tools

10-20      Purpose. The Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS) improves the certification and surveillance processes for air carriers. It assesses the safety of air carrier operating systems using system safety principles, safety attributes, risk management, and structured system engineering practices.

10-21      Oversight System Model. ATOS exists in relation to the aviation system that an air carrier uses to produce its goods and services. The air carrier is the process owner of its aviation system, which is a production system in that it serves customers via products and services. The FAA is the process owner of the oversight system, which is a protection system. Protection systems are designed to protect customers from receiving inferior goods and services, and from potential harm of production activities. This includes potential harm from airplane accidents, occupational hazards, loss of equipment and other property, and damage to the environment. Safety and quality management systems are also protection systems. FAA and air carriers are the process owners of such complementary systems. The relationship between production and protection systems is a matter of exchanging information and exerting influence. Protection systems influence production systems by imposing controls. Figure 10‑1 shows this relationship at a high level.

Figure 10‑1, Oversight System Model—Level I

Figure 10-1. Oversight System Model Level 1

A.     Major Functions of ATOS. Three major functions further define the oversight system: design assessment, performance assessment, and risk management. The following Level II diagram shows these functions in a high-level model.

Figure 10‑2, Oversight System Model—Level II

Figure 10-2, Oversight System Model Level II

B.     Design Assessment. Design assessment is the ATOS function that ensures an air carrier’s operating systems comply with regulations and safety standards, including the requirement to provide service at the highest level of safety in the public interest. Design assessment is the most important function of ATOS because safety is the outcome of a properly designed system. Poor system design compromises safety risk management. ATOS certification processes ensure that an air carrier’s operating systems comply with the intent of the regulations. ATOS uses standardized, systematic certification processes to determine an air carrier’s qualification for an operating certificate. FAA uses similar processes to approve or accept a new or changed air carrier program. The tools used in the certification processes also re-verify that an air carrier is meeting regulatory requirements during periodic program reviews or when environmental changes occur.

C.     Performance Assessment. FAA inspectors conduct performance assessments to confirm that an air carrier’s operating systems produce intended results, including mitigation or control of hazards and associated risks. ATOS uses time‑based performance assessments to detect latent, systemic failures that may occur due to subtle environmental changes. Performance assessment schedules are also adjustable based on known risks or safety priorities. Surveillance provides information for performance assessments and risk management. In this context, surveillance is synonymous with auditing. ATOS audits use the same tools as certification processes.

D.    Risk Management. Risk management identifies and controls hazards and manages FAA resources according to risk-based priorities. This function is accomplished through systematic risk assessments of an air carrier’s performance and environment. Hazards are defined in terms of their potential consequences. The likelihood and severity of a consequence determines risk. ATOS assesses the combined effects of likelihood and severity to determine priority when multiple risks are identified. Subsequent risk management action plans contain strategies to transfer, eliminate, accept, or mitigate the risk. This process validates the intended results of an action plan to ensure that a hazard is effectively eliminated or controlled. ATOS uses a modified version of Nicholas J. Bahr’s System Safety Process Model for hazard identification and risk management (see Figure 10-4). ATOS is concerned with the hazards and associated risks that are subject to regulatory controls such as enforcement actions, certificate amendments, and rulemaking. Hazards that are identified as the responsibility of an air carrier are tracked in the ATOS Risk Management Process until the air carrier satisfactorily resolves them.

10-22      Business Process Modules. A Level III model of the oversight system further defines ATOS processes at a procedural level.

A.     There are eight business process modules in the design and performance functions. The application of each process may be somewhat different depending on whether conducting a design assessment or performance assessment, but the overall purpose of each module is as follows:

1)      Module 1—System Configuration. The System Configuration process assesses an air carrier’s or applicant’s request for a new or changed scope of operation to develop an oversight profile that contains all applicable elements.
2)      Module 2—Planning. Planning develops a risk‑based data collection plan for design and performance assessments.
3)      Module 3—Resource Management. Resource Management provides the resources, training, and funding to execute the data collection plan.
4)      Module 4—Data Collection. The Data Collection process collects the data requested in the data collection plan.
5)      Module 5—Data Reporting. The Data Reporting process transfers the collected data into the ATOS database.
6)      Module 6—Data Review. The Data Review process evaluates data in the ATOS database for compliance with the requirements in the data quality guidelines.
7)      Module 7—Analysis and Assessment. Analysis and Assessment makes a data‑based decision about whether to approve or accept or reject the design or performance of an air carrier’s or applicant’s programs.
8)      Module 8—Action Determination and Implementation. Action Determination and Implementation decides on and executes the appropriate course of action based on the decisions made during analysis and assessment.

B.     Flow Chart. The Level III model consists of cross-functional flowcharts for each of the business process modules. Cross‑functional flowcharts show responsibility for process steps using horizontal bands. Standard flowchart symbols used to depict ATOS processes include:

Figure 10‑3, Standard ATOS Business Process Flowchart Symbols

Figure 10-3. Standard ATOS Business Process Flowchart Symbols

10-23      Application of System Safety Concepts. The overall purpose of a system safety‑based approach like ATOS is to identify, eliminate, or control hazards, and mitigate the associated risk.

A.     Below is the AFS System Safety Process Model, a modified version of the Nicholas J. Bahr system safety process model.

Figure 10‑4, System Safety Process Model

Figure 10-4, System Safety Process Model

B.     Comparing the ATOS model to the System Safety Process Model demonstrates how ATOS is a system safety‑based approach to air carrier oversight.


Figure 10‑5, Comparison of the ATOS Business Process and the System Safety Process

System Safety Process Step

ATOS Business Process

Define Objectives and Describe System.

Define the acceptable levels of safety.

How does the system work and how do its components interact?

Module 1 System Configuration.

Regulations and policy define the acceptable level of safety. System description begins with the Air Carrier Oversight Profile.

Hazard Identification.

Where are the hazards in the system?

What can go wrong?

Modules 2–6.

Identify areas where conditions in the system or operating environment may be creating hazards. Plan, report, and review data collection in those areas.

Risk Analysis and Assessment.

Determine the potential consequences that could result if hazards are not addressed or corrected.

Module 7 Analysis and Assessment.

Analyze collected data to identify systemic hazards that should be addressed or corrected.

Decisionmaking.

What can be done to control the effects of the hazard and/or mitigate the associated levels of risk?

Module 8 Action Determination and Implementation. Take action to control the effects of the hazard and/or mitigate unacceptable levels of risk.

Validation of Controls.

Did the action work?

Module 8 Action Determination and Implementation. Determine if the action eliminated the hazard or lowered the level of risk to acceptable levels. If not, take additional action.

10-24      Air Carrier Systems, Subsystems, and Elements. ATOS uses a structured process to analyze how systems, subsystems, and elements interact. Seven air carrier systems form the basis for the ATOS system‑based approach. Each of these systems has a defined set of subsystems and elements. Elements are interrelated activities or actions completed to support air carrier subsystems and systems.

A.     The following are the seven air carrier systems:

1)      Aircraft Configuration Control. An air carrier maintains the physical condition of the aircraft and its components using this system.
2)      Manuals System. This system controls the information and instructions to define and govern the air carrier activities.
3)      Flight Operations. This system pertains to aircraft movement.
4)      Personnel Training and Qualifications. Air carriers use processes to make sure that their personnel are trained and qualified.
5)      Route Structures. An air carrier uses this system to maintain facilities on approved routes.
6)      Airman and Crewmember Flight, Rest, and Duty Time. This system prescribes time limitations for air carrier employees.
7)      Technical Administration. Air carriers use this system to address other aspects of certification and operation, such as key management personnel.

B.     Figures 10‑6 and 10‑7 at the end of this section identify each of the systems, subsystems, and elements (along with associated inspector specialties) used in planning and executing ATOS data collection.

10-25      ATOS Tools. ATOS standardizes the certification and surveillance processes. Its structured automation tools include:

A.     Air Carrier Configuration Checklist. The Air Carrier Configuration Checklist helps Certification Project Teams and Certificate Management Teams (CMT) to document the air carrier’s or applicant’s scope of operation including factors such as type of operations, aircraft, equipment and operations specifications. This information is used for automated filtering of the oversight profile.

B.     Air Carrier Oversight Profile. This profile is a tailored list of elements, Data Collection Tool (DCT) questions, and job task items that are based on the specific regulatory requirements that apply to the air carrier or applicant.

C.     The Air Carrier Assessment Tool (ACAT). This tool uses risk indicators to look for conditions that may be creating hazards in the air carrier’s systems. The results of the ACAT help to prioritize oversight activities.

D.    The Comprehensive Assessment Plan (CAP). This tool helps plan design assessments and performance assessments.

E.     Outsource Oversight Prioritization Tool (OPT). The OPT is used for planning surveillance of air carrier outsource providers. Principal avionics inspectors and principal maintenance inspectors must use this tool during oversight planning. It allows for prioritization of outsource maintenance providers to help determine specific data collection requirements. The OPT will assist the principal inspector, other assigned inspectors, supervisors, and managers in identifying areas of concern or criticality about outsource providers and target resources toward the highest risk outsource maintenance providers.

F.      Data Collection Tools (DCT). These ATOS tools support the assessments:

1)      Safety Attribute Inspection (SAI). Inspectors use the SAI questions to collect data for design assessment. Air carrier applicants use SAI DCTs during initial certification to document the results of their self audit.
2)      Element Performance Inspection (EPI). Inspectors use the EPI questions to collect data for performance assessment.
3)      Constructed Dynamic Observation Report (ConDOR). This tool is used for focused, special inspections.
4)      Dynamic Observation Report (DOR). This tool allows inspectors to record on-the-spot safety observations outside the planned oversight process.
5)      Assessment Determination and Implementation Tool. The principal inspector or certification program manager uses this tool to document the bottom‑line design or performance assessment and the appropriate course of action for implementation.
6)      Off-Hour Surveillance Decision Aid. The Certificate Management Office (CMO)/CMT Comprehensive Assessment Plan (CAP) must be capable of detecting deficiencies in air carrier performance no matter when the activity is conducted. Sufficient off-hour surveillance must occur to:
a)      Know what types and levels of activity are conducted during off hours.
b)      Understand how the air carrier is managing and supervising off-hour activities, especially the interface with outsource maintenance and other contracted activities.
c)      Determine if the air carrier’s processes and controls are sufficient to detect and correct any risks inherent with off-hour activities.
d)      Determine if the off-hour activities present a greater risk than activities done during normal FAA duty hours.
7)      Based on information gathered during surveillance, the CMO/CMT will be prepared to evaluate the air carriers’ ability to manage activities conducted during off-hour periods and address any identified risks.

10-26      ATOS Process Feedback and Continuous Improvement. ATOS uses a feedback loop to aid in its effectiveness. Inspectors should submit their concerns or recommendations using the Problem Reporting and Feedback feature in ATOS automation.


Figure 10‑6, ATOS System/Subsystem/Element Chart—Airworthiness Elements

1.0 Aircraft Configuration Control

2.0 Manuals

1.1 Aircraft

2.1 Manual Management

1.1.1

Aircraft Airworthiness

2.1.1

Manual Currency

1.1.2

Appropriate Operational Equipment

2.1.2

Content Consistency Across Manuals

1.1.3

Special Flight Permits

2.1.3

Distribution (Manuals)

1.2 Records and Reporting Systems

2.1.4

Availability (Manuals)

1.2.1

Airworthiness Release/Log Book Entry

2.1.5

Supplemental Operations Manual Requirements

1.2.2

Major Repairs and Alterations Records

 

 

1.2.3

Maintenance Log /Recording Requirements

4.0 Personnel Training and Qualifications

1.2.4

Mechanical Interruption Summary Reports

4.1 Maintenance Personnel Qualifications

1.2.5

Service Difficulty Reports

4.1.1

Required Inspection Item Personnel

1.2.6

Aircraft Listing

4.1.2

Maintenance Certificate Requirements

1.3 Maintenance Organization

4.2 Training Program

1.3.1

Maintenance Program

4.2.1

Maintenance Training Program

1.3.2

Inspection Program

4.2.2

Required Inspection Item Training Requirements

1.3.3

Maintenance Facility/Main Maintenance Base

4.2.12

Hazardous Materials Training

1.3.4

Required Inspection Items

4.4 Mechanics and Repairmen Certification

1.3.5

Minimum Equipment List/Configuration Deviation List/Deferred Maintenance

4.4.1

Recency of Experience

1.3.6

Airworthiness Directive Management

4.4.2

Display of Certificate

1.3.7

Outsource Organization

4.4.3

Privileges Airframe and Powerplant

1.3.8

Control of Calibrated Tools and Test Equipment

4.4.4

Privileges and Limitations for Repairmen

1.3.9

Engineering/Major Repairs and Alterations

5.0 Route Structures

1.3.10

Parts/Material Control/Suspected Unapproved Parts

5.1 Approved Routes and Areas

1.3.11

Continuous Analysis and Surveillance

5.1.1

Line Stations (Service & Maintenance)

1.3.12

Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 36

5.1.2

Weather Reporting/Supplemental Aviation Weather Reporting System

1.3.13

Designated Alteration Station

5.1.3

Non‑Federal Navigational Aids

1.3.14

General Maintenance Manual or Equivalent

5.1.4

Altimeter Setting Sources

1.3.15

Reliability Program

5.1.8

Extended Operations

1.3.16

Fueling

5.1.9

Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum

1.3.17

Weight and Balance Program

6.0 Airman and Crew Flight, Rest, and Duty Time

1.3.18

Deicing Program

6.2 Maintenance Personnel

1.3.19

Lower Landing Minimums

6.2.1

Maintenance Duty Time Limitations

1.3.20

Engine Condition Monitoring

7.0 Technical Administration

1.3.21

Parts Pooling

7.1 Key Personnel

1.3.22

Parts Borrowing

7.1.1

Director of Maintenance

1.3.23

Short‑Term Escalations

7.1.2

Chief Inspector

1.3.24

Coordinating Agencies for Suppliers Evaluation

7.1.3

Director of Safety

1.3.25

Cargo Handling Equipment, Systems and Appliances

7.1.6

Maintenance Control

Figure 10‑7, ATOS System/Subsystem/Element Chart—Operations and Cabin Safety Elements

1.0 Aircraft Configuration Control

4.0 Personnel Training and Qualifications

1.1 Aircraft

4.2 Training Program

1.1.2

Appropriate Operational Equipment

4.2.3

Training of Flight Crewmembers

 

 

4.2.4

Training of Flight Attendants

2.0 Manuals

4.2.5

Training of Dispatchers

2.1 Manual Management

4.2.6

Training of Station Personnel

2.1.1

Manual Currency

4.2.7

Training of Check Airman and Instructors

2.1.2

Content Consistency Across Manuals

4.2.8

Simulators/Training Devices

2.1.3

Distribution (Manuals)

4.2.9

Outsource Crewmember Training

2.1.4

Availability (Manuals)

4.2.10

Aircrew Designated Examiner Program

2.1.5

Supplemental Operations Manual Requirements

4.2.11

Training of Flight Followers

 

 

4.2.12

Hazardous Materials Training

 

 

4.3 Crewmember and Dispatch Qualifications

3.0 Flight Operations

4.3.1

Pilot Operating Limitations/Recent Experience

3.1 Air Carrier Programs and Procedures

4.3.2

Appropriate Airman/Crewmember Checks and Qualifications

3.1.1

Passenger Handling

4.3.3

Advanced Qualification Program

3.1.2

Flight Attendant Duties/Cabin Procedures

5.0 Route Structures

3.1.3

Airman Duties/Flight Deck Procedures

5.1 Approved Routes and Areas

3.1.4

Operational Control

5.1.5

Station Facilities

3.1.5

Carry‑on Baggage Program

5.1.6

Use of Approved Routes, Areas and Airports

3.1.6

Exit Seating Program

5.1.7

Special Navigation Areas of Operation

3.1.7

Deicing Program

5.1.8

Extended Operations

3.1.8

Carriage of Cargo

5.1.9

Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum Authorization

3.1.9

Aircraft Performance Operating Limits

6.0 Airman and Crewmember Flight, Rest and Duty Time

3.1.10

Lower Landing Minimums

6.1 Airman and Crewmember Limitations

3.1.11

Computer‑based Recordkeeping

6.1.1

Scheduling/Reporting System

3.1.12

Hazardous Materials

6.1.2

Flight Crewmember Flight/Duty/Rest Time

3.1.13

Other Personnel with Operational Control

6.1.3

Flight Attendant Duty/Rest Time

 

 

6.1.4

Dispatcher Duty/Rest Time

 

 

7.0 Technical Administration

3.2 Operational Release

7.1 Key Personnel

3.2.1

Dispatch or Flight Release

7.1.3

Director of Safety

3.2.2

Flight/Load Manifest/Weight and Balance Control

7.1.4

Director of Operations

3.2.3

Minimum Equipment List/Configuration Deviation List Procedures

7.1.5

Chief Pilot

 

 

7.2 Other Programs

 

 

7.2.1

Safety Program (Ground and Flight)

RESERVED. Paragraphs 10‑27 through 10‑41.


7/28/08                                                                                                                         8900.1 CHG 0

Volume 10  Air Transportation Oversight System

Chapter 2  Procedures for Design and Performance Assessment

Section 2  Design and Performance Assessment Planning

Figure 10‑15, Module 2: Planning

Figure 10-15, Module 2. Planning flowchart

10-117  Introduction. The planning process develops a risk‑based data collection plan to support design and performance assessments.

A.     The first step in this process is to assess the air carrier’s or applicant’s systems and operating environment for indications of hazards or conditions that may create hazards. This process helps to highlight any area on which to focus special oversight attention, and is used to prioritize the elements. The 28 risk indicators contained in the Air Carrier Assessment Tool (ACAT) help determine the special focus areas. (See Figure 10‑16.)

B.     The Comprehensive Assessment Plan (CAP) is a tool for planning, documenting, and tracking design assessments and performance assessments. The principal inspector (PI) or certification project manager (CPM) uses the CAP to adjust priorities and due dates of assessments, and to record the reasons for making adjustments.

10-118 Planning Data. (See flowchart process step 2.1.) The PI or CPM assembles a design or performance planning data package from the Safety Performance Analysis System (SPAS) and other sources. The operations research analyst (ORA) assists, as required. The planning data package provides data to consider when assessing an air carrier’s or applicant’s systems and operating environment for hazards. The data may be used to update the ACAT. The data are organized by risk indicator and by system, subsystem, and element. Another important source of planning data is input from Certificate Management Team (CMT) or Certification Project Team (CPT) members.

Initial Certification Planning Meeting. The CPT holds an initial planning meeting following the formal application meeting to assess the applicant’s systems and operating environment. During the meeting, the CPT completes the initial ACAT and CAP using the application package and other data.

C.     Annual Planning Meeting. The CMT holds an annual planning meeting to (1) assess the air carrier’s systems and operating environment using the ACAT, (2) review the CAP, and (3) conduct recurrent training. This team‑based approach provides checks and balances. Other important goals for this meeting include building and improving team skills, establishing team norms, communicating CMT expectations, and sharing information. All CMT members should participate in the annual planning meeting whenever circumstances permit. Some members of the CMT may have to meet more often if they need to retarget planned data collection or collaborate on other oversight issues.

D.    Quarterly Planning Review. PIs conduct a quarterly planning review that determines if a changed condition for the air carrier can impact the ACAT or the CAP. In many cases, action by the PI is not necessary. The air carrier’s performance history, including the results of recent design and performance assessments, is accessible through ATOS data packages and the Assessment Determination and Implementation tool. Performance history should be reviewed quarterly.

10-119 Assess Air Carrier/Applicant Risk and Update the ACAT. (See flowchart process step 2.2.) PIs and CPMs use a series of risk indicators to identify conditions in an air carrier’s or applicant’s systems or operating environment that may create hazards. The risk indicators contain inspector consideration word pictures and a risk scale that guides the PI in completing the tool. The PI uses the results of the ACAT as an input to determine the priority and planned due date of design and performance assessments in the CAP.

Risk Indicators. Risk indicators are groupings of safety‑ and/or performance‑related data that reflect areas of potential hazards and are used to prioritize air carrier oversight plans.

1)      Risk Indicator Categories. Risk indicators are divided into two major categories (System Stability and Operational Risks) designed to reflect the fact that internal and external events impact air carrier systems. The categories are subdivided into two subject areas. These subject areas focus the indicators on the operational, performance, and environmental risks most likely to impact an air carrier’s systems.
a)      The system stability category is divided into Operational Stability and Air Carrier Dynamics.

1.      Operational Stability—Organizational and environmental factors the air carrier cannot control directly, but can effectively manage to improve system stability and safety.

2.      Air Carrier Dynamics—Organizational and environmental factors the air carrier can directly control to improve system stability and safety.

b)      The operational risks category is divided into Performance History and Environmental Criticality.

1.      Performance History—Measures the results of the air carrier’s operations over time.

2.      Environmental Criticality—Aspects of the air carrier’s operating environment that may lead to or trigger a systemic failure.

2)      Risk Indicator Format. All risk indicators use a standard format. Each risk indicator contains a condition statement and background material, inspector consideration word pictures, a risk scale, references, possible data sources, and suggestions for determining the impact of that indicator on air carrier systems, subsystems, and elements. The complete set of risk indicators is at the end of this section.
3)      Inspector Considerations. The inspector considerations are word pictures for each risk indicator to provoke thought and aid assessment; they are neither exhaustive nor conclusive. A rating scale corresponds to the word pictures. The rating scale is designed so that 1 represents the lowest level of concern and 7 represents the highest level of concern. If the indicator does not apply, the lowest level of concern is assigned.

E.     Air Carrier Assessment Tool. The ACAT is an automated tool to record the PI’s or CPM’s assessment of elements using the risk indicators and calculate a risk score. The risk score is used to prioritize elements for planning certification and oversight activities.

1)      ACAT Frequency. The ACAT is completed during initial certification and updated when the air carrier certificate is issued. After that, the ACAT is undergoes an annual update, quarterly review, and a revision when there are any major changes to the risk indicators.
2)      ACAT Comments. CMT members may review and comment on the ACAT at any time throughout the year. During each quarterly review, the PI should consider CMT member comments.
3)      Completing the ACAT. The PI or CPM reviews the risk indicators to determine if any of the conditions apply to the air carrier or applicant. The PI or CPM selects the appropriate word picture and risk value after determining that the condition exists and that the risk indicator applies to one or more of the air carrier elements. An alternative way to complete the ACAT is to review each element and determine if any of the risk indicators apply to a particular element. Either way, the PI or CPM should explain the rationale for a selection. The PI or CPM can complete this review in one sitting or save the ACAT as a draft and return to it after reviewing and gathering more data. After completing the initial ACAT, the PI or CPM revises only those risk indicator values that have changed. After making the necessary changes, the PI or CPM finalizes and saves the ACAT.

10-120 Do the Results of the ACAT Affect Either Design or Performance? (See flowchart process step 2.3.)

Design Assessment. The PI or CPM should evaluate the results of a modified ACAT to determine the impact on the air carrier’s system design. If the ACAT results affect design assessment, the PI or CPM determines whether the assessment plan baseline dates or priorities need adjustment.

Note:   The following only pertain to initial certification.

4)      Elements Related to FAA‑Approved Programs or Operations Specifications. Elements that pertain to FAA‑approved manuals, programs, or that are related to operations specifications are assigned the highest priority. Instructions for these SAIs will state that supplied data for each question must be verified by the CPT.
5)      Additional High‑Priority Elements. Additional elements that were identified as high priority in the CAP may be selected by the CPM. Instructions for these SAIs will state that the CPT must verify applicant‑supplied data.
6)      Remaining Elements. Instructions for all remaining elements will require, at a minimum, that the CPT verify applicant‑supplied data for the procedure attribute questions.

F.      Performance Assessment. If the ACAT results do not affect design, the PI or CPM determines if the ACAT results affect performance. If so, the PI or CPM should follow the process for planning performance assessment. If the ACAT affects neither design nor performance, adjusting the plan baseline dates or priorities may not be necessary.

10-121 Adjust Assessment Plan Due Dates and Priorities. (See flowchart process step 2.4.) The PI or CPM can adjust the design and performance assessment plan due dates and priorities based on the results of the ACAT or other factors.

The Comprehensive Assessment Plan. The CAP is a 5‑year plan that for each element contains a planned design assessment and a planned performance assessment using audit‑based intervals to determine when an assessment is due.

1)      Baseline Intervals.
a)      Design Assessment. The baseline interval for all design assessments is once every 5 years. Once the initial design assessment for an element is complete, another assessment must be scheduled within the next 5 years.
b)      Performance Assessment. The baseline interval for performance assessments is once every 6 months for high‑criticality elements, once a year for medium‑criticality elements, and once every 3 years for low‑criticality elements. After completing the initial performance assessment for an element, another assessment must be scheduled within the applicable baseline intervals.
2)      Baseline Dates.
a)      Design Assessment. Baseline dates are automatically generated 5 years after the quarter in which the previous design assessment was completed. A design assessment is complete when the data have been collected and reviewed, and the bottom‑line assessment with appropriate action is documented.
b)      Performance Assessment. Depending on the element’s criticality, baseline dates are automatically generated 6 months, 1 year, or 3 years after the quarter in which the previous performance assessment was completed. A performance assessment is complete when the data have been collected and reviewed, and the bottom‑line assessment with appropriate action is documented.
3)      Due Dates. The due date and the baseline date are the same unless the PI or CPM makes a manual adjustment to the due date based on ACAT results or other factors. The PI or CPM must provide an explanation for adjusting the due date. Changing due dates may extend or reduce the interval between assessments.
4)      Priority. In the CAP, all of the applicable elements are initially sorted and displayed by their ACAT risk score value from highest to lowest. Each applicable element is also assigned a priority number starting at 1 (for the highest priority). The PI or CPM can manually adjust the priority of any element. The PI or CPM must provide an explanation for manually adjusting an element priority.

G.    Initial Certification. The initial CAP for an applicant contains a planned design assessment and performance assessment for each applicable element. The CPM uses the following guidance to develop the initial CAP.

1)      Adjustments to Comprehensive Assessment Plan Due Dates. Initially all design and performance assessments will have a due date in the quarter that the initial CAP is finalized. During the certification, the CPM manually adjusts the dates based on the applicant’s schedule of events. The baseline assessment plan for the CMT should divide assessments equally among the four quarters of each year.
a)      Design Assessment. After the applicant has been certified, the new CMT needs to establish a plan that balances the design assessment activities over a 5‑year period. The PI should plan to complete design assessments for about one fifth of the applicable elements each year.
b)      Performance Assessment. Performance assessments are balanced over a 3‑year period. The PI should plan to complete performance assessments for high‑criticality elements within 6 months, within one year for medium‑criticality elements, and should plan to complete about one third of the low‑criticality elements each year.
2)      Adjustments to Comprehensive Assessment Plan Priorities. The initial CAP displays the elements sorted by the risk score derived from the ACAT starting with the element that has the highest potential risk. The CPM adjusts the design assessment priorities and enters an explanation for the adjustment, based on the following factors:
a)      Design Assessment.

1.      Air Carrier Programs Requiring FAA Approval or Acceptance. Elements that are associated with air carrier programs that specifically require documentation in FAA‑approved or accepted manuals are assigned the highest priority by the CPM and are accomplished by the CPT.

2.      Design Assessments Completed by the Applicant. The applicant must complete a self audit using the SAI. In addition to the design assessments required by the preceding paragraph, the CPM determines which additional applicant self‑audited elements will be verified by the CPT completing a design assessment. All other elements will be reviewed and accepted.

b)      Performance Assessment. Air Carrier Programs Requiring Demonstration. The CPM assigns the highest priority to the air carrier programs with elements that specifically require demonstration in tabletop exercises, simulated evacuations, and proving tests. The CPT accomplishes reviews such demonstrations.

H.    Continued Operational Oversight. The CAP for an air carrier contains a planned design and performance assessment for each applicable element. The PI uses the following guidance to adjust the CAP.

I.       Adjustments to Comprehensive Assessment Plan Due Dates or Priorities.

1)      The PI can adjust the design assessment due date or priority for any element with an explanation of the reason for the adjustment.
2)      The PI may consider any of the following in determining if an adjustment is required:
a)      The results of a bottom‑line assessment for that element.
b)      The status of the element in relation to the 6‑month, 1‑year, or 3‑year performance assessment review cycle, or the 5‑year design assessment cycle.
c)      Any increase or decrease in the risk score over time.
d)      Assignment of design assessment completion dates based on the highest risk.
e)      New elements that are added as a result of major changes to air carrier operations.
f)        Work that was unassigned in the previous planning cycle that may have a higher priority level for the current planning cycle.

Note:   One of the fundamental principles of ATOS is that resources should always be assigned to performance and design assessments with the highest risk-based priorities. This principle is intended to be applied to the performance assessments and/or design assessments which are due within the quarter currently being planned. It does not require adjusting due dates from the future quarters based solely on the ranking of an element.

10-122 Are There Other Factors That Affect Due Dates? (See flowchart process step 2.5.) The PI or CPM should consider any other factor that may impact the plan due dates and priorities. Upon determining that such a factor exists, the PI or CPM may adjust either the priority or the due date and include an explanation. The PI or CPM utilizes his or her knowledge and experience in making this assessment. Examples include:

The PI knows that a planned change to a program is coming in a future quarter.

J.      National guidance directs the CMTs to perform a focused design or performance assessment.

10-123 Determine the Data Collection Requirement for Each Performance Assessment. (See flowchart process step 2.6.) After considering all factors that affect performance, the PI or CPM determines the data collection requirements for each performance assessment.

Element Performance Inspection. The Element Performance Inspection (EPI) data collection tool (DCT) is used for performance assessments. The PI or CPM needs to determine how many EPI DCTs should be completed to obtain the data needed to assess air carrier performance for each element. Typically, an inspector is assigned only one EPI for a specific performance assessment and he or she may complete multiple activities as part of that single EPI. PIs or CPMs may assign EPIs to more than one inspector in a performance assessment. For example, PIs or CPMs may want to assign EPIs to different inspectors for each aircraft fleet, for certain geographic areas, or for different training programs.

K.    Outsource Oversight Prioritization Tool. The Outsource Oversight Prioritization Tool (OPT) is used for planning surveillance of air carrier outsource providers. Principal avionics inspectors and principle maintenance inspectors must use this tool during oversight planning. It allows for prioritization of outsource maintenance providers to help determine specific data collection requirements. The OPT will assist the PI, other assigned inspectors, supervisors, and managers in identifying areas of concern or criticality about outsource providers and target resources toward the highest risk outsource maintenance providers.

1)      The OPT is also used as part of the Enhanced Air Carrier Outsourcing Maintenance and Repair Station Oversight System, along with the Repair Station Assessment Tool and the Repair Station Risk Management Process.
2)      The data resulting from the use of these tools resides in SPAS and may provide valuable information to help an air carrier PI plan data collection activities for outsourced maintenance.

L.     Off‑Hour Decision Aid. The PI is required to know when to initiate the use of the Off-Hour Surveillance Decision Aid, and how to process the results. There does not need to be an hour-for-hour correlation between the amounts of work the air carrier does off hours and the off-hour surveillance. The emphasis needs to be on identifying potential issues related to the air carrier’s management and oversight of off-hour activities. This process and the associated decision aid will, through data collection and analysis, assist the PI in identifying potential risk associated with off-hour activities conducted by the air carrier.

1)      The Off-Hour Decision Aid instructs the user to match the capabilities of the air carrier to manage its off-hour activities or programs with a series of word pictures that address several dimensions. Each dimension results in a score, that when taken together, produces a scoring range that indicates the effectiveness of the operator’s off-hour activities. To properly complete the decision aid, the CMO/CMT will need to apply their knowledge of the carrier along with their assessment as to the prevalence and magnitude of the issues. The decision aid is designed to assist in these assessments and subsequent action planning.
2)      Examples of useful data may include the use of EPI 1.3.7 for Outsource Maintenance and/or Element 1.3.4 for Required Items of Inspection (RII), and include in the special instructions the requirement to identify the amount and type of activities going on off hours at the repair station (or other outsource maintenance facility). A Constructed Dynamic Observation Report (ConDOR) may be preferred when more specific information about the potential hazard or risk. The PI may also contact the specific air carrier for information regarding their off-hour activities. This may include the types of activities occurring during off hours, location of off-hour activities, management and supervision of off-hour activities, and interface with outsource maintenance and other contracted activities.

10-124 Document Data Collection Requirements Using the Detailed Work Instruction. (See flowchart process step 2.7.) The PI or CPM documents the data collection requirements using detailed work instructions after considering all the factors affecting design or performance. For performance assessment, instructions help to ensure that timely, high‑quality data collection is focused in the areas the PI or CPM determines.

Instructions Help Ensure Timely, High‑Quality Data. The CAP provides PIs with a plan that is tailored to the current oversight requirements for a specific air carrier.

M.  Instructions Prioritize Activities and Set Timelines for Start and Completion of the Activities by Certain Dates. The data collection period should be before the assessment due date to allow time for the PI or CPM to review the data and make an assessment.

N.    Resource Requirements. PIs and CPMs should provide specific instructions to assist the frontline manager in making assignments, including any special expertise, training, or background the inspectors assigned to the activity should have.

O.    Design Assessments. The PI or CPM determines if a team or individual inspector should complete the SAI.

P.      Performance Assessments. Instructions ensure that PIs or CPMs obtain the data they need to assess the element. Timely, high‑quality data are focused in the areas that the PI or CPM determines. PIs should provide specific instructions to ensure that activities are performed at appropriate locations and times for comprehensive and timely response to the questions. PIs or CPMs can use instructions to supplement or clarify DCT questions.

Q.    Other Relevant Information That the Instructions May Include.

1)      Location of the air carrier system documentation.
2)      Focused area of assessment.
3)      Type of fleet if there are program differences.
4)      Distressed carrier, labor unrest, or other risk indicator information.
5)      Information obtained from the Assessment Determination and Implementation (ADI) tool.
6)      Any supplementary information the principal needs to make the assessment.

R.    Examples of Quality Work Instruction.

1)      Design Assessment: This SAI will start on or about (date). Perform at (airline name) HQ and the Certificate Management Office. Complete a comprehensive review of the DCT and the applicable (airline name) policy and procedures. The team coordinator will schedule and conduct a meeting to discuss coordination of activities. The (Airline name) point of contact will be determined before starting the assessment. Complete and save to the master record by April 30, 2005.
2)      Performance Assessment: This EPI will start on or about (date). Complete a comprehensive review of the DCT and review the previous SAI to become familiar with the applicable (airline name) policy and procedures. Perform activities at a minimum of five locations including ORD and MCO. Complete and save to the master record by (date).

10-125 Other Data Collection Requirements. It is possible that a design or performance assessment is not required, but that some additional data are necessary either to aid the decisionmaking process or to update the SAI question responses and comments. When appropriate, ConDORs should be considered along with other planned oversight. The ConDOR may be appropriate in the following instances:

To evaluate program, policy, or regulatory changes.

S.      To address focused or unique situations in response to local, regional, or national requirements.

T.     To collect targeted data for specific areas of immediate concern.

U.     As an action item in the RMP action plan.

V.     To document minor changes to the air carrier’s system (e.g., changes to the individual identified by the certificate holder as having responsibility and/or authority over the process).

W.   If the air carrier presents a revision to a manual that only changes a reference, a design assessment may not be necessary. The PI or CPM can generate a ConDOR instead of planning for a design assessment if a design assessment has already occurred.

10-126 Retargeted Comprehensive Assessment Plan. Throughout the year, the CMT collects, reviews, reports on, and analyzes performance data and environmental factors so PIs can make timely and consistent adjustments to the CAP.

CMTs must obtain and continually monitor data for air carriers experiencing growth, financial distress, personnel reductions, labor unrest, and other organizational changes. The office manager or PI should not wait for formal notification of a problem before acting on identifying potential hazards and their associated risks.

X.     Reports such as the quarterly published Commercial Aviation System Profile, accessible on the SPAS homepage, may assist with this determination.

Y.     If performance data or environmental factors indicate that the air carrier is experiencing significant changes in the operating environment that may affect its ability to balance resources, size, and organizational structure with operational requirements, then the CMT must use the Financial Condition Assessment Decision Aid and the Growth/Downsizing Assessment Decision Aid located in the Inspector’s Handbook to determine if it is necessary to retarget design assessments or initiate the ATOS RMP.

Z.      Retargeting oversight is an integral part of the dynamic CAP. The PI determines any oversight retargeting requirement when oversight or external data identifies problems. Retargeting does not automatically delete or remove any information contained in the current CAP. It is not negative, nor does it mean the original CAP has flaws. It is normal for a CMT to retarget oversight several times a year based on the analysis of data or changing circumstances.

1)      Retargeting oversight allows for continuous update of the plan based on the analysis of data the CMT members collect. This should not be a response to CMT internal considerations such as staffing or budget constraints.
2)      The PI can retarget CAP oversight as often as necessary, but should not retarget on a calendar basis to close out a planning cycle. Continuously retargeting oversight to the same elements within a CAP upon identifying performance deficiencies is ill‑advised. Deficiencies warrant conducting a design assessment for those elements.
3)      If oversight retargeting is appropriate to focus additional resources in an area of concern, the PI must determine which elements of the ACAT are related to the area of concern. The PI can retarget oversight for the entire air carrier or for selected systems, subsystems, and elements.

Figure 10‑16, Risk Indicator Quick Reference Guide

Risk indicators are a first step to identifying hazards that should be addressed by the air carrier.

ENVIRONMENTAL CRITICALITY (EC)—Aspects of the air carrier’s surroundings that may lead to or trigger a systemic failure with the potential of creating an unsafe condition.

EC‑01

Age of Fleet

The age of an air carrier’s fleet can impact its systems.

EC‑02

Varied Fleet Mix/Configuration

A varied fleet mix and/or mixed fleet configuration can significantly alter an air carrier’s safety profile and the potential for failure in its systems.

EC‑03

Change in Aircraft Complexity

Changes to the complexity of an air carrier’s fleet can significantly affect an air carrier’s safety and the potential for failure in its systems.

EC‑04

Outsource (Maintenance, Training, Ground Handling)

The use of outsourcing programs, depending upon a number of factors, could heighten the risks associated with various air carrier operations. These programs must be effectively managed.

EC‑05

Seasonal Operations

Short-term operations may present their own unique risk(s) and may require attention and preparation by the air carrier.

EC‑06

Relocation/Closing of Facilities

Relocating or closing a facility may adversely affect operational and system stability at an air carrier.

EC‑07

Lease Arrangements

Aspects of lease arrangements may be sources of risk at air carriers and must be effectively managed.

EC‑08

Off‑hours Activity

Air carrier management of off‑hour (i.e., as outside normal FAA hours, including weekends) activity can be prone to risk.

PERFORMANCE HISTORY (PH)—Results of the air carrier’s operations over time.

PH‑01

Enforcement Actions

Enforcement actions can help identify the air carrier’s safety profile and any area of risk in its systems.

PH‑02

Accidents/Incidents/
Occurrences

Data regarding accidents, incidents, and occurrences may provide insights into areas of risk at an air carrier.

PH‑03

Department of Defense Audits

Department of Defense audit findings help to identify hazards and their associated risks. Audit data may provide insights into systemic problems in the design and performance of an air carrier’s systems.

PH‑04

Self Disclosures

The type and content of an air carrier’s self disclosures, and the effectiveness of the air carrier’s corrective actions can assist in risk assessment.

PH‑05

Safety Hotline/Complaints

Excessive or repetitive safety hotline and other complaints against an air carrier may assist in identifying and isolating areas of risk. Complaints can aid the air carrier in managing and controlling corrective and followup actions.

PH‑06

Voluntary Programs Data

Air carrier voluntary program data may be useful for hazard or risk identification. Such data can aid the air carrier in managing corrective and followup actions.

PH‑07

Surveillance Indicators

Surveillance data from the Safety Performance Analysis System, Program Tracking and Reporting Subsystem, and the Air Transportation Oversight System help to identify trends in air carrier performance and can assist with identifying risks in an air carrier’s system design.

OPERATIONAL STABILITY (OS)—Organizational and environmental factors the air carrier cannot directly control, but can manage effectively to improve system stability and safety.

OS‑01

Key Management SPAS Indicators

Changes in key management personnel can significantly impact an air carrier’s system and operational stability.

OS‑02

Financial Conditions

Air carriers that experience adverse financial conditions may have higher risk.

OS‑03

Change in Air Carrier Management

Changes in management personnel other than key management can significantly impact an air carrier’s system and operational stability.

OS‑04

Turnover in Personnel

A high turnover of operations or maintenance personnel can dramatically increase the potential for risk in an air carrier’s systems.

OS‑05

Reduction in Workforce

A reduction in the air carrier’s workforce can dramatically increase the potential for failure in an air carrier’s systems.

OS‑06

Rapid Growth/Downsizing

Times of significant change such as rapid expansion or downsizing can impact air carrier operations due to the possible misalignment of resources and operational requirements.

OS‑07

Merger or Takeover

Air carriers must effectively manage mergers or takeovers to ensure continued compliance and safe operating practices.

OS‑08

Labor–Management Relations

A poor or deteriorating labor–management relationship can create risk.

AIR CARRIER DYNAMICS (CD)—Organizational and environmental factors that the air carrier can directly control to improve system stability and safety.

CD‑01

New/Major Changes to Program

Safety issues may develop from new or changed programs and may increase the potential for noncompliance with existing processes and controls.

CD‑02

Continuing Analysis and Surveillance System (AW Only)

Air carriers with a poorly functioning Continuing Analysis and Surveillance System can overlook and improperly manage increased levels of risk.

CD‑03

Safety Management

Air carriers who do not have a safety management system may not understand or adequately control hazards to operational safety.

CD‑04

Relationship with the FAA

The air carrier’s relationship with its assigned Federal Aviation Administration personnel may provide insights into the air carrier’s compliance posture and safety culture.

CD‑05

Human Factors

Risk may exist due to human lapses in the air carrier’s design and/or performance.

 


Figure 10-17, EC‑01 Age of Fleet

Condition: The age of an air carrier’s fleet can impact its systems.

Background: Currently, the average jet in the U.S. commercial fleet is 13 years old. From the FAA’s perspective, aging aircraft are defined as aircraft of any make or model that are 15 years or older. Many aircraft of the current U.S. commercial fleet are considered aging aircraft. The age of the fleet must be considered for developing a surveillance plan.

Risk Score

Inspector Considerations

1–2

The air carrier does not have an aging fleet. The air carrier’s procedures, controls, interfaces and process measurements appear to adequately address the requirements of aging fleet.

3–5

Concern exists regarding the air carrier’s ability to manage an aging fleet due to considerations such as:

·        Inadequate management of operational risk associated with aging aircraft.

·        Inadequate aging aircraft identification process.

·        Ineffective internal and/or external communications flow regarding the maintenance and operational requirements of aging fleet.

·        Inadequate corrective action plan.

·        Air carrier maintenance program and related infrastructure inadequate to meet the enhanced requirements associated with aging aircraft. The air carrier has aircraft just approaching the time line for aging aircraft and dealing with aging aircraft is a new or unknown component of its profile.

6–7

Concern exists that the air carrier does not have a process to identify and evaluate the aging aircraft in its fleet. The air carrier has not demonstrated appropriate or effective management of the situation. Concern exists that the air carrier’s processes to manage an aging aircraft fleet appear to be inadequate at most levels.

Guidance References: Not Applicable.

Data Sources: Aircraft Evaluation Group, operations specifications, air carrier and industry fleet lists, ASIAS, SPAS

Impact on ATOS System, Subsystem, and Elements: ATOS systems contain elements that may pertain to aging aircraft, particularly in the airworthiness systems, subsystems, and elements. Focus on the area of concern and attempt to relate it to the affected elements in these systems. Remember to consider interfacing and supporting elements in the maintenance system as applicable.

 


Figure 10‑18, EC‑02 Varied Fleet Mix/Configuration

Condition: A varied fleet mix and/or mixed fleet configuration can significantly alter an air carrier’s safety profile and the potential for failure in its systems.

Background: A varied and/or mixed fleet exists when an air carrier fleet includes: (1) a variety of different aircraft types; (2) a mix of models and/or series of the same type the same fleet; (3) multiple types within the same fleet; and (4) a number of different configurations of the same make and model within the same fleet.

Many established carriers have long operated a varied fleet mix and/or mixed fleet configurations. The implications for operating this type of fleet may be more significant for new entrant carriers, where resources and infrastructure may be a major consideration.

Risk Score

Inspector Considerations

1–2

The air carrier does not have a varied fleet mix and/or mixed fleet configuration. The impact of varied fleet mix and/or mixed fleet configuration appears to be effectively managed by the air carrier’s procedures, controls and process measures. Any adverse impact appears negligible.

3–5

Concern exists regarding the impact of the varied fleet mix and/or mixed fleet configuration on the air carrier due to considerations such as:

·        Inadequate management structure to handle the impact of a varied fleet mix and/or mixed fleet configuration;

·        Potential for adverse impact on air carrier’s maintenance program;

·        Potential for adverse impact on air carrier’s operations program;

·        Potential for adverse impact on air carrier’s training program;

·        Air carrier lacks necessary system controls for the varied fleet mix and/or mixed fleet configuration; and

·        Air carrier has little or poor performance history with varied fleet mix and/or mixed fleet configuration.

6–7

Concern exists that the air carrier does not have the overall infrastructure in place to support a varied fleet mix and/or mixed fleet configuration. The air carrier has not demonstrated appropriate or effective management.

Guidance References: Notice 8900.23, New Aircraft Process Document.

Data Sources: Operations specifications, company manuals, air carrier and industry fleet listing, Vital Information Subsystem (VIS) data, past surveillance findings, internal audit findings, human factor indications (identified weaknesses of the controls attribute during surveillance of an element), Mechanical Interruption Summary, air carrier crewmember irregularity reports.

Impact on ATOS System, Subsystem, and Elements: Operating this type of fleet can cut across all aspects of an air carrier’s operations: training, maintenance, human factors, ground‑handling operations, etc. When considering the impact on the ATOS model, consider the operational area of the concern, and tie it to the ATOS system(s), subsystem(s), and element(s) most closely related with the concern. Consider also related training manuals and management areas, and the risk impact of the varied/mixed fleet on these areas.

 


Figure 10‑19, EC‑03 Change in Aircraft Complexity

Condition: Changes to the complexity of an air carrier’s fleet can significantly affect an air carrier’s safety and the potential for failure in its systems.

Background: Complex aircraft generally incorporate more sophisticated technology. Innovative technology can increase or decrease the potential for noncompliance with existing processes and controls. A change in aircraft means that the carrier may need processes and procedures to support differences in both manual and automated complexities and technology. New aircraft technology can impact the air carrier infrastructure because of additional requirements for training, operations, and maintenance.

Risk Score

Inspector Considerations

1–2

The air carrier is not currently experiencing a change in aircraft complexities or technologies. The impact of aircraft complexity and technology appears to be effectively managed by the air carrier’s procedures, controls, and process measures. Any adverse impact appears negligible to nonexistent.

3–5

Concern exists regarding the impact of change in aircraft complexity due to inadequate infrastructure considerations such as:

·        Controls and process measures may be inadequate to manage the changes in operations and maintenance.

·        Air carrier personnel and others have little experience with the new technologies and/or the operational environment.

·        Dramatic changes in operating environment due to changed aircraft complexity.

·        Ineffective or no air carrier safety audits to assess the effectiveness of the air carrier’s training programs and operation within the air carrier environment.

·        Equipment/logistical support for new technology may be lacking.

·        Air carrier has little or poor performance history with incorporating complex aircraft.

6–7

Concern exists about adverse impact on system design or performance due to the change in aircraft complexity. The air carrier has not demonstrated appropriate or effective management of the situation.

Guidance References: FAA Order 8900.1 Volume 6, Chapter 2, Section 18, Evaluation of Air Carrier’s Management of Significant Changes.

Data Sources: Aircraft Evaluation Group, aircraft manufacturer type‑certificate data sheets, FSB reports, CAS reports, MIS reports/SDRs, reliability reports, training records, line checks, Air Carrier Delay Summaries

Impact on ATOS System, Subsystem, and Elements: Aircraft configuration control, flight operations, and personnel training and qualifications ATOS systems all contain elements that may pertain to changes in aircraft complexity. Focus on the area of concern and attempt to relate it to the affected elements in these systems. Remember to consider interfacing and supporting elements in the Technical Administration and Manual systems as applicable.


Figure 10‑20, EC‑04 Outsource (Maintenance, Training, Ground Handling)

Condition: The use of outsourcing programs, depending upon a number of factors, could heighten the risks associated with various air carrier operations. These programs must be effectively managed.

Background: The aviation industry increasingly outsources traditional air carrier functions to independent contractors. Outsourcing has developed to the point where multiple levels of contractors could be involved in providing the service. Areas for outsourcing might include the maintenance function, the ground handling function, and training programs.

Risk Score

Inspector Considerations

1–2

The air carrier does not outsource. The air carrier’s oversight staffing and audit functions appear to be adequate to include the outsourced functions. The contractor(s) effectively meet the training requirements of the air carrier and appear to be qualified for the outsource function(s). The air carrier effectively manages impacts.

3–5

Concern exists regarding the impact of outsourcing due to considerations such as:

·        The contract personnel are utilized by numerous air carriers, increasing the possibility of non‑adherence to procedures.

·        The contract personnel training records are inaccurate.

·        Adverse Department of Defense (DOD) findings against the contractor.

·        Contractor qualifications and abilities (maintenance, training, and/or ground handling) are in question.

·        The air carrier frequently changes contractors based on economics.

—and/or—

·        The use of outsourcing for all or particular functions is relatively new at the carrier; therefore, lack of historical data is a major consideration.

6–7

Concern exists about the impact of outsourcing because the air carrier does not have an effective safety audit function to monitor the performance of the contractors. Concern exists because the contractor’s performance history indicates multiple, repeated safety violations.

Guidance References: FAA Order 8900.1, Volume 3, Chapter 42, Evaluate Part 121/135 (10 or More) Outsource Maintenance Arrangement; Air Transportation Oversight System; SAI 1.3.11 and EPI 1.3.11; SAI 1.3.7 AW; EPI 1.3.7 AW; SAI 4.2.9 OP; EPI 4.2.9 OP

Data Sources: Contractor enforcement history, training records, IOE records, SPAS Repair Station Reports, DOD audit findings, air carrier past performance including element 1.3.7 AW and/or 4.2.9 OP.

Impact on ATOS System, Subsystem, and Elements: Evaluate if the risk identified is related directly to the dedicated ATOS elements 1.3.7 AW and/or 4.2.9 OP. Compare the functions outsourced with the structure of the ATOS air carrier system, subsystem, and element model. Choose the element(s) whose performance measures and design most closely reflects the outsource work functions where risk has been identified. Evaluate across systems for elements where associated risk may also be present.


Figure 10‑21, EC‑05 Seasonal Operations

Condition: Short-term operations may present their own unique risk(s) and may require attention and preparation by the air carrier.

Background: Air carriers perform seasonal operations during a particular season or time of year to satisfy a short‑term need. Seasonal operations, while limited in nature, require as much or more preparation and attention to the quality and safety of the services provided as regular operations. (For example: air carriers who normally operate in a warm environment may engage in seasonal operations that occur during the winter months when flying to and from ski resort areas. They must be prepared to manage aircraft deicing, training, and all of the associated requirements. If the air carrier does not normally fly this route, deicing may not be part of its regular operations.) Understanding the type and scope of the seasonal operation, as well as the impact on the air carrier’s systems, is critical in rating this indicator.

Risk Score

Inspector Considerations

1–2

The air carrier does not conduct seasonal operations. Procedures, controls, and process measures appear to effectively manage the impact of seasonal operations on the infrastructure of the air carrier systems. Any adverse impact appears to be negligible to nonexistent.

3–5

Concern exists regarding the air carrier’s ability to conduct seasonal operations due to considerations such as:

·        Air carrier has no past experience with seasonal operations.

·        The air carrier’s procedures, controls, and process measures do not effectively manage the impact of seasonal operations its infrastructure.

·        Air carrier has encountered problems with seasonal operations in the past.

·        Air carrier does not conduct safety audits of its seasonal operations.

·        Incomplete integration of air carrier’s core business functions to the seasonal operation.

6–7

Concern exists that the air carrier is unable to manage the risks associated with the temporary change in its operational environment due to the seasonal operation, and controls and procedures do not support the operation or do not exist at all. The air carrier has not demonstrated appropriate or effective management of the situation.

Guidance References: FAA Order 8900.1 Volume 3, Chapter 18, Section 8, Amendment, Surrender, and Suspension of OpSpecs, paragraph 3‑1031A2); Volume 6, Chapter 2, Section 38, Evaluate a Part 121/135.411(a)(2) Operator Aircraft Storage Program; Advisory Circular (AC) 120‑27E, Aircraft Weight and Balance Control..

Data Sources: OpSpecs; SPAS data; ATOS data repository; discussion with air carrier personnel

Impact on ATOS System, Subsystem, and Elements: Based upon the scope and type of seasonal operation(s) conducted and inspector assessment of possible location(s) for risk, identify corresponding ATOS system(s), subsystem(s), and element(s) which relate to that risk. Consider other system(s) that support the seasonal operation and might be burdened. Focus also on the elements dealing with training and management support for these areas.


Figure 10‑22, EC‑06 Relocation/Closing of Facilities

Condition: Relocating or closing a facility may adversely affect operational and system stability at an air carrier.

Background: Air carrier change to facilities could include adding a new facility, closing a facility, and/or moving an existing facility to another site. A misalignment of resources to requirements surrounding the change should be of concern and may indicate safety risk.

Risk Score

Inspector Considerations

1–2

The air carrier has not experienced any changes/relocation of facilities. Air carrier changes/relocations of facilities do not appear to disrupt or adversely impact the quality and safety of ongoing operations. The air carrier’s system, process measures and controls, are both effective and undertaken correctly. The air carrier has demonstrated appropriate and effective management of events.

3–5

Air carrier changes/relocations of facilities may not be effectively managed. Concern exists due to considerations such as:

·        Air carrier already has poor past performance history with regard to relocation and closing of facilities.

·        Air carrier has not effectively managed changes to its facilities

·        Rate and pace of change is inappropriate.

·        Change is not steady, not implemented over time, and not accompanied by appropriate training, documentation, and manual changes.

·        Carrier may not have adequate resources and training to support the change.

·        Background and experience of personnel at new facility in question.

6–7

Concern exists due to adverse impact of air carrier changes/relocations of facilities which may disrupt the quality and safety of ongoing operations. The air carrier has not demonstrated appropriate or effective management of the event(s).

Guidance References: FAA Order 8900.1, Volume 2, Chapter 2, Section 5, Evaluate Applicant’s Refueling Procedures and Facilities (Parts 121, 125, and 135); Volume 3, Chapter 27, Section 1, General; Volume 6, Chapter 2, Section 24, Station Facilities Inspection for Part 121 and 135 Air Carriers (PTRS Code 1635); Volume 6, Chapter 2, Section 26, Inspect Operator’s Maintenance Facility for Part 121 and 135; ATOS elements 1.3.3, 5.1.1, 1.3.16, and 1.3.18.

Data Sources: ATOS data repository and discussion with air carrier personnel


Impact on ATOS System, Subsystem, and Elements: If root cause(s) and/or failure of event(s) is generally known and validated, consider the system(s), subsystem(s), and element(s) in the ATOS structure that relate to the failure or root cause. Consider also the ATOS Training and Technical Administration systems. If the air carrier has not effectively and appropriately managed the events, consider also the ATOS Manuals and Technical Administration systems.


Figure 10‑23, EC‑07 Lease Arrangements

Condition: Aspects of lease arrangements may be sources of risk at air carriers and must be effectively managed.

Background: A lease is any agreement by a person (the lessor) to provide an aircraft to another person (the lessee) who will use the aircraft for compensation or hire purposes. These arrangements are increasingly used to meet market demands and seasonal operations. The variety of leasing arrangements entered into by an air carrier can have a significant impact on its maintenance, training, and operations programs and its overall safety (wet lease, dry lease, interchange agreements). Interchange agreements can have a major impact on normal carrier operations; therefore, special attention during surveillance may be warranted when an air carrier is a party to this type of arrangement.

Risk Score

Inspector Considerations

1–2

The air carrier is not presently involved in any lease arrangements. The impact of any lease arrangements appears to be effectively managed by the air carrier’s procedures, controls and process measures. The air carrier has demonstrated appropriate and effective management of any events.

3–5

Concern exists about the impact of the lease arrangements due to considerations such as:

·        Perceived difficulty of exercise of operational control.

·        Air carrier audit functions fail to account for special circumstances of lease agreement.

·        Changes to flight and ground crew training to support the lease arrangement are broad.

·        Lack of sound controls and interfaces in new procedures required by lease agreement.

6–7

Concern exists regarding high adverse impact of the lease arrangement on air carrier systems, subsystems and elements. In the event of a wet lease arrangement, air carrier loss of operational control may be a concern. The air carrier has not demonstrated appropriate or effective management of the situation.

Guidance References: FAA Order 8900.1, Volume 3, Chapter 13, Section 1, Evaluate Aircraft Lease/Interchange Agreement; Volume 3, Chapter 46, Evaluate 14 CFR Part 121/135 10 or More Leased Maintenance Program Authorization: U.S. Registered Aircraft; Volume 12, Chapter 2, Foreign Air Carriers Operating to the U.S. and Foreign Operators of U.S.‑Registered Aircraft Engaged in Common Carriage Outside the U.S.

Data Sources: Lease agreement contract, air carrier promotional materials, Operations Specifications

Impact on ATOS System, Subsystem, and Elements: Lease agreements can affect most operational areas. Based on the nature of the lease arrangement and the concerns assessed, associate the corresponding ATOS system(s), subsystem(s), and element(s).

 


Figure 10‑24, EC‑08 Off‑Hours Activity

Condition: Air carrier management of off‑hour (i.e., outside normal FAA hours, including weekends) activity can be prone to risk.

Background: Oversight of 14 CFR part 121 air carriers requires insight into the entire range of activities performed by the air carrier. Since much of that activity is conducted during times that are not normal duty hours for FAA inspectors, the Certificate Management Office (CMO)/certificate‑holding district office (CHDO) must make a conscious effort to ensure that the air carrier has the means and methods to ensure that procedures are being followed and that the air carrier continues to be in regulatory compliance at all times. Potential factors that could contribute to problems during off‑hour activities include the possibility of diminished FAA presence; less‑than‑effective air carrier managerial oversight; unavailability of expert advice or other supporting resources (help desks, vendor support, etc.); and incomplete exchange of information during shift change, personnel fatigue, and a range of other potential problems. The Off-Hour Surveillance Decision Aid is designed to assist in identifying risk. Consider that while some components of the decision aid scoring are primarily geared toward airworthiness activities, an assessment can also be made for flight/ground operations in conjunction with the decision aid. An example of off-hours air carrier activity in the air carrier flight/ground operations arena might be training that is conducted during off hours (midnight shift) or flight operations primarily conducted outside of normal FAA duty hours (e.g., overnight cargo operations).

Risk Score

Inspector Considerations

1–2

Off‑hours activity appears to be effectively managed by the air carrier’s procedures, controls, and process measures. Any adverse impact appears to be negligible to nonexistent.

—and/or—

Off-Hour Surveillance Decision Aid score of 57–80.

3–5

Concern exists about air carrier management of components of its off‑hour activity for considerations such as: (1) adequacy of any training for off‑hours personnel; (2) effectiveness of change‑over procedures; and (3) amount of off‑hours activity performed.

—and/or—

Off-Hour Surveillance Decision Aid score of 41–56.

6–7

Concern exists regarding the air carrier’s ability to manage off‑hours activity on a system level.

—and/or—

Off-Hour Surveillance Decision Aid score of 8 to 40.

Guidance References: FAA Order 8900.1, Volume 10, Air Transportation Oversight System.

Data Sources: Off-hour Surveillance Decision Aid, Comprehensive Assessment Plan notes, interviews with air carrier management and personnel, company maintenance records, flight schedules, employee duty and rest records, CAMI Human Factors reports

Impact on ATOS System, Subsystem, and Elements: Based upon the notes which indicate the CMT’s collection of type and amount of off‑hour activity accomplished at the air carrier, associate the appropriate ATOS system, subsystem and element structure with the risk concern(s) identified. If the Off-Hour Surveillance Decision Aid was used, focus on the components of the aggregate scoring with the most adverse scores, and relate them to the ATOS system, subsystem, and element model.

 


Figure 10‑25, PH‑01 Enforcement Actions

Condition: Enforcement actions can help identify the air carrier’s safety profile and any area of risk in its systems.

Background: Enforcement actions are the reported results of any administrative and/or legal enforcement that the FAA has taken against an air carrier and/or certificated personnel in response to regulatory noncompliance. A trend analysis is an important factor in assessing this risk indicator, as it can identify deteriorating systems and programs.

Risk Score

Inspector Considerations

1–2

The air carrier has no recent enforcement activity. The air carrier’s enforcement history does not appear to indicate failure in system controls and/or an adverse change in the safety profile. Any enforcements have been low-criticality and not of a repetitive nature.

3–5

The air carrier’s enforcement history may indicate stresses in system controls and/or an adverse change in its safety profile. Concern exists due to considerations such as:

·        Enforcements in critical areas.

·        Enforcements are repetitive in nature.

·        Enforcements appear to identify a negative trend.

·        Air carrier failure to initiate adequate corrective action and followup processes.

6–7

The air carrier’s enforcement history appears to indicate failure in system controls and/or a rapid and large‑scale deterioration in safety profile. The air carrier has not demonstrated appropriate or effective management of the event(s). Concern exists due to enforcements of high criticality, or multiple enforcements in repeated areas, or across the air carrier’s systems.

Guidance References: FAA Order 2150.3, Compliance and Enforcement Program; 8900.1, Volume 11, Chapter 3, Section 1, Program Overview; Volume 7, Chapter 7, Conduct Violation Investigation; Volume 14, Chapter 2, Section 1, Compliance and Enforcement Special Consideration—Air Carrier; and Volume 12, Chapter 2 Foreign Air Carriers Operating to the U.S. and Foreign Operators of U.S.‑Registered Aircraft Engaged in Common Carriage Outside the U.S.

Data Sources: SPAS, ASIAS, EIS.

Impact on ATOS System, Subsystem, and Elements: Consider the area(s) of the air carrier’s operation where the regulatory noncompliance(s) caused the enforcement action(s). Review the ATOS system, subsystem, and element structure for corresponding loci for the risk. Consider related training and management issues that may also contribute to root cause, as well as failures in interfacing systems. If it is determined that air carrier followup and corrective action for enforcements have been ineffective, evaluate the Key Personnel and/or Manual Management subsystem(s).

Figure 10‑26, PH‑02 Accidents /Incidents/Occurrences

Condition: Data regarding accidents, incidents, and occurrences may provide insights into areas of risk at an air carrier.

Background: To be most effective, this data should be analyzed in conjunction with the air carrier’s response, corrective action planning, and ongoing followup activities. Collectively, this information may provide a point‑in‑time measurement of the air carrier’s performance. Repeated events could be an indication of management and air carrier systems’ inability to resolve issues and implement corrective actions appropriately.

Risk Score

Inspector Considerations

1–2

The air carrier has not experienced any accidents, incidents, or occurrences.

Any occurrences/incidents were minor. The air carrier has demonstrated appropriate and effective management of any events.

3–5

Concern exists regarding the air carrier’s accident, incident, occurrence history due to considerations such as:

·        Repeated events in interfacing areas.

·        Increasing number of events.

·        Criticality of event(s).

·        Root cause(s) of the event(s) or inadequate analysis of root cause.

·        Inadequate air carrier controls.

·        Inadequate air carrier followup to event(s).

6–7

Concern exists because the air carrier has experienced accident(s) or incident(s) that appear to indicate a negative trend with escalation in severity. The air carrier has not demonstrated appropriate or effective management of the event(s).

Guidance References: FAA Order 8900.1, Volume 7, Chapter 1, Section 1, Accident Investigations; Volume 7, Chapter 1, Section 2; Incident Investigations and Occurrences; and Volume 8, Chapter 5, Section 6, Process Service Difficulty Report.

Data Sources: SPAS Data packages, FAA Accident Investigation Records, Investigation of Pilot Deviation Reports, Accident/Incident Corrective Action Records, Aircraft Accident/Incident Preliminary Notices, NTSB findings/reports, MIS reports, SDR reports, DCT 1.2.4 “Mechanical Interruption Summary Reports”

Impact on ATOS System, Subsystem, and Elements: If root cause(s) and/or failure of event(s) is generally known and validated, consider the system(s), subsystem(s), and element(s) in the ATOS structure that relate to the failure or root cause. Consider also the ATOS Training and Technical Administration systems. If the air carrier has not effectively and appropriately managed the events, consider also the ATOS Manuals and Technical Administration Systems.



Figure 10‑27, PH‑03 Department of Defense Audits

Condition: Department of Defense (DOD) audit findings help to identify hazards and their associated risks. The audit data may provide insights into systemic problems in the design and performance of an air carrier’s systems.

Background: The DOD Air Carrier Survey and Analysis Team monitors certificate holders that do business with the DOD. The DOD regulations, directives, and Commercial Air Carrier Quality and Safety requirements form the basis for the DOD surveillance auditing process. The audit is conducted every 2 years and is documented on a structured Air Carrier Operations Survey Checklist. While the structure of the DOD surveillance auditing process varies from the FAA process, the results provide a unique view of the air carrier as DOD is often an airline’s largest customer and the audits are a requirement of the contract between the DOD and the certificate holder.

Risk Score

Inspector Considerations

1–2

The air carrier is not a DOD carrier. There are no significant adverse DOD findings against the air carrier.

3–5

DOD has placed carrier on Close Watch program for safety issues or has indicated other concerns for safety issues and/or DOD has recently recertified carrier after temporary non‑use status.

—or—

Timing interval since the last complete DOD survey is longer than standard two years and/or scope of that survey not complete.

6–7

Air carrier is currently removed from the DOD list of qualified air carriers. Air carrier is currently on temporary non‑use status for safety issues.

Guidance References: Order 8900.1, Volume 3, Chapter 2, Section 1, Exemptions, Deviations, Waivers, and Authorizations, paragraph 3‑39.

Data Sources: SPAS, DOD inspection reports, DOD liaison, air carrier personnel, air carrier’s OpSpecs.

Impact on ATOS System, Subsystem, and Elements: Inspector should evaluate and focus on those ATOS elements that correspond or are related to the areas of adverse DOD findings. Determine which aspects of the systems are affected by the adverse DOD findings. Further determine what these impacts might mean in terms of additional surveillance requirements.


Figure 10‑28, PH‑04 Self Disclosures

Condition: The type and content of an air carrier’s self disclosures, and the effectiveness of the air carrier’s corrective actions can assist in risk assessment.

Background: Self‑disclosures are intended to provide the air carrier with a means to generate safety information that may not be captured through the traditional reporting mechanisms. The details of the program are documented in AC 00‑58, Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program, current edition. The self‑disclosure process provides the air carrier and its employees with a means by which they can disclose information and identify possible violations of 14 CFR. Self‑disclosure of this type of information may be a positive indication of the air carrier’s commitment to addressing safety problems and proactively identifying potential safety hazards. It may also be a positive indication of the air carrier’s emphasis on safety and willingness to better manage its safety profile. Self‑disclosure of problems by the air carrier to the FAA can also heighten the trust that exists between the two entities and is a visible demonstration of cooperation. Trust and cooperation between air carrier and FAA personnel can have a positive impact on quality and safety.

Risk Score

Inspector Considerations

1–2

There have been no recently filed self‑disclosures involving the air carrier. Self‑disclosures appear to have been effectively handled as an integral air carrier system component and the corrective action has augmented the air carrier’s safety profile.

3–5

Concern exists due to considerations such as:

·        Ineffective self‑disclosure process at the air carrier.

·        Poorly documented procedures at the air carrier for self‑disclosure process.

·        Management does not encourage use of self‑disclosure process.

·        Self‑disclosure process has not reduced problems or violations.

·        Implementation of controls following self‑disclosure inadequate or implemented controls unacceptable.

·        Flow of safety information surrounding self‑disclosure is inadequate.

·        Company employees unaware of self‑disclosure process.

6–7

Concern exists because there are multiple repeated self‑disclosures in high criticality areas and continued failure on the part of the carrier in implementing corrective and followup action. Concern exists because the air carrier’s self‑disclosures appear to indicate a negative trend with escalation in severity.

Guidance References: AC 00‑58, current edition; FAA Order 8900.1 Volume 11, Chapter 1, Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program.

Data Sources: FAA records, air carrier self‑disclosure packages, SPAS.

Impact on ATOS System, Subsystem, and Elements: Focus on the subject area and nature of the self‑disclosure(s). Drill down to the root cause(s) if possible, and relate it to the system, subsystem, element structure of the ATOS model. Evaluate interfacing and supporting systems, such as training or personnel. If the risk concern includes the lack of effectiveness of the air carrier’s corrective action, consider focusing also on the Manual Management and Key Personnel subsystems.


Figure 10‑29, PH‑05 Safety Hotline/Complaints

Condition: Excessive or repetitive safety hotline and other complaints against an air carrier may assist in identifying and isolating areas of risk. Complaints can aid the air carrier in managing and controlling corrective and followup actions.

Background: This indicator considers recorded charges of dissatisfaction brought by consumers, employees, vendors, other air carriers, and members of Congress against the air carrier. Complaints received by these entities, which are related to the air carrier or aircraft operations, maintenance, quality, stability, compliance or safety may affect surveillance planning. Any type of complaint information, and actions taken as result of a complaint, provides an external view of how consumers and industry peers perceive the air carrier. This perspective may be of value during risk assessment and surveillance planning.

Risk Score

Inspector Considerations

1–2

There have been no safety hotline/complaints against the air carrier. Any complaints have been relatively minor and do not appear to point to system weakness or human factors issues.

3–5

Concern exists due to considerations such as:

·        Multiple complaint data points in same area(s).

·        Single complaint in highly critical area of the air carrier’s operation.

·        Air carrier complaint resolution history has indicated that air carrier does not have a strong corrective action plan and process for assessing, categorizing and handling complaints.

6–7

Concern exists because there are multiple, repeated complaints in the same area revealing risk in a system, subsystem or element that appear to indicate a negative trend with escalation in severity. The air carrier has not demonstrated appropriate or effective management of the event(s).

Guidance References: FAA Order 8900.1, Volume 7, Chapter 7, Conduct Violation Investigation; Volume 11, Chapter 3, Section 1, Program Overview; Volume 11, Chapter 3, Section 2, Inspector Responsibilities and Procedures; and Volume 11, Chapter 3, Section 3, Complaint Processing.

Data Sources: FAA safety hotline data, Congressional inquiries and/or other complaints lodged against the carrier, DOT complaint statistics, comparable surveillance data, SPAS, PTRS reporting source codes for hotline and whistleblower programs.

Impact on ATOS system, Subsystem, and Elements: Focus on the subject area and nature of the complaint(s). Drill down to the root cause(s) if possible, and relate it to the system, subsystem, element structure of the ATOS model. Also evaluate interfacing and supporting systems, such as training or personnel. If the risk concern includes the lack of effectiveness of the air carrier’s corrective action, consider focusing on the Manual Management and Key Personnel subsystems.


Figure 10‑30, PH‑06 Voluntary Programs Data

Condition: Air carrier voluntary program data may be useful for hazard or risk identification. Such data can aid the air carrier in managing corrective and followup actions.

Background: The FAA encourages air carrier participation in voluntary programs. Many of these programs provide unparalleled data opportunities, and therefore more effective opportunities for risk identification and control. The FAA will pursue harmonization of these programs and their integration with ATOS. These programs include but are not limited to Internal Evaluation Programs (IEP), Aviation Safety Action Programs (ASAP), Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA), Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program (VDRP) or Independent Flight Safety programs.

Properly managed, these programs help move safety management from the reactive mode to a data‑driven, proactive mode that continuously searches for accident precursors. Data sharing and open communication optimize the functioning of the oversight system and leverage resources to advance safety. If the air carrier does participate in one or more of these programs, in this indicator please consider the actual data from any internal risk management program(s) (IEP, CAS. VDRP, ASAP, etc.), and how it relates to ongoing identification and management of risk.

Risk Score

Inspector Considerations

1–2

The air carrier participates in voluntary programs. Data derived from the air carrier’s voluntary programs indicates apparent risk is well managed by air carrier systems.

3–5

Concern exists from the data derived from the air carrier’s voluntary program(s) due to considerations such as:

·        Repeated problem area(s) and/or adverse trending, particularly as regards procedures.

·        Signs of failure in interfaces and/or controls associated with the safety data.

·        Signs of failure in process measurements and/or responsibility/authority associated with the safety data.

6–7

Concern exists because data from air carrier voluntary program(s) appear to indicate a rapid degradation of the air carrier’s critical systems, apparent air carrier failure to address the associated risks. Concern exists because air carrier’s voluntary programs data appear to indicate a negative trend with escalation in severity.

Guidance References: FAA Order 8900.1, Volume 3, Chapter 44; Volume 6, Chapter 2, Section 30, Monitor Continuing Analysis and Surveillance Program/Revision; Volume 11, Chapter 2, Section 1, Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP); Volume 11, Chapter 2, Section 2, Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA); ATOS; SAI 1.3.11; EPI 1.3.11; AC 120‑79 as revised; AC 120‑59 as revised; AC 120‑66 as revised; AC 00‑58 as revised.

Data Sources: Data from any internal risk management program(s) (Internal Evaluation Program, Continuing Analysis and Surveillance, Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program, Aviation Safety Action Program, etc.)

Impact on ATOS System, Subsystem, and Elements: Associate the data that causes concern with the ATOS system, subsystem, and element model. Consider element(s) that might be affected, and/or element(s) relating to root causes.


Figure 10‑31, PH‑07 Surveillance Indicators

Condition: Surveillance data from SPAS, PTRS, and ATOS help to identify trends in air carrier performance and can assist with identifying risks in an air carrier’s system design.

Background: Data from ATOS‑ and SPAS/PTRS‑based surveillance provides inspectors with insight into ongoing and new areas of risk in the air carrier’s performance. Continued adverse findings should lead to corrective action, but may also indicate risk that has yet to be fully mitigated. Inspector experience and judgment concerning areas of repeated or ongoing difficulty would also bear some level of equivalency as a data source when assessing this indicator.

Risk Score

Inspector Considerations

1–2

Insufficient data exists for the purpose of this Risk Indicator as defined above to make a determination. ATOS/SPAS data trends for the air carrier do not indicate any area(s) or trend(s) of apparent risk, or indicated risk currently being mitigated by other means.

3–5

Concern exists in ATOS/SPAS data trends for considerations such as:

·        Decline in air carrier performance on reported surveillance.

·        Repeated items of concern in the same area(s) in data.

6–7

Concern exists because ATOS/SPAS data trends indicate major deviation from the baseline in critical operational and/or maintenance area(s). Air carrier is not addressing the associated risk(s). Concern exists because ATOS/SPAS appears trending appears to indicate a negative trend with escalation in severity. Concern exists because oversight in this area has been postponed due to lack of Federal Aviation Administration resources.

Guidance References: FAA Order 8900.1 Volume 6, Chapter 2, Section 2, Reporting on Surveillance for Parts 121, 135, and 91 Subpart K; Volume 6, Chapter 2, Section 25, Evaluating Part 121, Air Carrier Programs With Safety Attribute Inspection and Element Performance Inspection Data Collection Tools; Volume 10, Chapter 1, Section 2, Introduction to ATOS Business Process and Tools; Volume 10, Chapter 2, Procedures for Design and Performance Assessment; ATOS Automation User Guide, System Data Analysis Guide.

Data Sources: ATOS database, SPAS, inspector observation/knowledge of performance history.

Impact on ATOS System, Subsystem, and Elements: For negative SPAS trends related to PTRS surveillance findings, associate the problem area(s) with the corresponding ATOS system(s), subsystem(s), element(s). For negative ATOS data trends, focus on the element(s) that are the source of the adverse trend. Consider also the related manuals, training and personnel systems that support the element(s) adversely affected.


Figure 10‑32, OS‑01 Key Management SPAS Indicators

Condition: Changes in key management personnel can significantly impact an air carrier’s system and operational stability.

Background: The SPAS management indicator incorporates the SPAS performance measures related to changes in the following key management personnel: chief executive officer, chief inspector, chief pilot, director of maintenance, director of operations, director of safety, general manager. Consider the size of the air carrier. The impact of SPAS indicators on small air carriers or a new entrant may be greater than on large, established air carriers. Key management personnel at a small air carrier may play multiple roles. High key‑management turnover could significantly impact the air carrier’s operational stability if no processes are in place to manage the change. Regardless of the number of years an air carrier has been in operation, the changes reflected in the SPAS indicators should be considered in light of their potential impact on system and operational stability.

Risk Score

Inspector Considerations

1–2

The air carrier has not experienced a change in its key management personnel. There may have been changes in key management personnel, but SPAS flag state is Expected.

3–5

Concern exists due to considerations such as:

·        SPAS flag states are at the Concern or Advisory Threshold.

·        Changes in key management personnel appear to have adversely affected the air carrier’s programs, regardless of SPAS flag state.

6–7

Concern exists because of rapid and widespread changes in key management in nearly all departments and operational areas. \

Guidance References: FAA Order 8900.1 Volume 3, Chapter 34, Section 1, Air Carrier Mergers and Acquisition of Air Carrier Operational Assets; Volume 10, Chapter 4, Section 1, The Air Carrier Evaluation Process.

Data Sources: SPAS, air carrier interviews, labor unions, air carrier press releases, air carrier regulatory notifications.

Impact on ATOS System, Subsystem, and Elements: When concern exists regarding change in key air carrier management positions required by regulation, focus on the corresponding and interfacing ATOS element(s) for these positions. Consider also the impact on other ATOS system(s), subsystem(s) and element(s) depending upon the position jurisdiction and safety purview related to the changed position.


Figure 10‑33, OS‑02 Financial Conditions

Condition: Air carriers that experience adverse financial conditions may have higher risk.

Background: When an air carrier experiences financial instability, the possibility for risk may increase due to a number of complex and interrelated causes, factors, and results. These may directly or indirectly impact various aspects of the air carrier’s system, subsystem, element structure, and may overlap with other risk indicators, or become a causal factor for the generation of risk in other areas. FAA Order 8900.1, Volume 6, Chapter 2, Section 18, Evaluation of Air Carrier’s Management of Significant Changes, discusses in detail the issues of risk management for air carriers. Figure 6‑29 of that section includes a decision aid for scoring risk as it relates to financial condition. This decision aid should be utilized to arrive at periodic assessments at the air carrier. Adverse findings on the decision aid for an ATOS carrier lead to ACAT changes or the RMP. If the inspector arrives at adverse scoring, he or she should consider this risk indicator, as well as other associated risk indicators that are alluded to in the scoring components for the Financial Condition Assessment Decision Aid.

Risk Score

Inspector Considerations

1–2

Financial Condition Assessment Decision Aid Score of 72–90

3–5

Financial Condition Assessment Decision Aid Score of 46–71

6–7

Financial Condition Assessment Decision Aid Score of 9–45

Guidance References: FAA Order 8900.1, Volume 6, Chapter 2, Section 18, Evaluation of Air Carrier’s Management of Significant Changes.

Data Sources: Periodic meetings between the FAA PIs and air carrier management, conversations with knowledgeable air carrier personnel, documentation received from the air carrier or other appropriate agencies (Security and Exchange Commission, courts, banks, creditors, etc.), press, industry publications, ASIAS, etc.

Impact on ATOS System, Subsystem, and Elements: This particular risk indicator has a potentially close association with other risk indicators. When associating this indicator with the ATOS system, subsystem, element model, keep in mind that problems identified here may also have similar impact for other risk indicators as the risk indicator evaluation continues. Direct linkage might be possible between poor financial condition and the ATOS system, subsystem, element model. Consider any element(s) where budget cuts might have adverse impact.


Figure 10‑34, OS‑03 Change in Air Carrier Management

Condition: Changes in management personnel other than key management can significantly impact an air carrier’s system and operational stability.

Background: Middle management at a small air carrier may be primarily responsible for the quality of the air carrier’s systems, and any major changes could be significant. A large air carrier may have additional resources that can be relied upon when air carrier middle management personnel change. Regardless of size, the significance of the change in air carrier management should be assessed to determine the potential impact on the air carrier’s system and operational stability. The air carrier management may include personnel in the air carrier’s safety, quality assurance, engineering, operations, and maintenance departments. Changes in middle management in any of the air carrier’s major lines of business should be considered. Changes in administrative management should also be considered though they may not have the same level of impact.

Risk Score

Inspector Considerations

1–2

There have been no changes in air carrier middle management. Changes in middle management are not of high concern as there appears to be little to no impact on the air carrier’s system and operational stability. The air carrier has demonstrated appropriate and effective management of any events.

3–5

Concern exists for adverse impact at the air carrier due to change in middle management due to considerations such as:

·        Change in middle management is sudden and due to employee dissatisfaction.

·        Change in middle management does not appear to be a controlled change.

·        High change in middle management within the maintenance and/or operations organizations.

·        New or remaining staff is being retrained or cross‑trained to perform the new or expanded functions.

·        Air carrier has not experienced change in middle management in its prior history.

6–7

Concern exists for adverse impact because of rapid and widespread changes in middle management in nearly all departments and operational areas. The air carrier has not demonstrated appropriate or effective management of the event(s).

Guidance References: FAA Order 8900.1 Volume 6, Chapter 2, Section 18, Evaluation of Air Carrier’s Management of Significant Changes; Volume 10, Chapter 4, Section 1, The Air Carrier Evaluation Process.

Data Sources: Air carrier information, labor information. Consultation with the air carrier or use of industry data may be helpful in identifying such changes and assessing their impact.

Impact on ATOS System, Subsystem, and Elements: Evaluate the organizational areas that the changed middle management positions oversee. Consider the impact of such dislocations on air carrier stability and operations, and focus on the ATOS system(s), subsystem(s) and element(s) corresponding to the changed middle manager’s oversight responsibilities. Evaluate whether and how the changes might also adversely impact the training and technical administration system(s).


Figure 10‑35, OS‑04 Turnover in Personnel

Condition: A high turnover of operations or maintenance personnel can dramatically increase the potential for risk in an air carrier’s systems.

Background: Turnover in personnel may affect only the maintenance or operations organizations, or there may be a significant loss of key personnel throughout the entire organization. Maintenance personnel include staff members directly involved in ensuring the quality of the maintenance organization. Operations personnel include staff members directly involved in ensuring the quality of air carrier operations, including crewmembers (pilots and flight attendants), dispatch, and training staff.

Risk Score

Inspector Considerations

1–2

The air carrier has not experienced significant turnover in personnel. Any turnover in personnel is minor and/or the air carrier has demonstrated appropriate and effective management of any events.

3–5

Concern exists for adverse impact at the air carrier due to turnover in personnel because of such considerations including:

·        Turnover of personnel is sudden and due to employee dissatisfaction.

·        Turnover of personnel does not appear to be a controlled change.

·        High turnover in personnel within the maintenance and/or operations organizations.

·        New or remaining staff is being retrained or cross‑trained to perform the new or expanded functions.

6–7

Concern exists for adverse impact due to widespread and rapid personnel turnover in safety sensitive areas with very high impact on critical systems. The air carrier has not demonstrated appropriate or effective management of the event(s).

Guidance References: FAA Order 8900.1, Volume 6, Chapter 2, Section 10, Operator Trip Records Inspections (PTRS Code 1628); Volume 6, Chapter 2, Section 18; Volume 3, Chapter 34, Section 1.

Data Sources: Direct queries of company management, union announcements, company newsletters, bulletins, etc.

Impact on ATOS System, Subsystem, and Elements: Evaluate the areas of the company’s operation that is losing personnel. Match the diminished job function(s) to the ATOS system, subsystem, and element model to assess impact. Consider also the impact on training, manual, and technical administration systems. If inspector concern is centered upon retraining, or cross training of employees, focus on the personnel training and qualification system.


Figure 10‑36, OS‑05 Reduction in Workforce

Condition: A reduction in the air carrier’s workforce can dramatically increase the potential for failure in an air carrier’s systems.

Background: Workforce reductions, layoffs, or buyouts may or may not have an impact on safety and the potential for noncompliance; it depends on how and why they occur, and who is involved.

Risk Score

Inspector Considerations

1–2

The air carrier has not experienced reduction in workforce. There has been little reduction in workforce and/or the air carrier has demonstrated appropriate and effective management of any events.

3–5

Concern exists for adverse impact at the air carrier due to reduction in workforce due to considerations such as:

·        Reduction of personnel does not appear to be a controlled change, pace and rate of reduction is abrupt, haphazard, uncoordinated, or occurring over very short timeframe.

·        Reduction in personnel within the maintenance and/or operations organizations.

·        Reduction affected most experienced personnel and/or of quality, safety or training personnel.

·        Air carrier has not experienced a comparable reduction in workforce in its prior history.

6–7

Concern exists for adverse impact at the air carrier due to widespread and rapid personnel reduction in safety sensitive areas with very high impact on critical systems. The air carrier has not demonstrated appropriate or effective management of the event(s).

Guidance References: FAA Order 8900.1, Volume 6, Chapter 2, Section 18.

Data Sources: Direct queries of company management, union announcements, company newsletters, bulletins, etc.

Impact on ATOS System, Subsystem, and Elements: Evaluate the areas of the company’s operation that is losing personnel. Match the diminished job function(s) to the ATOS system, subsystem, and element model to assess impact. Consider also the impact on training, manual, and technical administration systems.


Figure 10‑37, OS‑06 Rapid Growth/Downsizing

Condition: Times of significant change such as rapid expansion or downsizing can impact air carrier operations due to the possible misalignment of resources and operational requirements.

Background: Growth may be quite apparent in the addition of new aircraft, routes, and employees. It may also be less apparent; growth may be in the form of the addition of new programs or business practices. (For example: the addition of a repair station certificate, or an increase in aircraft utilization.) Downsizing may also be apparent in the reduction of aircraft, routes, and employees or in less apparent operational areas. It is also possible for an air carrier to simultaneously experience rapid change in the areas of growth and downsizing. (For example: an air carrier’s business plan could include a dramatic reduction in workforce with a simultaneous expansion in routes.) If organizational structures and support resources do not keep pace with the tempo of operations and the changes, safety problems can occur.

Risk Score

Inspector Considerations

1–2

The air carrier is not presently experiencing rapid growth or downsizing. Rapid growth or downsizing appears to be effectively managed by the air carrier’s procedures, controls and process measures. Any adverse impact appears to be negligible to nonexistent.

—and/or—

Rapid Growth/Downsizing Assessment Decision Aid score between 43 and 60.

3–5

Air carrier may not have properly implemented its rapid growth/downsizing plan. Concern exists due to considerations such as: Delay, cancellation and reliability rates, MELs carried daily, Turn times between flights and/or ground time for maintenance, Crew rest requirements, Misallocation of resources, Adequacy of training and training department personnel

—and/or—

Rapid Growth/Downsizing Assessment Decision Aid score between 25 and 42 related to growth, downsizing or simultaneous combination.

6–7

Concern exists since the air carrier is not using any projected business plan to govern the growth or downsizing

—and/or—

Rapid Growth/Downsizing Assessment Decision Aid score between 6 and 24 related to growth, downsizing or simultaneous combination.

Guidance References: FAA Order 8900.1, Volume 6, Chapter 2, Section 18.

Data Sources: Air carrier programs, OpSpecs, discussion with air carrier personnel, performance history of risk management programs, DCTs.

Impact on ATOS System, Subsystem, and Elements: Since rapid expansion, growth, or downsizing virtually affects the whole operation of an air carrier, it can be difficult to pinpoint specific areas in the operation that may present a risk. If the Rapid Growth/Downsizing Assessment Decision Aid (FAA Order 8900.1, Volume 6, Chapter 2, Section 18, Figure 6‑30) was used, focus on the word pictures where the individual scoring was low and consider any corresponding ATOS element(s).


Figure 10‑38,OS‑07 Merger or Takeover

Condition: Air carriers must effectively manage mergers or takeovers to ensure continued compliance and safe operating practices.

Background: A merger or takeover may include a combination of divergent corporate and organizational structures and safety cultures. Some merger or takeover transactions may simply be a name change, or may occur at a level that does not alter or impact safety sensitive operations. In these cases, the impact on system or operational stability may be minimal.

Risk Score

Inspector Considerations

1–2

The air carrier has not experienced a merger or takeover. The air carrier appears to be effectively managing the risk associated with the merger or takeover. Adherence to new processes, procedures and programs appears to be adequate. Any adverse impact is negligible to nonexistent, or unrelated to safety‑sensitive issues.

3–5

Concern exists for adverse impact at the air carrier due to considerations such as:

·        The impact of a merger or takeover may not be effectively managed by the air carrier’s procedures, controls and process measures.

·        The air carrier key personnel and others have little to moderate experience with the new type and complexity of the operation.

·        Evidence of inadequate interface between processes, procedures, and programs across departments.

·        Evidence of inadequacies in adherence to new processes, procedures and programs.

6–7

Concern exists for adverse impact because the air carrier has no transition plan in place for accomplishing the merger or acquisition. The air carrier’s key personnel and others have no experience with the new type and complexity of the operation. The air carrier has not demonstrated appropriate or effective management of the event(s).

Guidance References: FAA Order 8900.1, Volume 5, Chapter 3, Section 1, Application Phase¾ATP Applicants Engaged in Operations Under Title 14 CFR Part 121, 135, or 91 Subpart K—Airplanes and Helicopters; Volume 3, Chapter 34, Section 1; Volume 3, Chapter 34, Section 2, Major Changes in Operating Authority.

Data Sources: Office of the Secretary of Transportation, media, air carrier personnel, labor unions, DCTs, SPAS.

Impact on ATOS System, Subsystem, and Elements: Look at system(s), subsystem(s) and element(s) associated with the risk by evaluating where the largest changes/program differences or most serious lack of interface could exist. Consider focusing also on the ATOS elements dealing with training and technical administration/management support for these areas of concern.


Figure 10-39, OS‑08 Labor–Management Relations

Condition: A poor or deteriorating labor–management relationship can create risk.

Background: Good labor–management relations are critical to the system and operational stability of the air carrier. A threatened or actual shutdown in operations can have an adverse economic impact on an air carrier as well as greatly affect the stability of an air carrier’s systems. Areas to consider include the status of the bargaining agreements between air carrier labor and management, job function(s) of employee groups in adversarial relationship with management and the potential effect(s) on the air carrier’s systems, subsystems, and elements.

Risk Score

Inspector Considerations

1–2

The air carrier appears to have no adverse labor–management relations issues at this time. The air carrier has demonstrated appropriate and effective management of any labor‑management issues or events.

3–5

There appear to be difficulties in the air carrier’s labor–management relations.

Concern exists due to considerations such as:

·        Informational picketing is being conducted by employees against the air carrier.

·        Newspaper advertisements, billboards, or other methods that describe lack of contract negotiations or bargaining has been purchased by either the employee groups or management of the air carrier.

·        Cross‑utilization of employees in safety sensitive areas due to the unrest (e.g., management working line functions in addition to their normal managerial responsibilities).

·        Requests for employee concessions by management and/or lower than industry average compensation and benefits.

6–7

Concern exists regarding direct adverse impact of poor labor–management relations on safety. Employee group(s) actively conducting a work stoppage due to labor unrest at the air carrier. The air carrier has not demonstrated appropriate or effective management of the event(s).

Guidance References: FAA Order 8900.1, Volume 7, Chapter 1, Section 1, Accident Investigations; Volume 7, Chapter 1, Section 2, Incident Investigations and Occurrences; Volume 8, Chapter 5, Section 6, Process Service Difficulty Report.

Data Sources: SPAS Data packages, FAA Accident Investigation Records, Investigation of Pilot Deviation Reports, Accident/Incident Corrective Action Records, Aircraft Accident/Incident Preliminary Notices, NTSB findings/reports, MIS reports, Service Difficulty Report, DCT 1.2.4 “Mechanical Interruption Summary Reports”

Impact on ATOS System, Subsystem, and Elements: If root cause(s) and/or failure of event(s) is generally known and validated, consider the system(s), subsystem(s) and element(s) in the ATOS structure that relate to the failure or root cause. Consider also the ATOS Training and Technical Administration systems. If the air carrier has not effectively and appropriately managed the events, consider also the ATOS Manuals and Technical Administration Systems.


Figure 10‑40, CD‑01 New/Major Changes to Program

Condition: Safety issues may develop from new or changed programs and may increase the potential for noncompliance with existing processes and controls.

Background: New or changed programs at an air carrier should be assessed to determine if and how they affect the air carrier’s operations, training and maintenance system. Some program changes are significant enough to require an OpSpecs amendment, such as Extended Twin‑Engine Operations (Extended Operations), but some new or changed programs are less apparent. For example, a sales and marketing initiative adding additional destinations might drive a program change to increase fleet utilization, and cause a reduction in ground time and aircraft servicing, which may induce safety‑related risks. Any new program or program change that affects the air carrier’s systems could have a significant impact on the air carrier’s safety profile.

Risk Score

Inspector Considerations

1–2

There are no new or major changes to air carrier programs. There are well‑established and maintained system controls, with fully documented procedures, which have allowed the air carrier to absorb new programs or program changes without affecting quality or safety. The air carrier has demonstrated appropriate and effective management of the situation.

3–5

Concern exists regarding adverse impact of new/major changes at an air carrier due to considerations such as: major changes to programs are inadequately described and documented; major changes are motivated by cost cutting; the affected department(s) system control(s) do not have sufficient degree of strength and comprehensiveness to support the new/changed program; air carrier’s staff size and capabilities do not meet the requirements of the changed program and/or are not sufficiently trained, and/or Air carrier past performance history with new/changed programs.

6–7

Concern exists because air carrier infrastructure supporting the safety related aspects of the new or changed program does not exist at all. The controls in place no longer support the changed program or no controls exist for a new program. The air carrier has not demonstrated appropriate or effective management of the event(s) and concern exists for extremely adverse impact.

Guidance References: Not applicable.

Data Sources: Notifications by carrier, OpSpecs revisions, validation flight results, training program revisions, air carrier performance history.

Impact on ATOS System, Subsystem, and Elements: Identify the operational area where the change has taken place. In some cases, the new/changed program will correspond exactly with an ATOS element. Some examples include ETOPS, reduced vertical separation minimums authorizations, lower landing minimums, exit seating. Remember to also consider the interfacing ATOS systems, such as the Training, Manual, and Technical Administration systems. In other cases, the new/major change to program will not have a direct parallel with a specific element. In these cases, focus on the operational context of the change, and look for the element(s) that would most likely be impacted. Also consider supporting Manual, Training, and Technical Administration systems.


Figure 10‑41, CD‑02 Continuing Analysis and Surveillance System (CASS) (Airworthiness only)

Condition: Air carriers with a poorly functioning CASS can overlook and improperly manage increased levels of risk.

Background: A CASS provides the air carrier with an internal diagnostic and evaluation tool (audit and surveillance) for continuously monitoring and correcting deficiencies in its maintenance program through a system of ongoing data collection, data analysis, and trend reporting. When implemented and maintained within an environment that includes clear definition of responsibilities; process independence; management commitment; continuity; scheduled evaluation; corrective action and followup; and clear, concise, and available documentation; CASS can provide the air carrier with one critical means of ensuring management control over the maintenance organization. The CASS is an integral piece of an air carrier’s comprehensive maintenance and inspection program. As such, it requires consistent oversight not only by the carrier’s responsible personnel but also by the principal inspectors. It is incumbent on the CMT to monitor this program and identify and request corrective action of any shortcomings in the CASS.

Risk Score

Inspector Considerations

1–2

The air carrier appears to have an effective CASS in place and is using the data generated therein to continuously monitor and correct deficiencies in its maintenance program. The air carrier has demonstrated appropriate and effective management of any events.

3–5

Concern exists regarding the air carrier’s ability to manage a comprehensive CASS due to considerations such as:

·        Recurring findings after the issues has been mitigated by CASS.

·        CAS corrective actions result in new problem(s).

·        Recurring CASS findings are associated with the same ATOS subsystem(s).

·        CASS results are inconsistent with other outside audit results, such as those conducted by FAA and DOD.

·        There is no internal audit system of the CASS, e.g., Safety Audit Program.

·        Air carrier has no CASS performance history.

6–7

Concern exists that the carrier does not have a functioning CASS in place as indicated by IEP, safety program, or other equivalent program(s).The air carrier has not demonstrated appropriate or effective management of the situation.

Guidance References: FAA Order 8900.1, Volume 3, Chapter 43, Section 1, Evaluating a CAMP Program; Volume 3, Chapter 44, Section 1, Evaluating an Air Carrier’s CASS; Volume 6, Chapter 2, Section 30, Monitor Continuing Analysis and Surveillance Program/Revision; AC 120‑16, Air Carrier Maintenance Programs, as revised; AC 120‑59, Air Carrier Internal Evaluation Programs, as revised; AC 120‑79, Developing and Implementing a Continuing Analysis and Surveillance System, as revised; ATOS SAI 1.3.11 and EPI 1.3.11.

Data Sources: Periodic reliability reports, monthly CASS meetings, surveillance reports from both SPAS and the ATOS database, DOD findings, air carrier past performance including element 1.3.11.

Impact on ATOS system, Subsystem, and Elements: In addition to the actual ATOS element dedicated to CASS (1.3.11), consider how the deficiencies identified in the CASS may impact other ATOS system(s), subsystem(s) and element(s).


Figure 10‑42, CD‑03 Safety Management

Condition: Air carriers who do not have a safety management system may not understand or adequately control hazards to operational safety.

Background: A safety management system is essentially a business management approach to controlling risk. A risk management system provides the company’s management with a detailed roadmap for monitoring safety‑related processes. Risk management systems may incorporate one or more voluntary programs such as an Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP), and Internal Evaluation Program (IEP). Both of these programs have a strong relationship to the functions of safety assurance and safety promotion. Air carriers are encouraged to consider integrating these programs into their comprehensive approach to safety management. Safety management concentrates more on the control of processes rather than efforts targeted toward extensive inspection and remedial actions on end products. A good system will include safety quality policy, safety risk management, safety assurance, and safety promotion.

Risk Score

Inspector Considerations

1–2

The air carrier appears to have an effective Safety Management system in place and is utilizing the data generated therein to continuously monitor and correct deficiencies in its critical programs to adapt to the carriers’ changing environment. The air carrier has demonstrated appropriate and effective management of the situation.

3–5

Concern exists regarding the air carrier’s ability to manage a risk due to considerations such as:

·        The air carrier does not have policy and procedures that defines a method by which risk is managed

·        The air carrier does not have a risk management process to monitor the critical programs

·        The carrier does not have a safety assurance process; this is equivalent to an Internal Evaluation Program.

·        The carrier does not promote safety—safety culture must allow for communication and a means for employees to report safety deficiencies without fear of reprisal

6–7

Concern exists that the carrier does not have a safety management system or an equivalent method to assess and mitigate safety risk. It does not have an effective method of monitoring its safety critical programs to ensure it is adapting to the carrier’s changing environment.

Guidance References: FAA Order 8900.1, Volume 3, Chapter 24, Section 2, Evaluate and Accept a Maintenance Human Factors Training Program; Volume 3, Chapter 44, Section 1; Volume 6, Chapter 2, Section 25; Volume 6, Chapter 2, Section 30, Monitor Continuing Analysis and Surveillance Program/Revision; ATOS SAI 1.3.11, EPI 1.3.11.; AC 120‑79 as revised, AC 120‑59 as revised, AC 120‑66 as revised. AC 00‑58 as revised.

Data Sources: Periodic Reliability reports, monthly CAS meetings, surveillance reports from SPAS and the ATOS database, DOD Audit findings, Shared information and data collected from voluntary disclosure reporting programs.

Impact on ATOS System, Subsystem, and Elements: If weakness in a critical program has been identified, concentrate on the area(s) the critical program manages. Relate those area(s) to corresponding ATOS system(s), subsystem(s), element(s). Consider also focusing on Manuals and Key personnel subsystems.


Figure 10‑43, CD‑04 Relationship with the FAA

Condition: The air carrier’s relationship with its assigned FAA personnel may provide insights into the air carrier’s compliance posture and safety culture.

Background: Strong communication, a high level of trust, and a good working relationship between air carrier personnel and FAA personnel assigned to monitor the air carrier can have a positive impact on quality and safety. Conversely, a weak communications infrastructure and a lack of trust between parties can have a negative impact on air carrier operations, quality, and safety. This, in turn, can affect the stability of the air carrier’s systems, and may be an indication of risk.

Risk Score

Inspector Considerations

1–2

The air carrier appears to have a cooperative relationship with assigned FAA personnel.

3–5

Concern exists regarding the air carrier’s relationship with the FAA due to considerations such as:

·        Little or no history of strong two‑way communication between air carrier and assigned FAA personnel.

·        Recent indications of unwillingness to share data and findings with assigned FAA personnel on the part of the air carrier.

·        FAA recommendations and suggestions not welcomed by the air carrier.

6–7

Concern exists due to apparent failure of cooperation with assigned FAA personnel in critical air carrier areas. The air carrier has not demonstrated appropriate or effective management of this situation.

Guidance References FAA Order 8900.1, Volume 10, Chapter 1, Section 2, 

Data Sources: FAA personnel assigned to the air carrier, meetings with air carrier personnel, written correspondence between air carrier and CMO/CHDO.

Impact on ATOS system, Subsystem, and Elements: Consider which subsystem(s) and element(s) are directly affected by the perceived lack of cooperation and/or communication. (For example, if the company department/personnel overseeing flight attendants are not cooperative with the FAA, consider which ATOS system(s), subsystem(s), element(s) may have associated adverse impact and risk due to that lack of cooperation.).


Figure 10‑44, CD‑05 Human Factors

Condition: Risk may exist due to human lapses in the air carrier’s design and/or performance.

Background: Human factors is an umbrella term for the myriad effects of human interaction with a system. When humans act within established parameters, the system functions as designed. When humans deviate from established parameters, the system is degraded and moves into areas of unknown levels of risk and accidents and incidents occur. To achieve the level of safety desirable in high-consequence operations such as airlines, an organization’s systems must function in a variety of circumstances without degradation. Standard operating procedures and controls can be introduced into the system to lessen the potential for human variability or increase the system’s tolerance for human variability. A certificate holder’s failure to develop and implement effective standard operating procedures and controls could increase the level of risk in system and processes.

Risk Score

Inspector Considerations

1–2

There were no observed human factors lapses at the air carrier. Any human factors lapses were minor. The air carrier has demonstrated appropriate and effective management of any events.

3–5

Concern exists that the air carrier has inadequate human factors design or performance due to considerations such as:

·        Human factors not integrated into air carrier’s training program.

·        Human factors not integrated into air carrier’s safety systems.

·        Air carrier process to ascertain root cause of human factors problems is ineffective.

·        Air carrier system controls are ineffective.

·        Substantial number and/or type of human factors performance errors have occurred at the air carrier.

6–7

Concern exists due to repeated and critical human factors performance errors that remain uncorrected and appear to indicate a negative trend with escalation in severity. The air carrier has not demonstrated appropriate or effective management of the event(s).

Guidance References: FAA Order 8900.1, Volume 3, Chapter 24, Section 2, Evaluate and Accept a Maintenance Human Factors Training Program; Volume 11, Chapter 4, Human Factors Involved in Inspection and Repair in a Heavy Maintenance Environment; FAA Order 9550.8, Human Factors Policy.

Data Sources: ATOS Data Collection Tools, particularly SAI Controls Section and EPI Performance Measures; SPAS and PTRS data; ASIAS database; NTSB database

Impact on ATOS System, Subsystem, and Elements: Human factors issues could potentially impact every air carrier system, as all systems involve human input and interaction with the system. Lapses in human factors design may exist in Manual Management, Maintenance Organization, and Training Program. Consider the location of the concern. Focus on elements with past negative findings in SAI controls attribute and/or EPI performance measures. Consider if training and technical administration design or performance also contributes to the risk.

RESERVED. Paragraphs 10‑127 through 10‑141


7/28/08                                                                                                                         8900.1 CHG 0

Volume 10  Air Transportation Oversight System

Chapter 2  Procedures for Design and Performance Assessment

Section 3  Design and Performance Assessment Resource Management

Figure 10‑45, Module 3: Resource Management

Figure 10-45, Module 3. Resource Management flowchart

10-142  Resource Management. Resource management is an ongoing process to ensure that available resources are assigned to the highest risk priorities identified in the Comprehensive Assessment Plan (CAP) for continuing operational safety.

A.     By comparing the prioritized CAP and available resources, managers ensure that available resources are assigned to tasks with the highest safety priority for a given quarter.

B.     Funding to complete the job is allocated at the same time the individual is assigned. If resources are not available, the manager leaves the work unassigned and documents the reasons why. The principal inspector (PI) or certification project manager (CPM) is notified that the work was not assigned. When insufficient resources are available to complete all the work, the frontline manager uses the CAP to establish priority when making assignments.

C.     Prioritizing and assigning resources based on risk is a critical aspect of the Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS). CAPs are created independent of resources. Quarterly work programs consist of design assessments and performance assessments that are assigned to inspectors. Unassigned design and performance assessments eventually are documented as work not accomplished because resources are not available.

10-143 Is the Appropriate Resource Available? (See flowchart process step 3.1.) The frontline manager evaluates the CAP against the roster of the Certificate Management Team (CMT) or the Certification Project Team (CPT) to determine whether the appropriate resources are available to accomplish the assessment activities. The frontline manager considers scheduled leave, scheduled training, training requirements, and other potential constraints. For a certification project, the certificate‑holding district office (CHDO) and the regional office determines adequate resource availability during the initial evaluation per the Certification Services Oversight Process for Original Organizational Certifications document. The manager should consider the availability of the AFS‑900 ATOS Certificate Management Office (CMO) certification section support, and regional and national specialist availability (e.g., resource pilot support).

A.     Roster Maintenance. The manager ensures that the roster accurately reflects CMT or CPT membership as active qualified, active nonqualified, or inactive.

1)      Active, qualified members are assigned to the CMT or CPT and meet the baseline training requirements for their assigned position. (See paragraph 3.)
2)      Active, nonqualified members are assigned to the CMT or CPT, but have not completed baseline training requirements. (See paragraph 3.)
3)      Inactive members are no longer assigned or available to the CMT or CPT.

B.     Certificate Management Team Staffing. A dedicated CMT is assigned oversight responsibility for each air carrier. The CMT develops and executes a CAP that is tailored to that air carrier. CMT staffing may include:

1)      Certificate Management Team Manager. The CMT manager is the office, section, or unit manager who is assigned overall responsibility for air carrier certificate management. The CMT manager is an advocate for ATOS policies, processes, and their integration into the business strategies and operations of the office. The manager ensures that inspector resources are assigned to the highest safety priorities for a given quarter.
2)      Frontline Manager(s). Frontline managers directly supervise, assign, and review the work of CMT members.
3)      Principal Operations Inspector, Principal Maintenance Inspector, and Principal Avionics Inspector. A PI should not be assigned to more one Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations part 121 air carrier CMT. Each PI may have one or more assistant PIs.
4)      Data Evaluation Program Manager. A data evaluation program manager (DEPM) may be assigned to the CMT. In the absence of a DEPM, frontline managers serve as data reviewers. The DEPM reports to a frontline manager above the PI. The DEPM must be qualified as an air carrier inspector. A DEPM should be assigned to no more than four CMTs. Shared DEPMs report to only one CMT manager and only one frontline manager, as determined by their regional office.
5)      Aviation Safety Inspectors. All aviation safety inspectors (ASI) assigned to the air carrier certificate are members of the CMT. ASIs are generally located at the CHDO or CMO but can be shared among more than one CMT. Assigned ASIs can include those from the following areas of expertise: flight operations, maintenance, avionics, cabin safety, and dispatch. At least one Cabin Safety inspector (CSI) is assigned to each CMT with oversight responsibility of air carriers involved in passenger carriage. If the air carrier is an all‑cargo operation, the CMT must consider cabin safety issues if the air carrier has provisions or procedures for supernumerary personnel. Dispatch ASIs (DSI) may be shared resources and priority assignment should be considered to support CMT’s with oversight responsibility of air carriers involved in passenger carriage.
a)      Shared ASIs. Shared ASIs may be approved by a division when only one certificate‑holding region (and ideally when only one CHDO) is involved. An ASI that is a shared resource should not be assigned to more than four CMTs. Shared ASIs report to only one CMT manager and only one frontline manager, as determined by their regional office.
b)      Requirements for Remotely Sited Positions. Under certain circumstances, ASIs may be based in a location other than the CHDO or CMO. Regional division managers are responsible for establishing and approving remotely sited positions.

1.      These positions are only established for situations where the air carrier has very large, noncontract training or maintenance centers located far from the CHDO.

2.      A remotely sited position also may be necessary with the expectation of an ongoing full person‑year of data collection for design and performance assessments associated with the CAP.

3.      As the focus of ATOS is on systems‑based assessments rather than event‑ or activity‑based assessments, air carrier hubs and employee domiciles are not the sole consideration in this determination.

6)      Operations Research Analyst. An operations research analyst (ORA) is assigned to each CMT. Regional or national analysts may provide analytical support.
7)      Aviation Safety Technicians and Aviation Safety Assistants. If aviation safety technicians and aviation safety assistants are assigned to the air carrier certificate, then they are members of the CMT.

C.     Certification Project Team Staffing. A CPT is assigned to each initial certification project prior to the applicant initiating formal application. The CPT develops and executes a CAP that is tailored to that applicant.

1)      General Certification Project Team Requirements. For air carriers certificated to operate under part 121, existing part 121 principal inspectors are not used for new certification activities. Other ASIs currently assigned to a part 121 CMT may be used for the new certification activities only to the extent that existing operator oversight is not compromised. Available staffing for post certification should exist or be reasonably projected to be available through reassignments or merit promotion selections. The staffing should be comprised of dedicated PIs that are not assigned other complexity to 14 CFR part 121 CMTs. Only inspectors in an air carrier position description are used for air carriers certificated for part 121 operations.
2)      CPT members include:
a)      Certification Project Manager. The CHDO manager designates one member of the certification team to serve as the CPM. The person designated as CPM should have completed the baseline training and should have previous experience in certifying an air carrier under part 121. It is desirable that a person with PI experience be designated as the CPM.
b)      Certification Team Leader. The AFS‑900 ATOS CMO Certification Section assigns a certification team leader and team members to each certification project. This person works with the CPM to communicate and coordinate all certification team activities and ensure the CPD is followed.
c)      Certification Team Members. The certification team should consist of at least an Operations inspector, a Maintenance inspector, and an Avionics inspector. At least one CSI is assigned to each certification project involving passenger carriage. If the certification is for a cargo‑only operation, the certification team must consider cabin safety issues if the applicant has provisions or procedures for supernumerary personnel. Utilizing a Dispatch inspector is recommended. For each proposed aircraft type, there should be a qualified Operations inspector assigned to the team.

10-144 Baseline Training. An inspector may be assigned to a CMT or CPT before receiving baseline training, but inspectors cannot be assigned a Safety Attribute Inspection (SAI), Element Performance Inspection (EPI), or Constructed Dynamic Observation Report (ConDOR) until they have received the baseline training. Frontline managers verify that their assigned inspectors have completed required training, including the Air Carrier‑Specific Familiarization Briefing, before assigning them to SAIs, EPIs, and ConDORs. The CMT or CPT roster should always be updated when an inspector completes baseline training. The baseline training for all inspectors assigned to a CMT or a CPT includes:

·        All courses of all phases of the initial or transition air carrier training string for the inspector’s specialty;

·        System Safety course;

·        Overview of ATOS and system safety;

·        ATOS orientation training course;

·        ATOS automation applications training course; and

·        Initial and recurrent Air Carrier‑Specific Familiarization Briefing (CMT members only).

10-145 Air Carrier‑Specific Familiarization Briefing. ASIs are provided the Air Carrier‑Specific Familiarization Briefing upon initial assignment to an ATOS CMT. (See Figure 10‑46 for recommended topics.) Inspectors who are assigned to a CPT, or who were assigned to the air carrier when it transitioned to ATOS are considered to have already received the required initial Air Carrier‑Specific Familiarization Briefing during the certification or transition processes. At the annual planning meeting inspectors receive recurrent Air Carrier‑Specific Familiarization Briefings in applicable subjects to refresh their knowledge and be notified of any significant changes in the air carrier’s operations. CMTs use the following policies and procedures to plan, conduct, and document initial and recurrent Air Carrier‑Specific Familiarization Briefings.

A.     Applicability. Inspectors assigned to CMTs receive briefings in the general topics and subjects that are specific for their specialty. DEPMs receive briefings in the general topics and subjects specific to operations, cabin safety, maintenance, and avionics.

B.     Methodologies. The air carrier‑specific outline of subjects may be presented by a combination of lectures, site visits, and directed self‑study. The briefings may be conducted one on one or for a group of new CMT members at the option of the manager. The directed self‑study should be completed during normal working hours and should not be used for more than 50 percent of the recommended programmed hour requirements.

C.     Recommended Curriculum. A standard curriculum is contained in the Air Carrier‑Specific Familiarization Briefing outline located in Figure 10‑46 at the end of this section. The CMT manager determines which subjects are applicable to the air carrier’s operations, and determines the amount of lecture and self‑study hours.

D.    Briefing Presenters. Inspectors assigned to the CMT with expertise in the covered subject will conduct lecture portions of the Air Carrier‑Specific Familiarization Briefings. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Briefing and Presentation Techniques correspondence course (catalog number 14010) should be used by presenters who do not have prior experience as instructors.

E.     Assessment. An open‑book, oral, or written quiz determines satisfactory completion of the briefings.

F.      Recordkeeping. Each CMT will maintain a copy of its Air Carrier‑Specific Familiarization Briefing outline and any self‑study materials. The CMT documents successful completion of the initial Air Carrier‑Specific Familiarization Briefing for each CMT member.

G.    Funding. Each CMT is responsible for the costs associated with completing the Air Carrier‑Specific Familiarization Briefings.

10-146 OTHER TRAINING.

A.     All CMT Operations inspectors are programmed to receive initial training in an aircraft type operated by their assigned air carrier. CMT Operations inspectors may be programmed to receive recurrent training as required by their assigned responsibilities.

B.     All CMT Airworthiness inspectors are programmed to receive initial systems training appropriate to their avionics or maintenance specialty in an aircraft type operated by their assigned carrier.

C.     Inspectors assigned to a CPT receive briefings on the Certification Process Document.

D.    ORAs receive the following training, as required: indoctrination, Safety Performance Analysis System, ATOS baseline training, and training for data‑rich carrier programs as needed (e.g., Advanced Qualification Program, Aviation Safety/Accident Prevention, Maintenance Reliability).

10-147 Sharing of Resources. For decisions regarding resource management of the CMT positions above, the Shared Resources Decision Aid can assist CHDO management. This decision aid is located on the ATOS intranet site. Aviation Safety inspectors may be assigned to no more than four CMTs. Employees report to only one frontline manager. Resources sharing should only occur within a single region and ideally when only one CHDO is involved.

Note:   Sharing of resources should be accomplished based on national guidance and directives.

10-148 Assign Individual and Allocate Funding. (See flowchart process step 3.2.) When the appropriate resource is available based on staffing, training, and funding, the frontline manager assigns the inspector to the appropriate work assignment and allocates funding.

A.     The frontline manager assigns and utilizes resources in accordance with the prioritization identified by the PI or CPM in the CAP.

B.     Frontline managers should also consider relevant certificate factors when making work assignments, particularly when CMTs share resources. Factors to consider when comparing work requests from two or more CMTs include:

·        Enplanements and departures,

·        Length of time the carrier has been certificated,

·        Fleet size, type, and age,

·        Utilization rate,

·        Route structure (number of stations, number of FAA regions),

·        Type of operation (Effect on flying public),

·        Number of approved programs (complexity),

·        Maintenance contracts,

·        Training contracts,

·        Crew domiciles,

·        Multiple certificate management responsibilities of principals, and

·        Wet and dry lease.

C.     Other Considerations for Assigning Work to CMT or CPT Inspectors.

1)      The CAP is the only part 121 assessment work program assigned. In addition to data collection activities for the assigned CMTs, inspectors may also be assigned work in accordance with FAA Order 8900.1, Volume 11, Chapter 11, Section 1, Flight Standards Geographic Program.
2)      The frontline manager can redirect work assignments from one CMT or CPT member to another.

10-149 Assignments for Design or Performance Assessment.

A.     PI Instructions. PIs should provide detailed instructions to assist the manager or frontline manager in identifying appropriate individuals to assign to SAIs and EPIs. The manager or frontline manager should consider inspector training, experience, qualifications, geographic location, availability, and workload.

B.     DCT‑Specific Instructions. Some DCTs may contain specific instructions for additional training, experience, or qualifications that may be helpful in determining inspector assignments. Specific instructions may also include additional references, background information, manuals, or other system document that should be reviewed, as well as suggestions for specific types of activities and/or reporting instructions.

C.     Inspector Assignments Can Be Changed Anytime Prior to Actual Work Activity Being Started. Assignment changes may include switching from unassigned to assigned or vice versa, and reassigning an assessment from one inspector to another. Once work has begun on an EPI or SAI, inspector assignments cannot be changed.

10-150 Considerations Specific to Assigning an SAI. The frontline manager assigns SAI team coordinators (TC) and SAI team members. The frontline manager may assign an SAI to a single inspector. In that case, the inspector is also the TC. To help the frontline manager identify appropriate individuals to assign to SAI teams, PIs or CPMs should provide detailed instructions. The frontline manager should consider inspector training, experience, qualifications, geographic location, availability, and workload.

A.     The SAI Team Coordinator. The SAI TC organizes and coordinates SAI team activities. The TC ensures that activities, such as air carrier personnel interviews, are not redundant and that team members complete all activities to accurately answer the questions on the SAI. The TC is a leadership role that should be assigned to an experienced inspector with a solid knowledge of the air carrier. The TC should be based near the location where most SAI activities will take place.

B.     SAI Team Members. Inspectors who have varied backgrounds and experience, and are from different geographic locations can comprise a team. SAI teams should always contain inspectors with a sufficient knowledge base to accurately assess the element. The inspector(s) designated to complete the SAI should be appropriately trained and knowledgeable on subjects related to the element.

10-151 Document Reasons Why Work Was Not Assigned. (See flowchart process step 3.3.) The frontline manager assigns work based on the CAP priorities for a given quarter until no resources remain. If appropriate resources are not available to complete the entire CAP, the frontline manager documents why the remaining work is unassigned. This ensures work that remains unassigned is documented for evaluation in a future planning cycle.

10-152 Notify PI or CPM That Work Remains Unassigned. (See flowchart process step 3.4.) The frontline manager notifies the PI or CPM of any work that remains unassigned. If necessary, the PI or CPM can initiate the Risk Management Process to address any air carrier risks associated with the unassigned work.

10-153 Review Comprehensive Assessment Plan. (See flowchart process step 3.5.) Once the CAP is developed, the data collection requirements are documented using detailed work instructions, and all of the data collection activities are either assigned or identified as unassigned, the CMT or CPT manager reviews the plan.

A.     The review ensures that the CAP is risk‑based and that the work is assigned according to priorities. In the review of the design or performance assessment plan, the CMT or CPT manager must ensure that the elements are risk‑prioritized with the proper justification.

B.     A CMT or CPT manager that does not concur with the oversight requirements, priorities, or resource decisions should discuss the issue with the PI and the frontline managers. The plan may be adjusted, as required, by the PI. The PI can enter a comment in the plan that explains the reason for an adjustment.

10-154 Ongoing Resource Management. Resource management is a continual task for the CMT or CPT. Frontline managers should continue to evaluate resources for work plans, and consider the needs of special data collection and assessment activities, such as ConDORs and risk management action plans.

10-155 Incomplete Inspection Records Resulting from an Inspector Leaving the CMT or CPT. Frontline managers ensure that when an inspector leaves the CMT or CPT all inspection records are finalized before the inspector’s departure. If the inspector cannot complete the work in progress and leaves the CMT or CPT, the PI or CPM notifies the frontline manager and initiates the removal process for an incomplete record.


Figure 10‑46, Air Carrier‑Specific Familiarization Briefing Outline of Subjects

General Topics—All Specialties

(Recommended Minimum Hours—8)

 

1. OVERVIEW OF AIR CARRIER

a. Brief History

(1)Mergers

(2) Acquisitions

(3) Financial status (i.e., bankruptcies)

(4) Compliance attitude

(5) Corporate headquarters location

(6) Main base location

(7) Corporate philosophy

b. Air Carrier Demographics

(1) Key personnel (names/phone numbers)

(2) Organization chart

(3) Major programs

(4) Location of hubs

(5) Location of training bases

(6) Location of maintenance facilities

(7) Personnel strengths

(8) Agent for service

(9) Communications

(10) Special operations

(11) Fleet demographics

(12) Aircraft numbering system

c. Areas of Operations

(1) Type/fleet type of activity

(2) Concentrations of activity

d. Code Sharing/Wet Lease/Interchange

(1) Airline participants

(2) Foreign flight attendant supernumeraries

e. Future Plans of the Air Carrier

 

b. Policies and Procedures for CMT

Responsibility for coverage of incidents and occurrences

c. Individual Interests/Specialties

Type ratings, areas of interest, background and experience

d. Communications

(1) Types of information to be requested directly from air carrier (points of contact)

(2) Information available from the CMO

(3) Points of contact and protocol

 

3. BACKGROUND OF CAP

a. Special Emphasis Areas

(1) Results of Air Carrier Assessment Tool (ACAT)

(2) New and pending issues

 

4. COMPANY MANUALS

a. Overview of Air Carrier Manual System

(1) Manual numbering

(2) Master listing of all parts of the air carrier's manual

(3) Where to find the master listing

(4) Where certain manuals are located

b. Types and Identification of Manuals

(1) Hard copies

(2) Computerized manuals; CD‑ROM

c. Location of Manuals

(1) Required on aircraft

(2) Required software, if applicable

(3) Required for crewmembers

(4) Microfiche reader

(5) Required at stations

 

2. CERTIFICATE MANAGEMENT TEAM

a. Key Personnel

(1) Listing (name and phone number of all)

(2) PIs (including Principal Security inspector (PSI) and regional hazmat branch managers)

 

 

 


Figure 10‑46, Air Carrier‑Specific Familiarization Briefing Outline of Subjects (Continued)

General Topics—All Specialties (continued)

(Recommended Minimum Hours—8)

d. Distribution and Revision

(1) Determining current revision status

(2) Use of computer, if applicable

(3) What method is used to issue revisions?

(4) Tracking responsibilities

e. Alerts and Bulletins

(1) Method to determine current status

(2) Transmission of bulletins and revisions

 

8. FLIGHT DECK PROCEDURES

a. Checklist Location and Use

(1) Flight Deck flows

b. Quick Reference Handbook Location and Use

c. Safety Briefing

d. Crew Briefing; Communication

e. Required Paperwork/Documentation

(1) Location of logbooks (flight deck/cabin)

(2) Location of minimum equipment list (MEL)

(3) Airworthiness release

(4) Placards

f. Unique Fleet/Air Carrier Procedures

g. Airborne Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS)

(1) Weight and balance

(2) Release amendments

(3) Communications

5. SECURITY AND ACCESS

a. Access to Ramp and Facilities

(1) Site‑specific requirements

(2) Air carrier’s security coordinators

b. ID Badges

c. Cockpit Keys

d. Security Alerts for Travel Advisories

6. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

a. Acceptable Shipments

b. Documentation

c. Location Verification

d. Company Material (COMAT)

 

9. CABIN PROCEDURES

a. Exit Seating

b. Emergency Equipment

(1) Location

(2) Preflight, if applicable, for flight attendants

c. Markings and Placards

d. Carry‑On Baggage

e. Special Procedures

f. Medical Emergencies

(1) Medical oxygen

(2) Medlink

(3) AED (defibrillators)

g. Couriers

h. Cargo/Animal Handlers

i. Cockpit/Cabin Communications

j. Carriage of Weapons

(1) Forms and procedures

7. EN ROUTE PROCEDURES

a. Jumpseat Authorization and Procedures

(1) Jumpseat operation

(2)Radio operation; headset location and use

b. Requirement for International Travel

(1) Country clearance forms

Passport and visa

 


Figure 10‑46, Air Carrier‑Specific Familiarization Briefing Outline of Subjects (Continued)

Specific Topics—All Specialties

(Recommended Minimum Hours—8)

1.AIR CARRIER PROGRAMS

a. Deicing

(1) General procedures and training

(2) Paperwork

b. Fueling

(1) General procedures and training

(2) Paperwork

(3) Passenger handling during fueling

(4) Bonding and grounding

c. Pushback/Powerback Procedures

d. International Procedures

(1) Crew check‑in time

(2) Crew complement

(3) Flight/duty and rest computation

(4) General declaration

(5) Passport and visa requirements

e. Special and Ferry Flight Procedures

f. Cargo Operations

g. Security

(1) Hijack procedures

(2) Interference with crewmembers

4. OPERATIONS SPECIFICATIONS

a. Exemptions and Deviations

b. Special Areas of Operations

c. Special Authorizations and Programs

(1) Powerback procedures

(2) Single‑engine taxi

(3) Extended Operations (ETOPS)

(4) Areas of magnetic unreliability (AMU)

(5) Lower Landing Minimums

(6) Minimum Navigation Performance Standards (MNPS)

(7) Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA)

(8) Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP)

(9) Reduced vertical separation minimums (RVSM)

(10) Cat III procedures

2. RECORDS AND REPORTING

a. General

(1) Format: paper, microfiche, electronic

(2) Electronic signatures

(3) Security issues

(4) Custody and retention

3. STATION FACILITIES

a. Manuals

b. Fueling Equipment and Facilities

c. Maintenance Support

d. Contract Services

e. Passenger and Baggage Screening

f. Cargo

g. Marshalling and Ground Handling


Figure 10‑46, Air Carrier‑Specific Familiarization Briefing Outline of Subjects (Continued)

Operations and Cabin Safety Topics

(Recommended Minimum Hours—8 to 16)

1. FLIGHT OPERATIONS PROGRAMS

a. Flight Planning and Documentation

(1) Performance/operating limits

(2) Operational release

(3) Format of the release package

(4) Supplemental operations

(5) Passenger manifest

(6) Weather

(7) Weight and balance

(8) Documentation transmittal

b. Dispatch and Flight Following

(1) Centralized procedures

(2) Shared procedures

c. MEL/Configuration Deviation List (CDL) System/Deferral Process

4. CABIN SAFETY

a. Flight Attendant Duties/Cabin

(1) Supernumeraries

(2) Wet lease operations

(3) Reporting discrepancies

(4) Seatbelt discipline

(5) Child restraint

(6) Smoking requirements

(7) Number of required flight attendants

(8) Briefing requirements

(9) Reporting of mechanical discrepancies

(10) Sterile cockpit

b. Passenger Handling

(1) Interference with crewmember programs

(2) Passengers who may appear intoxicated

c. Carry‑On Baggage

(1) Screening

(2) Carry‑on baggage program

(3) Regional airline differences

d. Exit Seating

(1) Announcements; briefing cards

(2) Interpreters

e. Gate Agent Procedures

(1) Passenger service

(2) Supplemental operations

f. First Aid and Medical

(1) Medlink procedures

(2) CPR training

(3) Equipment required

Other equipment

 

2. TRAINING AND QUALIFICATIONS

a. Overview

(1) Operations specifications (OpSpecs)/specific training requirements

(2) Types of training conducted (wet lease, Advanced Qualification Program (AQP))

b. Training Facilities and Equipment

c. Key Fleet Personnel

d. Documentation of Personnel Requirements and Training

e. Outsource Training

3. REST AND DUTY TIME

a. Flight Crew

(1) Records and reporting

(2) Scheduling

b. Cabin Crew

(1) Records and reporting

(2) Scheduling

c. Dispatch

Records and reporting

Scheduling

 


Figure 10‑46, Air Carrier‑Specific Familiarization Briefing Outline of Subjects (Continued)

Maintenance and Avionics Topics

(Recommended Minimum Hours—8 to 16)

1. MAINTENANCE SYSTEMS

a. Air Carrier Procedures

(1) General procedures manual

b. Suspected Unapproved Parts (SUP)/Parts and Materials

(1) Site receiving inspection

(2)Scrap parts procedures

c. Ground Handling/Taxi/Run‑Up Procedures

d. Calibrated Tools and Test Requirements

e. Maintenance Assessments

f. Required Equipment

(1) Aircraft

(2) Fly away kit

(3) Maintenance library

f. Training Programs

(1) Overview of qualifications and training

(2) OpSpecs/specific training

(3) Types conducted

(4) Training facilities/equipment

(5) Key personnel

g. Airworthiness Release

(1) Format of the release package

(2) Supplemental operations

(3) Maintenance releases

h. Weight and Balance

i. MEL/CDL

(1) Preamble; general; revision status

(2) Deferral and tracking

(3) Coordination with maintenance control

(4) Action required for inoperative items

(5) Interim actions; DENT program

j. Special Programs

(1) ETOPS

(2) AMU

(3) Lower landing minimums

(4) MNPS

(5) ASAP

(6) FOQA

(7) RVSM

(8) Reliability program

(9) Repeat maintenance items

(10) Required inspection items

(11) Continuous Analysis Surveillance

(12) Coordination Agency for Supplier’s Evaluation

(13) Corrosion Prevention Control Program (CPCP)

(14) Aging aircraft program

(15) Supplemental Inspection Document /Supplemental Structural Inspection Document

2. RECORDS AND REPORTING

a. Maintenance Logbooks/Recording

b. Aircraft Records/Aircraft Listing

c. Mechanical Interruption Summary

d. Service Difficulty Reports

3. OPERATIONS SPECIFICATIONS

4. STATION FACILITIES

a. Parts and Equipment

b. Deicing Procedures

5. MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION

a. Maintenance Control

b. Engineering Systems and Forms

c. Internal Evaluation and Quality Assurance

d. Airworthiness Directive Management

e. Contract Maintenance and Repair Stations

RESERVED. Paragraphs 10‑156 through 10‑170.


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Volume 10  Air Transportation Oversight System

Chapter 2  Procedures for Design and Performance Assessment

Section 9   Design Assessment Action Determination and Implementation

Figure 10‑53, Module 8: Design Assessment Action Determination and Implementation

Figure 10-53, Module 8. Design Assessment Action Determination and Implementation flowchart

10-279  Introduction. The action determination and implementation process module requires the principal inspector (PI) or certification project manager (CPM) to determine and document one or more appropriate courses of action in response to the bottom‑line design assessment. Actions may be required even if the design of the air carrier’s system meets the requirements for approval or acceptance. The PI or CPM must take action when the air carrier system design does not meet the requirements for approval or acceptance and the system is rejected.

10-280 System Design Accepted. If the design of an air carrier’s system meets all the regulatory and quality requirements and safety standards, the PI or CPM may accept or approve it, as applicable, and take no further action (other than issuing applicable operations specifications (OpSpecs) and approving system documentation).

A.     Is Mitigation Required? (See flowchart process step 8.1.) The PI or CPM determines whether the program or system design can be accepted or approved without mitigation based on the program or system design meeting regulatory requirements. The air carrier or applicant system may be approvable or acceptable but still have some weakness that concerns the PI or CPM. Acceptance or approval of the system with mitigation might also be appropriate when the system meets the explicit requirements of the regulations, but not their intent. The PI or CPM may determine that additional data collection, monitoring, or other mitigation is needed.

B.     Document Action is Not Required. (See flowchart process step 8.2.) Once the PI or CPM determines that the air carrier’s system design meets all the regulatory requirements and safety standards, and decides that no action is required, the decision is documented. No explanation is required.

C.     Is Enforcement Action Required? (See flowchart process step 8.3.) The PI determines if a potential violation of an FAA regulation is involved that may lead to an enforcement action. Enforcement action is required if an air carrier is, or has been, conducting operations contrary to applicable FAA regulations. The PI follows the procedures outlined in FAA Order 2150.3, Compliance and Enforcement Program, if enforcement action is required.

D.    Has a Systemic Hazard Been Identified? (See flowchart process step 8.4.) Before accepting or approving an air carrier or applicant system, with mitigation, the PI or CPM must determine the extent of the deficiencies and identify hazards that may exist.

1)      Some hazards are isolated incidences that can typically be attributed to performance and do not necessarily require system‑level changes, but they may be indications of systemic hazards.
2)      Systemic hazards indicate defects in the design of the air carrier’s processes (e.g., missing procedures, poor controls, lack of attention to interfaces), patterns of repeated noncompliance with procedures, or significant changes in the operating environment. Controlling or eliminating systemic hazards requires modifications to the system design.

E.     Is a SAT Required? (See flowchart process step 8.5.) If a systemic hazard has been identified, the PI or CPM determines whether a System Analysis Team (SAT) would be beneficial. The SAT is formed at the discretion of the PI or CPM when further analysis is required to determine the cause of a systemic problem. To perform further analysis and determine cause, the SAT can include participants from the Certificate Management Team, Certification Project Team, other Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) personnel, airline and/or manufacturer representatives, and industry personnel. The SAT can be appropriate when the PI or CPM chooses to work jointly with the carrier or industry in identifying system deficiencies.

F.      Convene SAT. (See flowchart process step 8.6.)

1)      Composition of SAT. The PI or CPM determines the composition of the SAT depending on the nature of the issue. The PI or CPM should request input from the certificate holder regarding SAT composition.
2)      Request for Participation. The PI or CPM contacts personnel from the certificate holder and the FAA to request their participation on the SAT. The certificate holder coordinates the participation with non‑FAA participants, such as manufacturer representatives or other industry personnel.

G.    Is Risk Management Process Required? (See flowchart process step 8.7.) The PI determines whether it is necessary to initiate the Air Transportation Oversight System Risk Management Process (RMP) to address the specific systemic hazard. The RMP may be used to address any hazard that the PI or CPM decides is significant enough to justify more extensive analysis and tracking. Other possible considerations are the need for a formal action plan, participation of air carrier personnel, timeliness of required actions, regional or national significance, or the output of other tools such as the decision aid used to evaluate air carrier changes.

H.    Document Need for Risk Management Process. (See flowchart process step 8.8.) If the PI determines that the RMP is required to address the hazard, the decision and explanation is documented.

I.       Document Need for Performance Assessment or ConDOR. (See flowchart process step 8.9.) If a systemic hazard has not been identified, or if a decision is made to not initiate the RMP, but issues exist, the PI or CPM documents the need for a performance assessment or Constructed Dynamic Observation Report (ConDOR) to monitor the air carrier system or gather additional information. The decision to take this approach is documented and explained.

10-281 System Design Rejected. The PI or CPM must take action when the air carrier’s or applicant’s system design does not meet the requirements for approval or acceptance and the system is rejected. The PI or CPM documents the action taken and the rationale.

A.     Are Operations Specifications Modifications Required? (See flowchart process step 8.10.) The PI or CPM must take action when the air carrier’s or applicant’s system design does not meet the requirements for approval or acceptance and the system is rejected. The air carrier may be required to modify its system, or the FAA may modify its authorizations. If changes are required to the OpSpecs issued to the air carrier or applicant, the PI or CPM follows the procedures in Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations part 119.

B.     Is Enforcement Action Required? (See flowchart process step 8.11.) The PI determines if a potential violation of an FAA regulation is involved that may lead to an enforcement action. Enforcement action is required if an air carrier is, or has been, conducting operations contrary to applicable FAA regulations. The PI follows the procedures outlined in Order 2150.3 if enforcement action is required.

C.     Document Need for System Configuration. (See flowchart process step 8.12.) If the PI or CPM determines that the air carrier’s or applicant’s system design does not meet the requirements for approval or acceptance, the PI or CPM requires that the air carrier or applicant reconfigure its system design and resubmit its request for a new or updated scope of operation. The action and explanation are documented and the air carrier or applicant is notified.

10-282 Completion of Design Assessment. Once the PI or CPM determines and documents the action he or she intends to implement, the design assessment is complete. If this occurs within 30 days of the end of the quarter in which the design assessment is due, the assessment is considered to have been completed by the due date. The PI or CPM notifies the air carrier or applicant of the results of the design assessment verbally or in a closeout letter. The PI may also use this letter to notify the air carrier of ongoing design assessment results that occur in the normal planning cycle.

RESERVED. Paragraphs 10‑283 through 10‑297.


7/28/08                                                                                                                         8900.1 CHG 0

Volume 10  Air Transportation Oversight System

Chapter 2  Procedures for Design and Performance Assessment

Section 11  Performance Assessment Action Determination and Implementation

Figure 10‑55, Module 8: Performance Action Determination and Implementation

Figure 10-55, Module 8 Performance Action Determination and Implementation

10-319  Introduction. The action determination and implementation process requires the principal inspector (PI) or certification project manager (CPM) to determine and document one or more appropriate courses of action in response to the bottom‑line performance assessment. Actions may be required even if the air carrier’s system performance has been affirmed. When the air carrier system performance is not affirmed, the PI or CPM must take action.

10-320 System Performance Affirmed. If the air carrier’s system meets all the performance standards, it is affirmed and the PI or CPM takes no further action.

A.     Is Additional Action Required? (See flowchart process step 8.1.) The air carrier’s or applicant’s system performance may be affirmed overall, but still indicate some isolated or minor problems. The PI may determine that additional data collection or monitoring or other action is needed.

B.     Document That Action is Not Required. (See flowchart process step 8.2.) Once the PI or CPM determines that the air carrier’s or applicant’s system performance is affirmed, and decides that no action is required, the decision is documented.

C.     Is Enforcement Action Required? (See flowchart process step 8.3.) The PI or CPM determines if a potential violation of a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulation is involved that may lead to an enforcement action. Enforcement action is required if an air carrier is, or has been, conducting operations contrary to applicable FAA regulations. The PI follows the procedures outlined in FAA Order 2150.3, Compliance and Enforcement Program, if enforcement action is required.

D.    Has a Systemic Hazard Been Identified? (See flowchart process step 8.4.) The PI or CPM identifies any systemic hazard in the program that may need to be addressed. Hazards are conditions, events, or circumstances that could lead or contribute to an unplanned or undesired outcome.

1)      Some hazards are isolated incidences that can typically be attributed to performance and do not require system‑level changes, but they may be indications of systemic hazards.
2)      Systemic hazards are those that indicate defects in the design of the air carrier’s processes (e.g., missing procedures, poor controls, lack of attention to interfaces), patterns of repeated noncompliance with procedures, or significant changes in the operating environment. Controlling or eliminating systemic hazards requires modifications to the system design.

E.     Is a SAT Required? (See flowchart process step 8.5.) If a systemic hazard has been identified, the PI or CPM determines whether a System Analysis Team (SAT) would be beneficial. The SAT is formed at the discretion of the PI or CPM when further analysis is required to determine the root cause of a systemic problem. The SAT can include participants from the CMT or CPT, other FAA personnel, airline and/or manufacturer’s representatives, and industry personnel to perform further analysis and determine root cause. The SAT can be appropriate when the PI or CPM chooses to work jointly with the air carrier or industry in identifying system deficiencies.

F.      Convene System Analysis Team. (See flowchart process step 8.6.)

1)      Composition of SAT. The PI or CPM determines the composition of the SAT depending on the nature of the issue. The PI or CPM should request input from the certificate holder regarding SAT composition.
2)      Request for Participation. The PI or CPM contacts personnel from the certificate holder and the FAA to request their participation on the SAT. The certificate holder coordinates the participation with non‑FAA participants, such as manufacturers’ representatives or other industry personnel.

G.    Is Risk Management Process Required? (See flowchart process step 8.7.) The PI or CPM determines whether it is necessary to initiate the Air Transportation Oversight System Risk Management Process (RMP) to address the systemic hazard. The RMP may be used to address any hazard that the PI or CPM decides is significant enough to justify more extensive analysis and tracking. Other possible considerations are the need for a formal action plan, participation of air carrier personnel, timeliness of required actions, regional or national significance, or the output of other tools such as the decision aid used to evaluate air carrier changes.

H.    Document Need for Risk Management Process. (See flowchart process step 8.8.) If the PI determines that the RMP is required to address the hazard, the decision and explanation is documented.

I.       Document Need for Design Assessment, Performance Assessment, or Constructed Dynamic Observation Reports (ConDOR). (See flowchart process step 8.9.) If a systemic hazard has not been identified, or if a decision is made to not initiate the RMP, the PI or CPM documents the need for a design assessment, performance assessment, or ConDOR to monitor the air carrier system or gather additional information. The decision to take this approach is documented.

10-321 System Performance is Not Affirmed. If the air carrier’s or applicant’s system performance is not affirmed, the PI or CPM must determine if the deficiency is due to a systemic problem.

A.     Is System Reconfiguration Required? (See flowchart process step 8.10.) When the air carrier or applicant’s system performance is not affirmed due to a systemic problem, action must be taken by the PI or CPM. The air carrier may be required to modify its system or the FAA may modify its authorizations. The PI or CPM documents the action taken and the rationale.

B.     Are Operations Specifications Modifications Required? (See flowchart process step 8.11.) If changes are required to the operations specifications issued to the air carrier or applicant, the PI or CPM follows the Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations part 119 procedures.

C.     Is Enforcement Action Required? (See flowchart process step 8.12.) The PI or CPM determines if a potential violation of an FAA regulation is involved that may lead to an enforcement action. Enforcement action is required if an air carrier is, or has been, conducting operations contrary to applicable FAA regulations. The PI follows the procedures outlined in FAA Order 2150.3 if enforcement action is required.

D.    Document Need for System Reconfiguration. (See flowchart process step 8.13.) When the air carrier’s or applicant’s system performance is not affirmed due to deficiencies in the system design, the air carrier may be required to modify its system or the FAA may modify its authorizations. Either way, system reconfiguration will be involved and the PI or CPM documents the nature of the required change.

10-322 Completion of Performance Assessment. Once the PI or CPM determines and documents the action he or she intends to implement, the performance assessment is complete. If this occurs within 30 days of the end of the quarter in which the performance assessment is due, the assessment is considered to have been completed by the due date. The PI or CPM notifies the air carrier or applicant of the results of the performance assessment verbally or in a performance assessment closeout letter. The PI may also use this letter to notify the air carrier of ongoing performance assessment results that occur in the normal planning cycle.

RESERVED. Paragraphs 10-323 through 337.


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Volume 10  AIR TRANSPORTATION OVERSIGHT SYSTEM

CHAPTER 4  AIR CARRIER EVALUATION PROCESS

Section 1  The Air Carrier Evaluation Process

Figure 10-57, Air Carrier Evaluation Process

Figure 10-47, Air Carrier Evaluation Process flowchart

10-360  INTRODUCTION. The Air Carrier Evaluation Process (ACEP) provides the Flight Standards Service (AFS) with standard policies and procedures to evaluate Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 121 air carriers at the national, regional, and district office or certificate management office levels. Evaluations are an extension of Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS) design and performance assessments, and by invitation, could include members from the air carrier. ACEP allows for an indepth look at one or more air carrier systems and has four primary goals:

A.     To verify that the air carrier complies with applicable regulations.

B.     To promote a positive safety culture by reinforcing how system safety principles and concepts directly apply to air carrier oversight.

C.     To identify hazards and mitigate associated risks.

D.    To identify program strengths (e.g., potential best practices that other air carriers could emulate).

Note:   Any identified program strength(s) should be documented in the comment box of the applicable question of the Safety Attribute Inspection (SAI), Element Performance Inspection (EPI), or Constructed Dynamic Observation Reports (ConDOR) per the Automation User’s Guide (AUG). Please note that an air carrier’s best practice(s) may be proprietary information that cannot be shared without the permission of the air carrier.

10-361  DETERMINE THE NEED FOR EVALUATION. (SEE FLOWCHART PROCESS STEP 1.1.) The following conditions may indicate the need to conduct an air carrier evaluation.

·        The results of design or performance assessments,

·        Substantial change in air carrier management,

·        Substantial turnover in personnel or reduction in force,

·        Labor dispute,

·        Rapid expansion or growth,

·        Merger, takeover, or change in ownership,

·        Enforcement actions,

·        Noncompliant attitude,

·        Accidents/incidents/occurrences,

·        Department of Defense reviews,

·        Department of Transportation/Office of the Secretary of Transportation economic authority/insurance requirements,

·        Change in fleet type,

·        Substantial change in outsourcing,

·        Financial distress,

·        Substantial passenger or employee complaints, and

·        Hotline complaints.

10-362  IDENTIFY AND SELECT AIR CARRIERS FOR EVALUATIONS. (SEE FLOWCHART PROCESS STEP 1.2.) There are several ways that an air carrier might be selected for evaluation. These include:

A.     National Level. The director of AFS‑1 may identify and select a part 121 air carrier for an evaluation using this process. AFS managers may identify and request an evaluation of an air carrier through their chain of command. AFS‑1 notifies the appropriate regional division manager and the certificate‑holding district office (CHDO) manager of the air carrier selected for an evaluation.

B.     Regional Level. Under this process, the AFS region division manager responsible for the air carrier’s oversight may identify and select a part 121 air carrier for evaluation. The AFS regional division manager notifies the appropriate CHDO manager of the air carrier selected for an evaluation. AFS managers within a region may request a region‑level evaluation.

C.     Office Level. Under this process, a CHDO manager responsible for the air carrier’s part 121 oversight may identify and select the air carrier for an evaluation.

10-363  DETERMINE THE TYPE OF EVALUATION. (SEE FLOWCHART PROCESS STEP 1.3.) ACEP has four types of evaluations, which include:

A.     Focused. This is an evaluation of some of the air carrier elements by completing design and/or performance assessments using the appropriate ATOS Data Collection Tools (DCT). This evaluation is performed during a specified time period.

B.     Comprehensive. This is an evaluation of all applicable air carrier elements by completing design assessments and/or performance assessments using the appropriate ATOS DCTs. This evaluation is performed during a specified time period.

C.     Program Review. A program review is an evaluation that focuses on one or more of the air carrier elements and is conducted upon several, if not all part 121 air carriers within all of AFS, a region, or a CHDO area of responsibility. Reports that use data from a program review must be deidentified (by not including the tracking number, the air carrier’s designator, or personnel names) and analyzed to determine problems, issues, concerns, trends, and program strengths.

Note:   Program review reports can be generated by an Operations Research Analyst (ORA) upon request of the appropriate manager.

D.    System Process Audit. A system process audit is an evaluation that focuses on validating the effectiveness of ATOS as the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) oversight system. Reports that use data from a system process audit must be deidentified (by not including the tracking number, the air carrier’s designator, or personnel names) and analyzed to determine problems, issues, concerns, trends, and program strengths.

Note:   System process audit reports can be generated by an operations research analyst upon request of the appropriate manager.

10-364  DECIDE ON EVALUATION TEAM COMPOSITION. (SEE FLOWCHART PROCESS STEP 1.4.) The level and type of evaluation, along with the complexity of the air carrier determines the composition of the evaluation team. The team must include:

A.     Evaluation Team Leader. AFS‑1, the regional AFS division manager, or the CHDO manager, depending on the level of evaluation, designates a team leader. The team leader is responsible for ensuring that the evaluation is conducted in accordance with ACEP. The evaluation team leader guides the evaluation team members on a daily basis during the evaluation period. The team leader is responsible to ensure that team members receive air carrier‑specific training applicable to the scope of the evaluation.

B.     Evaluation Team Members. Evaluations teams may consist of local CHDO personnel or personnel from another CHDO, regional or national specialists, and air carrier personnel.

1)      FAA Team Members. These members must be selected based on individual qualifications and experience to ensure that a quality evaluation is accomplished. Team members are selected in accordance with current FAA guidance, including the Collective Bargaining Agreement, as amended.
2)      Principal Inspectors. Principal inspectors (PI) responsible for the certificate management of the air carrier being evaluated must be part of the evaluation team. The PIs must not be assigned any air carrier elements, but they may assist team members in evaluating elements. PIs must be available to evaluation team members to provide clarification pertaining to such items as program approvals, authorizations, and exemptions that apply to their assigned air carrier. PIs must help resolve issues that are identified during the evaluation.
3)      Air Carrier Team Members. Evaluations conducted jointly with the air carrier must include air carrier personnel as active participants of the evaluation team. When participating in the evaluation, air carrier personnel have an active roll in determining and resolving element evaluation issues. The FAA, however, cannot delegate its responsibilities and final decisionmaking with regard to issues involving compliance with FAA statutes, regulations, and orders.

10-365  COMPLETE EVALUATION AGREEMENT. (SEE FLOWCHART PROCESS STEP 1.5.) AFS‑1, the regional AFS division manager, or the CHDO manager, depending on the level of evaluation, must develop an evaluation agreement. The agreement will document the:

·        Level and type of evaluation;

·        Air carrier elements to be evaluated;

·        DCTs to be used in that evaluation SAI, EPI, and/or ConDOR;

·        Evaluation period, including tentative start and completion dates;

·        Designated team leader;

·        Composition of evaluation team; and

·        Participation of air carrier personnel.

Note:   An evaluation agreement template is included at the end of this section (see Figure 10‑58).

10-366  NOTIFY AIR CARRIER OF THE EVALUATION. (SEE FLOWCHART PROCESS STEP 1.6.) The air carrier should be informed of the planned evaluation and, at the discretion of the FAA, be given the opportunity to participate. The initial notification can be verbal, but should be followed up in writing. The written notification should be sent at least 2 weeks before the evaluation by the appropriate FAA manager, and should contain the same information as the evaluation agreement.

Note:   A notification letter template is included at the end of this section (see Figure 10‑59).

10-367  JOINT EVALUATIONS WITH THE AIR CARRIER. The air carrier may participate in the evaluation.

A.     When an air carrier participates in the evaluation, the team leader will ensure that all key management officials (as defined in 14 CFR part 119, § 119.65) of the air carrier receive a briefing on ACEP and the provisions of Advisory Circular (AC) 00‑58, Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program, current edition, before beginning the evaluation.

Note:   A PowerPoint briefing resides on the News & Documentation page of the ATOS V1.2 automation.

B.     The air carrier’s management must understand the requirement to use the appropriate SAI to assess and document the comprehensive fix of any identified air carrier element deficiency that involves an apparent violation of FAA regulations.

10-368  VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE. When an air carrier is an active participant of the evaluation team, any apparent violation of FAA regulations discovered during the specified evaluation period (as specified in the evaluation agreement) and subsequent enforcement action is governed by the provisions of AC 00‑58.

10-369  EVALUATIONS NOT CONDUCTED JOINTLY WITH THE AIR CARRIER. If an air carrier elects not to participate with the FAA in the evaluation, or when the FAA decides not to include air carrier personnel as team members, the provisions and protections contained in AC 00‑58 do not apply to apparent violations of FAA regulations discovered during the specified evaluation period.

10-370  REVISE THE COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT PLAN. (SEE FLOWCHART PROCESS STEP 1.7.) The PI(s) for the air carrier revises the Comprehensive Assessment Plan (CAP) in accordance with ATOS planning policies and procedures to include the elements targeted for evaluation. The PI(s) documents the data collection requirements.

Note:   Update the Air Carrier Assessment Tool (ACAT) with the appropriate evaluation element(s) per the Automation User Guide (AUG), Updating an Existing ACAT. Comments should be included to indicate that these element(s) are part of an Air Carrier Evaluation.

Note:   Update the CAP per the AUG, Changing the Schedule of a Particular Performance Assessment or Design Assessment. Move the evaluation element(s) into the quarter that the evaluation is to be conducted. Comments should be included that these element(s) are part of an air carrier evaluation.

A.     When it is not necessary to complete an entire SAI or EPI, or if those tools do not focus on the specific issues, the PI(s) may be asked to create a ConDOR.

Note:   Refer to AUG, Creating a ConDOR.

B.     The evaluation may require the use of other specialized jobs aids, tools, documents, or guidance.

10-371  ASSIGN RESOURCES TO COMPLETE THE EVALUATION. (SEE FLOWCHART PROCESS STEP 1.8.) Frontline managers (FLM) assign team members to data collection activities to support the evaluation.

Note:   The data evaluation program manager (DEPM)/data reviewer/FLM adds evaluation team members to the CMT roster in accordance with the AUG, Adding an Existing ATOS User to Carrier Roster.

10-372  COLLECTING EVALUATION DATA. (SEE FLOWCHART PROCESS STEP 1.9.) Team members perform activities to collect data in accordance with the evaluation agreement, CAP, and evaluation team leader instructions.

A.     Coordinate Team and Establish Communication Methods. The team leader decides how the team communicates. Coordination and communication are especially important if members are spread among different locations.

B.     Team Meeting. The team leader organizes a team meeting after reviewing the ATOS automation instructions. This meeting can be in person, over the phone, or by other means. During this meeting team members are briefed on ACEP and the contents of the evaluation agreement.

C.     Distribute and Schedule Tasks. The tasks may be distributed by element, safety attribute, individual questions, or some combination to one or more team members to allow the timely collection of accurate data.

10-373  REPORT EVALUATION DATA. (SEE FLOWCHART PROCESS STEP 1.10.) After collecting evaluation data, each FAA team member submits their responses into the ATOS database in accordance with the data quality guidelines.

A.     Evaluation teams enter data collected by air carrier personnel and indicate the source in the ATOS database.

B.     Communication between team members is essential, but sharing answers is not necessary or desirable because of possible duplication.

10-374  REVIEWING EVALUATION DATA (TEAM LEADER). (SEE FLOWCHART PROCESS STEP 1.11.)

A.     The evaluation team leader will typically be the data reviewer. In some instances it may be necessary for the DEPM/data reviewer/FLM to proxy the data review function to a team member other than the evaluation team leader. The data reviewer determines if data meet the data quality guidelines. The PI should be notified immediately if any critical or time sensitive information is found during the data review.

Note:   The DEPM/data reviewer/FLM must designate the team leader or a team member as the data reviewer for the data collected for the evaluation element(s) per the AUG, Editing a CMT Members Job Function.

B.     The data review process ensures that quality data are available for decisionmaking. Automation provides initial validation to ensure that the data fields contain air carrier‑specific data. The data reviewer provides secondary validation and reviews activity records submitted by the evaluation team.

10-375  ANALYZE AND ASSESS EVALUATION DATA. (SEE FLOWCHART PROCESS STEP 1.12.) After all data has been collected, reported, and reviewed, the evaluation team completes the evaluation using the ATOS analysis and assessment procedures and tools (ATOS Modules 7 and 8).

A.     The objective of the analysis and assessment process is to determine if the air carrier’s system is designed, or performs as intended by regulations in such a way that it controls the conditions that led to the decision to conduct an evaluation.

B.     The evaluation team leader and the operations research analyst (ORA) analyze the data by element to determine if the air carrier’s system design or performance meets the standards for acceptance or approval. Data may be collected from other sources to assist the team leader in making a bottom‑line assessment.

C.     The evaluation team leader documents the bottom‑line assessment, then includes the rationale for the decision and notes any issues or concerns.

Note:   The DEPM/data reviewer/FLM can give additional automation functionality to the team leader to add and update the Assessment Determination and Implementation Tool (ADI) per the AUG, adding additional functionality to a CMT member.

10-376  FINALIZE EVALUATION REPORT. (SEE FLOWCHART PROCESS STEP 1.13.) Evaluation team leaders will generate an evaluation report when requested by either AFS‑1, the regional AFS division manager, or the CHDO manager.

Note:   Upon request by the appropriate manager the evaluation team leader must have the assigned ORA generate a report of the data that were collected during the evaluation of the element(s).

10-377  DETERMINE AND IMPLEMENT FOLLOWUP ACTIONS. (SEE FLOWCHART PROCESS STEP 1.14.) PIs are responsible for determining and implementing followup actions in response to the design and performance assessments completed during the evaluation. PIs should consider whether they need to initiate enforcement actions; reevaluate air carrier approvals, authorizations, deviations, or exemptions; recommend an FAA policy or regulation change; recommend the issuance of an airworthiness directive; or schedule a followup evaluation. The PI documents one or more appropriate courses of action.

A.     The PI need not take any further action if the air carrier system design is acceptable or approvable, or performance of an air carrier’s system is affirmed.

B.     The design of the air carrier’s system may meet the requirements for acceptance or approval, and/or performance of the system may be affirmed, but the evaluation may have identified some weakness that concerns the evaluation team. In those cases, the PI should document additional data collection, monitoring, or other action.

C.     The PI must take additional action when the evaluation team determines that air carrier system design does not meet the requirements for approval or acceptance, or that performance was not affirmed.

1)      Risk Management Process. The PI determines whether it is necessary to initiate the Risk Management Process (RMP) to address a systemic hazard. The RMP may be used to address any hazard that the PI decides can justify more extensive analysis and tracking. Factors that may influence the decision to use the RMP are:

·        Hazards that can justify more extensive analysis and tracking;

·        The need for a formal action plan;

·        Participation of air carrier personnel;

·        Timeliness of required actions;

·        Regional or national significance; and

·        The output of tools such as the decision aid used to evaluate air carrier changes.

Note:   See AUG, entitled Risk Management.

2)      System Analysis Team. If a systemic hazard is identified, the PI determines whether the System Analysis Team (SAT) would be beneficial. The SAT is formed at the PI’s discretion when further analysis is required to determine the cause of a systemic problem. The SAT can include participants from the CMT, other FAA personnel, airline and/or manufacturer representatives, and other industry personnel to perform further analysis to determine root cause. The SAT can be appropriate when the PI chooses to work jointly with the carrier or industry in identifying system deficiencies.
3)      Enforcement Action. Enforcement action is required if an air carrier is, or has been, conducting operations contrary to applicable FAA regulations. If enforcement action is required, the PI follows the procedures outlined in FAA Order 2150.3, Compliance and Enforcement Program, and documents that action with explanation on the ADI tool.
4)      System Reconfiguration. The air carrier may be required to modify its system, or the FAA may modify its authorizations. If changes are required to the operations specifications issued to the air carrier or applicant, the PI or certification project manager follows the procedures of part 119. If changes are made to the air carrier’s system configuration, the air carrier may need to submit a request for a new or up to date scope of operation. The action and explanation are documented in the ADI tool.

10-378  BRIEF THE AIR CARRIER AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS. (SEE FLOWCHART PROCESS STEP 1.15.) The PI briefs the air carrier on the results of the evaluation.

Figure 10-58, Evaluation Agreement

Evaluation Agreement

Note:   This document is a generic sample of a written agreement between the CHDO/CMO and the regional staff and/or ATOS CMO addressing the process and procedures to be used during the performance of an Air Carrier Evaluation. This document must be prepared jointly by the CHDO/CMO and the regional staff or ATOS CMO and must be modified to fit the specific needs of the evaluation.

There are four types of air carrier evaluations for ATOS air carriers: Focused, Comprehensive, Program Review, and System Process Audit.

A.     Focused. This evaluation of some air carrier elements is executed by completing design and/or performance assessments using the appropriate ATOS DCTs. This evaluation is performed during a specified time period.

B.     Comprehensive. This evaluation of all applicable air carrier elements is executed by completing design assessments and/or performance assessments using the appropriate ATOS DCTs. This evaluation is performed during a specified time period.

C.     Program Review. A program review is an evaluation that focuses on one or more air carrier elements and is conducted upon several, if not all, part 121 air carriers within all of AFS, one particular region, or a CHDO area of responsibility. Reports that use data from a program review must be deidentified (by not including the tracking number, the air carrier’s designator, or personnel names) and analyzed to determine problems, issues, concerns, trends, and program strengths.

D.    System Process Audit. A system process audit is an evaluation that focuses on validating the effectiveness of ATOS as the FAA’s oversight system. Reports that use data from a system process audit must be de-identified (by not including the tracking number, the air carrier’s designator, or personnel names) and analyzed to determine problems, issues, concerns, trends, and program strengths.

In accordance with FAA Order 8900.1, Volume 10, Chapter 4, Section 1, The Air Carrier Evaluation Process, and under the authority of Title 49, of the United States Code (49 U.S.C.) section 44709, as amended, and Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 119, § 119.59, a (__type__) Evaluation (or Program Review) of (__name__) Airlines will be conducted by the (__name__) CHDO/CMO and ATOS CMO and/or Regional personnel.

(__name__) Airlines is the holder of Air Carrier Certificate (__number__) and is currently conducting (__type__) operations. The company’s main base of operation is located at (__where__). The company’s fleet of aircraft consists of (__number and type of aircraft__).

The (evaluation or program review) will be conducted at the (__national, regional, local__) level.

The (evaluation or program review) will commence on (__date__) at the (__location__) with an Air Carrier Evaluation Process briefing, an introduction of FAA personnel, the company’s personnel, a tour of the company’s facilities, and an overview of their operations.

The (evaluation or program review) Objective: The objective of the (evaluation or program review) is to:

A.     Verify that the air carrier complies with applicable regulations.

B.     Promote a positive safety culture by reinforcing how system safety principles and concepts directly apply to air carrier oversight.

C.     Identify hazards and mitigate associated risks.

D.    Identify program strengths (e.g., potential best practices that other air carriers could emulate).

This (evaluation or program review) has no set completion date, but will end when the objectives of the evaluation have been met.

For the purpose of the Air Carrier Evaluation Process the provisions of Advisory Circular 00‑58, Voluntary Disclosure, paragraph 7 (C) may be used.

1)      At a minimum, the CHDO/CMO must provide, in addition to the Certificate Management Team (CMT), (__number__) Operations Inspectors, (__number__) Maintenance Inspectors, (__number__) Avionics Inspectors, (__number__) Dispatcher Inspectors (if applicable), a Cabin Safety Inspector (if applicable), a Data Evaluation Program Manager (DEPM), and administrative support if necessary.
2)      The appropriate office must designate an evaluation team leader (______Name_______) as follows:

·        An evaluation team member from the CHDO/CMO will be designated as the evaluation team leader if the evaluation is conducted at the local level.

·        An evaluation team member from the region will be designated as the evaluation team leader if the evaluation is conducted at the regional level. An evaluation team member from the ATOS CMO will be designated as the evaluation team leader if the evaluation is conducted at the national level.

3)      If requested, the ATOS CMO will provide (__number__) Operations inspectors, (__number__) Maintenance inspectors, (__number__) Avionics inspectors, (__number__) Dispatcher inspectors (if applicable), and a Cabin Safety inspector (if applicable).
4)      If requested, the (_________) region will provide (__number__) Operations inspectors, (__number__) Maintenance inspectors, (__number__) Avionics inspectors, (__number__) Dispatcher inspectors (if applicable), and a Cabin Safety inspector (if applicable).
5)      Any specialized personnel who will be participating in the evaluation should be listed in this paragraph (________________).
6)      If the evaluation is conducted jointly with the air carrier, personnel from the air carrier will participate in the evaluation as active participants and working members of the evaluation team.
7)      The personnel assigned by CHDO/CMO, the ATOS CMO, and/or the Region, and the air carrier personnel, plus any specialized personnel, shall constitute the Evaluation Team.
8)      The (__type__) Air Carrier (evaluation or program review) will consist of a review of the air carrier elements listed below:
Elements
2.1.1 Manual Currency
2.1.2 Manual Content Consistency
Evaluation Team Roles and Responsibilities.
1)      The evaluation team members, except for the PIs assigned to the air carrier, must not discuss any comprehensive fix or corrective action plans with the operator during the evaluation.
2)      Any significant safety concerns discovered during the evaluation must be immediately brought to the attention of the PIs, and the evaluation team leader. Upon concurrence that there is an actual safety concern, the appropriate PI must notify the air carrier.
3)      Any and all safety issues that involve the actual safety of passengers or crew shall be addressed immediately by the discovering inspector.
4)      The evaluation team member who discovers a compliance issue requiring enforcement action will complete Section B, obtain all necessary items of proof, and provide this information to the appropriate PI.
5)      Any written communication between the evaluation team and the air carrier will be from the assigned principals. During the evaluation, the evaluation team leader must be made aware of any written communication pertinent to the evaluation before it is sent.
________________________                                    _________________________
Evaluation Team Leader                                               CHDO / CMO Manager
_________________________                                  _________________________
Concurrence Date                                                        Concurrence Date                   

Figure 10-59, Notification Letter

Notification Letter

This document is a generic sample of a notification letter between the CHDO/CMO and the air carrier.

(Date)

CERTIFIED-RETURN RECEIPT

(Name)

(Title)

(Address)

(Address)

(Address)

Dear (Name):

The (Name) (Flight Standards District Office or Certificate Management Office), in coordination with the (Insert appropriate FAA offices) will be conducting an (evaluation or program review) of (name of airline), operating under part 121 (flag, domestic, supplemental) Air Carrier Certificate No. (Insert number).
The objectives of the (evaluation or program review) are to:

A.     Verify that the air carrier complies with applicable regulations.

B.     Promote a positive safety culture by reinforcing how system safety principles and concepts directly apply to air carrier oversight.

C.     Identify hazards and mitigate associated risks.

D.    Identify program strengths (e.g., potential best practices that other air carriers could emulate).

This (evaluation or program review) will be conducted under the inspection authority of 49 U.S.C., section 44709. As we agreed on (date), this evaluation (will or will not) be conducted jointly. An air carrier person assigned to an air carrier element needs to possess a thorough knowledge and understanding of the company’s policies and procedures pertaining to that element.
The (evaluation or program review) is scheduled to begin on (date), at (name of airline) corporate headquarters in (Location). An integral part of the (Evaluation or Program Review) process is a briefing for your company’s personnel who will be participating in the evaluation. Personnel in the management positions listed in Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations part 119, § 119.65 are expected to attend. We respectfully request that you make the necessary arrangements so that all these participants may attend. Please call our office so that we can schedule this session for a mutually acceptable date, time and location.
The evaluation period is scheduled to last approximately (_____) weeks; however, the team will continue their evaluation until all scheduled activities are completed. The (evaluation or program review) is focused on the following carrier elements:

Element Number           Name of Element

            1.3.11              Continuing Analysis and Surveillance

            3.1.8                Carriage of Cargo

            4.2.3                Training of Flight Crewmembers

(name) will be assigned as the (insert appropriate FAA office) team leader during the evaluation. Should you have any additional questions or comments, please feel free to contact me at 123‑456-7890.

Sincerely,

(Name)

Manager, (CHDO/CMO Name)

RESERVED. Paragraphs 10‑379 through 10‑392


7/28/08                                                                                                                         8900.1 CHG 0

Volume 10  Air Transportation Oversight System

Chapter 5  Off‑Hour Surveillance Assessment Decision Aid

Section 1  Off-Hour Surveillance Air Carrier Oversight Process

Figure 10‑60, Off Hour Surveillance Air Carrier Oversight Process

Figure 10-60, Off Hour Surveillance Air Carrier Oversight Process

10-393  INTRODUCTION.

A.     It is essential to identify and record how much, and what kind of activity the air carrier performs during off hours. Based on this information, the Certificate Management Office (CMO)/ Certificate Management Team (CMT) will evaluate an air carrier’s ability to adequately manage its off-hour activities. The CMO/CMT must take appropriate action to address any identified hazards, to include retarget/adjust the Comprehensive Assessment Plan (CAP), or other actions designed to address a specific, significant risk. This section describes a process that can be used to prepare this evaluation.

B.     The following conditions or events may be indicators of a need for additional off-hour surveillance. Particularly where multiple indicators or multiple examples of single indicators are observed, inspectors should consider more in-depth inquiries with air carrier management or targeted off-hour surveillance to determine possible impacts on affected programs or air carrier systems. The Off-Hour Surveillance Assessment Decision Aid helps the CMO/CMT evaluate the effectiveness of air carrier activities conducted during off hours.

10-394 Process Participants.

A.     CMO/CMT Principal Inspector (PI) and Certification Project Manager (CPM). The key participants in the Off-Hour Surveillance Assessment Process include the PI/CPM assigned the oversight or initial certification of an air carrier. These people are responsible for deciding how to anticipate or respond to air carrier risks, and for identifying what information is needed to make these decisions. When faced with a potential problem associated with off-hour activities, these participants must decide if a critical problem exists that must be handled immediately, and if these problems warrant the CAP to allow the CMO/CMT to effectively evaluate and manage potential risks, to enter into the Risk Management Process (RMP), or to collect additional data through the use of additional Design Assessments, Performance Assessments, or ConDORs.

B.     Aviation Safety Inspector(s) (ASI). The ASI will participate through the collection and reporting of data assigned to them through the CAP.

C.     Air Carrier. The air carrier is a participant in this process as the overseen entity and is a potential source of information for the evaluation process.

D.    Evaluate Available Off-hour Information. The PI must review the Off-Hour Surveillance Decision Aid to identify what information is needed to use the tool. They are also encouraged to use their experience with the air carrier and other data sources to evaluate the adequacy of information about off-hour activities. If there is a lack of sufficient information about the amount and type of activities being conducted off hours by, or for, the carrier, then it is necessary to collect that information to make an informed decision about whether or not a significant problem exists.

Note:   Inspections that are performed off hours should have the term “OFFHOUR” in the National use block. This will allow a national look at the amount and type of inspections being conducted off hours.

10-395 Recognize and Communicate Concerns. If a significant concern is discovered in the off-hour activities being performed by, or for, the air carrier, this must be communicated to the CHDO office manager or PI immediately. Once sufficient information is gathered to make the assessment, proceed with the process.

10-396 Required actions based on analysis of the Off-hour Decision Aid.

A.     Initiate RMP. A low decision aid (8-40) score reflects an inadequate capability to manage off-hour activities, and requires the initiation of the RMP that targets the specific off‑hour hazards and creates an action plan to address the related risks. The action plan generated by the RMP will be initiated and closed by the PI.

B.     Retarget Surveillance. A moderate decision aid (41-56) score indicates that the air carrier has only a moderate ability to manage off-hour activities, and assessment plans should be retargeted to closely monitor this condition. The completion of an Air Carrier Assessment Tool will aid in developing a surveillance plan that concentrates on the elevated risk areas.

C.     Continue Current Surveillance Program. A high decision aid (57-80) score indicates the air carrier’s ability to manage off‑hour activities is adequate and the existing surveillance program should be continued. However, if particular issues of concern exist, then they must be addressed.

10-397 Instructions. For each of the eight questions below, rate each question based on information available and your knowledge of the certificate holder. Once all questions have been answered, utilize the table on the last page to determine the results of this assessment.

A.     Amount, Complexity and Type of In-House Activities. (includes operations, maintenance and ground).

1)      Amount of activities conducted at off hours.
2)      Complexity of activities conducted at off hours.
3)      Type of activities conducted at off hours.

Table 10‑6, Amount, Complexity and Type of In-House Activities

Score

Word Picture

1-2

Concerns exist about the certificate holder regarding three of the above issues.

3-5

Concerns exist about the certificate holder regarding two of the above issues.

6-7

A concern exists about the certificate holder regarding one of the above issues.

8-9

A minor concern exists about the certificate holder regarding one of the above issues.

10

The certificate holder’s off-hour activities are acceptable.

B.     Amount, Complexity and Type of Outsourced Activities. (includes operations, maintenance and ground).

1)      Amount of outsourced activities conducted at off hours.
2)      Complexity of outsourced activities conducted at off hours.
3)      Type of outsourced activities conducted at off hours.

Table 10‑7, Amount, Complexity and Type of Outsourced Activities

Score

Word Picture

1-2

Concerns exist about the certificate holder regarding three of the above issues.

3-5

Concerns exist about the certificate holder regarding two of the above issues.

6-7

A concern exists about the certificate holder regarding one of the above issues.

8-9

A minor concern exists about the certificate holder regarding one of the above issues.

10

The certificate holder’s off-hour outsourced activities are acceptable.

C.     Facilities.

1)      Adequacy of off-hour, in-house maintenance facilities (e.g., lighting, HVAC, working on ramps, etc.).
2)      Adequacy of off-hour ground handling and servicing facilities.
3)      Adequacy of off-hour outsource maintenance facilities (e.g., lighting, HVAC, working on ramps, etc.).

Table 10‑8, Facilities

Score

Word Picture

1-2

Concerns exist about the certificate holder regarding three of the above issues.

3-5

Concerns exist about the certificate holder regarding two of the above issues.

6-7

A concern exists about the certificate holder regarding one of the above issues.

8-9

A minor concern exists about the certificate holder regarding one of the above issues.

10

The certificate holder has adequate facilities (both in-house and outsource).

D.    Supervision and Maintainers (In-House).

1)      Reduction of off-hour supervisors.
2)      Qualifications and expertise of the off-hour supervisors.
3)      Reduction of non-supervisory off-hour personnel.
4)      Qualifications and expertise of non-supervisory off-hour personnel.

Table 10‑9, Supervision and Maintainers (In-House)

Score

Word Picture

1-2

Concerns exist about the certificate holder regarding three or more of the above issues.

3-5

Concerns exist about the certificate holder regarding two of the above issues.

6-7

A concern exists about the certificate holder regarding one of the above issues.

8-9

A minor concern exists about the certificate holder regarding one of the above issues.

10

The certificate holder has a very stable and qualified off-hour workforce.

E.     Supervision and Maintainers. (Outsourcing).

1)      Effective oversight of off-hour outsourced activities.
2)      Adequate oversight of off-hour outsourced activities.
3)      Adequacy of the number of off-hour contracted personnel.
4)      Qualifications and expertise of off-hour contracted personnel.

Table 10‑10, Supervision and Maintainers. (Outsourcing)

Score

Word Picture

1-2

Concerns exist about the certificate holder regarding three or more of the above issues.

3-5

Concerns exist about the certificate holder regarding two of the above issues.

6-7

A concern exists about the certificate holder regarding one of the above issues.

8-9

A minor concern exists about the certificate holder regarding one of the above issues.

10

The certificate holder has a stable and qualified off-hour contracted personnel.  Additionally, the certificate holder has adequate and effective oversight of outsourced activities.

F.      Air Carrier Management and Oversight.

1)      Adequacy of the operator's off-hour maintenance inspection department/system.
2)      Adequacy of the operator's maintenance of its Continuing Analysis and Surveillance System (CASS) Audit and Performance Monitoring System.
3)      Effectiveness of changeover procedures.
4)      Effective management of off-hour maintenance controlled through supervision, training, shift change over and RII.

Table 10‑11, Air Carrier Management and Oversight


Score

Word Picture

1-2

Concerns exist about the certificate holder regarding three or more of the above issues.

3-5

Concerns exist about the certificate holder regarding two of the above issues.

6-7

A concern exists about the certificate holder regarding one of the above issues.

8-9

A minor concern exists about the certificate holder regarding one of the above issues.

10

The air carrier management and oversight processes are stable.

G.    Current Compliance Status.

1)      The level of operator's cooperative relationship with the FAA certificate management team.
2)      Compliance culture of the operator.
3)      Number of airworthiness regulatory enforcement actions.
4)      The results of Safety Performance Analysis System (SPAS) indicators.

Table 10‑12, Current Compliance Status

Score

Word Picture

1-2

Concerns exist about the certificate holder regarding three or more of the above issues.

3-5

Concerns exist about the certificate holder regarding two of the above issues.

6-7

A concern exists about the certificate holder regarding one of the above issues.

8-9

A minor concern exists about the certificate holder regarding one of the above issues.

10

The certificate holder is compliant.

H.    Training.

1)      Adequacy of air carrier’s training provided to off-hour maintenance, operations and ground personnel.
2)      Effectiveness of air carrier’s training provided to off-hour maintenance, operations and ground personnel.
3)      Adequacy of air carrier’s outsourced training provided to off-hour maintenance, operations and ground personnel.
4)      Effectiveness of air carrier’s outsourced training provided to off-hour maintenance, operations and ground personnel.

Table 10‑13, Training

Score

Word Picture

1-2

Concerns exist about the certificate holder regarding three or more of the above issues.

3-5

Concerns exist about the certificate holder regarding two of the above issues.

6-7

A concern exists about the certificate holder regarding one of the above issues.

8-9

A minor concern exists about the certificate holder regarding one of the above issues.

10

The certificate holder has an adequate and effective off-hour training program.

I.       Overall Score. After all the questions have been answered, add all the scores to obtain the overall score. Using the table below, determine what actions are necessary to ensure adequate surveillance is being planned for the operator.

Table 10‑14, Training

Overall Score

Actions

8-40

The operator seems to have major issues with off-hour activities.  Begin a Risk Management Process (RMP) immediately and closely track all issues of concern.

41-56

The operator seems to have some issues with off-hour activities.  Utilize an ACAT or RMP to further determine a course of action.

57-80

The operator does not seem to have any issues with off-hour activities.  However, if particular areas of concern exist, then those must be addressed.

RESERVED. Paragraphs 10‑398 through 10‑412.


8/1/08                                                                                                                           8900.1 CHG 0

Volume 10  Air transportation oversight system

chapter 6  Initial CERTIFICATION PROCESS of Part 121 Air Carriers

Section 2  Certification Process Document

10-435 GENERAL. This section contains the text of the Certification Process Document (CPD) in its entirety. This section also provides direct links to reference material including briefing guides; meeting agendas; training requirements; and other guidance material used during the process.

Figure 10-60 A, Certification Process Document

PHASE 1—APPLICATION

            1.1       Applicant Requests Formal Application Meeting

                        1.1.1    Applicant‑Contact the certificate‑holding district office (CHDO) to schedule a formal application meeting date. Make this request at least 45 calendar days prior to the proposed formal application meeting to allow the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to prepare resources. The items listed below from the Pre-application Checklist (PAC) (refer to Figure 10‑63, Pre-application Checklist) must be submitted at this time:

·        Formal application letter

·        Completed Management Qualification Summary Form and Quality Audit Form

·        List of proposed operations specifications (OpSpecs)

·        An up to date Pre-application Statement of Intent (PASI) if there have been any changes to the original PASI

·        A proposed schedule of events (Refer to Figure 10‑61, Schedule of Events)

                        1.1.2    CHDO‑Advise the ATOS leadership team that an applicant has requested a formal application meeting, and e-mail a copy of the submitted documents to AVS-AFS900-ATOS-Leadership Team.
                        1.1.3    Certification project manager (CPM)‑Request a new Labor Distributing Reporting (LDR) project code by completing LDR Form for New Project Code and Revisions (MS Word) at: http://intranet.faa.gov/FAAemployees/Org/LineBusiness/AVS/Offices/AFS/LDR/

            1.2       Establish Certification Project Team

                        1.2.1    AFS‑900 Certification Section Manager‑Assign the AFS-900 certification team.
                        1.2.2    Certification team leader (CTL)‑Review the applicant’s submissions to become familiar with the applicant’s operation.
                        1.2.3    CHDO Manager and CTL‑Identify certification project team (CPT) members.
                        1.2.4    CPM‑If a data evaluation program manager is not assigned to the project, Ensure a CPT member(s) is assigned to act as the data reviewer(s).
                        1.2.5    CTL‑Create a Project Management Tool (PMT) record per AFS‑900‑001‑WI‑02 process.

            1.3       Formal Application Preparation

                        1.3.1    CPM‑Schedule a tentative date for the formal application meeting.
                        1.3.2    CTL‑Conduct CHDO briefing. (Refer to powerpoint presentation, CHDO Briefing, currently located at http://www.faa.gov/safety/programs_initiatives/oversight/atos/air_carrier/data_collection/)
                        1.3.3    CPM and CTL‑Identify team resources to complete the initial review.

            1.4       CPT Automation Preparation

                        1.4.1    CTL‑Ensure that a new air carrier account is generated in the Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS) database.
                        1.4.2    CHDO Team Members‑Complete the ATOS/PMT Automation Access Worksheet. (Refer to Figure 10‑65, Automation Access Worksheet.)
                        1.4.3.   CTL‑Create a CPT roster in the ATOS database. Include all frontline managers.
                        1.4.4    CPM‑Ensure an air carrier oversight profile is opened and the elements (and questions, if desired) are tailored to the requested scope of operation.

            1.5       Submission of Certification Documents Prior to Formal Application Meeting

                        1.5.1    Applicant‑Submit all additional PAC documents to the CHDO at least 15 business days before the formal application meeting. (Refer to Figure 10‑63, Preapplication Checklist.)
                        1.5.2    CPM‑Contact the Office of the Secretary of Transportation (OST), Air Carrier Fitness Division, (202) 366-2999, to confirm receipt of application.
                        1.5.3    CPM‑Inform the certification team leader via e-mail that all items on the PAC have been submitted.

            1.6       Initial Review

                        1.6.1    CTL‑Upload the applicant’s documents to the PMT, per AFS‑900‑001‑WI‑02.
                        1.6.2    CPT‑Conduct an initial review of the applicant’s submission and verify that content is sufficient to conduct a formal application meeting. (Refer to Paragraph 10‑436, Initial Review Instructions. and Paragraph 10-437, Evaluation Criteria.)

NOTE: Teams assigned to Safety Attribute Inspections (SAI) that pertain to FAA‑approved manuals, programs, or that are related to OpSpecs must include at least one CHDO inspector.

            1.7       Plan Formal Application Meeting

                        1.7.1    CPM‑If the initial review finds that the formal application package is of sufficient quality, continue planning the formal application meeting (refer to Paragraph 10‑439, Formal Application Meeting Plan). If the package is not of sufficient quality, return it to the applicant.
                        1.7.2    CPM‑Confirm that Title 14 of Federal Regulations(14 CFR) part 119.65(a) required management personnel will attend. Reschedule the meeting if any required management personnel cannot attend.
                        1.7.3    CPM and CTL‑Determine which certification team members will attend the formal application meeting.

            1.8       Notify/Coordinate with Applicable Offices

                        1.8.1    CPM‑Advise the Regional Flight Standards Division (RFSD) of the formal application date.
                        1.8.2    CPM‑Notify The Air Transportation Division Program Management Branch, AFS–260, of the project. Coordinate activity for the Industry OpSpecs Subsystem, user IDs, and passwords.

            1.9       Conduct Formal Application Meeting

                        1.9.1    CPM‑Circulate the attendance roster. (Refer to Figure 10‑66, Attendance Roster.)
                        1.9.2    CPM‑Ensure meeting agenda items are accomplished. (Refer to Paragraph 10‑439, Formal Application Meeting Plan.)
                        1.9.3    Applicant‑Verify that all required management and personnel with process change authority will be available throughout the certification process.
                        1.9.4    CPM‑Conclude the formal application meeting.
                        1.9.5    CPM‑Tell the applicant that they will be notified within five working days of acceptance or rejection.

NOTE: An unsuccessful evaluation does not always require a rejection of the formal application. The CPM may elect to conduct a follow-up evaluation. This follow-up evaluation must be completed with satisfactory results before finishing Phase 1.

            1.10     Accept or Reject the Entire Formal Application Package

                        1.10.1  CPT‑Discuss areas of concern and identify risks found during the formal application meeting.
                        1.10.2  CPM‑Determine if the application will be accepted.
                        1.10.3  CPM‑If the application is rejected, document discrepancies that caused the rejection.
                        1.10.4  CPM‑If the application is accepted, Ensure the air carrier oversight profile is completed. Save as final.

            1.11     Notification to Applicant.

                        1.11.1  CPM‑Provide either a letter of acceptance or a letter of rejection to the applicant within five working days of completing the formal application meeting.

NOTE: A letter of rejection will state the reason for rejection. The formal application package will be returned with the letter of rejection. The CHDO manager will determine at what step the applicant will reenter the CPD, or if the project should be terminated.

            1.12     Phase 1 Review

                        1.12.1  CPM/CTL‑Verify all Gate I requirements have been met. (Refer to Figure 10‑67, Gate Requirements.)
                        1.12.2  CTL‑Solicit applicant and CPT feedback. (Refer to Certification Process Feedback Form, currently located at http://www.faa.gov/safety/programs_initiatives/oversight/atos/air_carrier/data_collection/)
                        1.12.3  CTL‑Document the services provided by AFS‑900 in PMT “Status/Comments History.”

PHASE 2—DESIGN ASSESSMENT.

            2.1       Planning Meeting

                        2.1.1CPM/CTL‑Generate a design planning data package.
                        2.1.2    CPT‑Complete the Air Carrier Assessment Tool (ACAT).
                        2.1.3    CPM‑Ensure the initial Comprehensive Assessment Plan (CAP) is developed.
                        2.1.4    CPM‑Identify elements that pertain to FAA‑approved manuals, programs, or that are related to OpSpecs (refer to Figure 10‑62 Elements charts). Identify additional elements that were identified as high priority in the CAP. Instructions for these SAIs will state that all applicant-supplied data must be verified.
                        2.1.5    CPM‑Ensure that SAI work instructions for all elements not identified in the previous step state, at a minimum, that applicant‑supplied data for the procedure questions (section 1) will be verified.
                        2.1.6    CPM‑Ensure design assessment due dates are adjusted.

NOTE: Data sharing, collaboration, and open communication optimize the certification process and leverage resources. The CPM should plan to use applicant‑supplied SAI data during the FAA’s design assessment.

NOTE: If necessary, the CPM may request that additional attribute questions be verified throughout the design assessment phase.

            2.2       Resource Management

                        2.2.1    CPM and CTL‑Provide input to frontline managers to help them identify team resources needed to complete each SAI.
                        2.2.2    CHDO and AFS-900 Frontline Managers‑Determine resource availability and assign team coordinators (TC) and team members to support the design assessment plan.

NOTE: Teams assigned to SAIs that pertain to FAA‑approved manuals, programs, or that are related to OpSpecs, must include at least one CHDO inspector.

                        2.2.3    CHDO Manager‑Concur with the design assessment plan.

            2.3       Data Collection

                        2.3.1    Frontline Manager‑Ensure all applicant‑supplied SAI data (self assessment data) is entered into the ATOS database. Identify this data as “Air Carrier Provided Record” per ATOS automation instructions. Save activity as final.
                        2.3.2    CPT ASIs‑Complete assigned SAIs by verifying applicant‑supplied data. Enter “Initial Cert” in the Local/Regional/National Field on the “Begin Inspection Activity” screen. Save activity as final.

NOTE: If an inspector observes an issue not related to their assigned element, either document the issue in an “other” Dynamic Observation Report (DOR) or notify the inspector(s) working that element.

                        2.3.3    CPM‑Ensure that an SAI Activity Report and DOR is generated after completing the review of each submission.
                        2.3.4    CPT‑Meet to review the SAI activity and DOR report for each element.
                        2.3.5    CPM‑If additional data is needed or if the current submission is not of sufficient quality to proceed, return the entire submission to the applicant with a written explanation of concerns.

NOTE: Advise the applicant that the next revision must be returned as an entire submission accompanied by a revised SAI self assessment. Every document in the revised submission will be labeled as “Revision B”, “Revision C”, etc. Upon receipt of the revised submission, the CPT will verify revised SAI data and update the ATOS database using a new activity. Save revised activities to draft. Verify the compliance statement has been updated.

                        2.3.6    CTL‑Post a copy of the notice to applicant, activity report, and DOR report to the PMT per AFS‑900‑001‑WI‑02.

            2.4       Initial Cadre Training

                        2.4.1    CPT‑Review the initial cadre check airman (ICCA) plan to verify compliance with guidance. (Refer to 8900.1 Vol. 3 Chap 20, “Initial Cadre Check Airmen”.)
                        2.4.2    CPM‑Confirm approval of the ICCA plan.
                        2.4.3    Applicant‑Begin initial cadre training.
                        2.4.4    CPM‑Ensure the CAP is retargeted to use appropriate training EPIs to assess the performance of the ICCA training.

            2.5       Initial Training Program Approval

                        2.5.1    CPM‑Coordinate with the primary CHDO operations inspector to provide initial approval for selected training programs.

NOTE: This should be done after completing all training SAIs and a substantial portion of the design assessment. The applicant must be advised in writing that “differences training” may be required.

NOTE: The CMT must agree that all courseware to be used during training is acceptable.

                        2.5.2    CPM‑Ensure the CAP is retargeted to use appropriate training EPIs to assess the performance of the training program.

            2.6       Data Reporting

                        2.6.1    CPT‑Ensure SAI and DOR data is in accordance with data quality guidelines.
                        2.6.2    TC‑Save SAI to master record.

            2.7       Data Reviewing

                        2.7.1    CPM‑Ensure data meets data quality guidelines.
                        2.7.2    CPM‑Ensure all data have been saved to the ATOS database.

            2.8       Analysis and Assessment

                        2.8.1    CPM‑Conduct a design assessment meeting with identified members of the CPT to analyze collected data by element.
                        2.8.2    CPM‑Make bottom‑line assessment for each element and document on the Assessment Determination and Implementation tool.

            2.9       Action Determination and Implementation

                        2.9.1    CPM‑Follow the module 8 process map in Order 8900.1 Vol 10 Air Transportation Oversight System Version 1.2, to determine the appropriate course of action for each element.
                        2.9.2    CPM‑If the entire air carrier system design meets requirements for acceptance or approval without mitigation, accept or approve manuals and programs, as applicable.
                        2.9.3    CPM‑If the air carrier’s system design is accepted with mitigation, accept or approve manuals and programs, as applicable, and document the need for additional data collection, monitoring, or mitigation.
                        2.9.4    CPM‑Notify the applicant that all manuals and programs have been given approval and/or acceptance.
                        2.9.5    CPM‑If the system is not properly designed, notify applicant in writing and repeat steps as necessary.

            2.10     Check Status of the Following.

                        2.10.1  CPM‑Environmental review.
                        2.10.2  CPM‑Drug and alcohol abatement program.
                        2.10.3  CPM‑Dangerous goods program.
                        2.10.4  CPM‑Security program.
                        2.10.5  CPM‑All required training.
                        2.10.6  CPM‑Progress of economic authority.
                        2.10.7  CHDO Manager‑CMT baseline staffing and baseline training requirements.

            2.11     Operations Specifications

                        2.11.1  Applicant and CPM‑Verify the proposed OpSpecs have been generated.

            2.12     Phase 2 Review

                        2.12.1  Applicant‑Submit Figure 10‑61, Schedule of Events.
                        2.12.2  CPM and CTL‑Verify that all Gate II requirements have been met. (Refer to Figure 10‑67, Gate Requirements.)
                        2.12.3  CTL‑Document the services provided by AFS‑900 in PMT “Status/Comments History.”
                        2.12.4  CTL‑Solicit applicant and CPT feedback. (Refer to Certification Process Feedback Form, currently located at http://www.faa.gov/safety/programs_initiatives/oversight/atos/air_carrier/data_collection/

PHASE 3—PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT.

            3.1       Confirm Operational Readiness

                        3.1.1    Applicant‑Conduct an internal safety assessment of operating systems using company audit procedures and documentation. Submit results to the CPM.
                        3.1.2    Applicant‑Ensure all concerns found during the internal safety assessment have been properly addressed.

            3.2       Performance Assessment Planning

                        3.2.1    CPM‑Ensure the ACAT is updated using information from the design assessment.
                        3.2.2    CPT‑Adjust the CAP and plan performance assessments for elements 1.1.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.7, 3.1.2, 3.1.3, 5.1.1, 5.1.5, elements that are related to FAA certification requirements, and elements that were identified as high priority in the CAP.
                        3.2.3    CPM‑Ensure performance assessment due dates are set.
                        3.2.4    CPM‑Ensure data collection requirements for each performance assessment are determined.
                        3.2.5    CPM‑Ensure work instructions for identified Element Performance Inspections (EPI) and Constructed Dynamic Observation Reports (ConDOR) are documented.

            3.3       Resource Management

                        3.3.1    CPM and CTL‑Provide input to frontline managers to help them identify team resources to complete the performance assessment plan.
                        3.3.2    Frontline Managers‑Review schedule of events to ensure availability of resources (e.g., travel funds, passports, and country clearance requests).
                        3.3.3    CHDO and AFS‑900 Frontline Managers‑Assign team members to complete the performance assessment plan.
                        3.3.4    CHDO Manager‑Concur with the performance assessment plan.

            3.4       Aircraft Conformity Evaluation

                        3.4.1    Applicant‑Notify the CPM of aircraft availability at least 10 working days prior to the proposed aircraft evaluation, and forward the completed aircraft configuration control job aid (or applicant’s equivalent) and aircraft information form to CPM for the aircraft conformity evaluation. Refer to the ATOS aircraft conformity Web at Federal Aviation Administration - Aircraft Conformity Process for these forms.
                        3.4.2    CPM‑Provide the applicant a copy of the Aircraft Document Request List. (Refer to Figure 10‑68, Aircraft Document Request List.)
                        3.4.3    CPM‑Complete an initial review of the applicant’s conformity submissions to confirm all required records are present and of sufficient quality to continue to the next step.
                        3.4.4    CPT‑Evaluate the applicant’s aircraft conformity evaluation using the aircraft configuration control job aid and documentation provided by the applicant.
                        3.4.5    CPM‑In writing, notify the applicant of discrepancies identified during the aircraft conformity evaluation.
                        3.4.6    Applicant‑Submit a letter of corrections to the CPM. Update the schedule of events, if required.
                        3.4.7    CPM‑Confirm that discrepancies were corrected prior to beginning proving tests.
                        3.4.8    CTL‑Post the letter of corrections in the PMT.

            3.5       Demonstration Plans

                        3.5.1    Applicant‑Submit the following plans, as appropriate, for the proposed operation:

·        Emergency Evacuation Plan

·        Ditching Plan

·        Proving‑Test Plan

                        3.5.2    CPT‑Review and accept submitted plans.

·        Emergency Evacuation Plan and Ditching Plan (Refer to “Emergency Evacuation and Ditching Demonstration”.) 8900.1 Vol. 3 Chap. 30

·        Proving Test Plan (Refer to 8900.1 Vol. 3 Chap 29 and Paragraph 10-445, Proving Test Protocols.)

                        3.5.3    CPM‑If applicable, respond to the applicant request for a reduction of proving test hours.
                        3.5.4    Applicant‑Submit a request for a letter of authorization (LOA), in accordance with part 119.33I, for demonstrating appropriate operations under part 121. Make this request at least 10 business days before any aircraft flight demonstration. (Refer to 8900.1 Vol. 3 Chap 29 and Paragraph 10-445, Proving Test Protocols.)
                        3.5.5    Applicant‑Submit draft OpSpecs.
                        3.5.6    CPM‑Issue LOA in accordance with part 119.33(c).

            3.6       Tabletop Exercise

                        3.6.1    CPT‑Develop scenarios to assess performance during tabletop exercises. (Refer to paragraph 10-440, Tabletop Exercise.)
                        3.6.2    CPT/Applicant‑Conduct tabletop exercises and discuss results of each scenario.
                        3.6.3    CPM‑If any scenario is found to be unsatisfactory, Confirm the applicant has made corrections to its system design or has corrected personnel performance issues before beginning proving tests.

            3.7       Evacuation/Ditching Demonstrations (as required)

                        3.7.1    CSI‑Discuss demo plan with the CPT.
                        3.7.2    CPT‑Brief applicant on plan and expectations.
                        3.7.3    CPT/Applicant‑Conduct evacuation/ditching demonstrations.
                        3.7.4    CPT‑Document results of each demonstration on FAA Form 8430-1, Emergency Evacuation Demonstration Report, and EPIs 1.1.2, 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 (refer to 8900.1 Vol. 3 Chap. 30, Emergency Evacuation and Ditching Demonstration.) EPI records will remain in draft.
                        3.7.5    CPM‑Forward completed 8430-1 forms to RFSD.
                        3.7.6    CPM‑Save completed 8430-1 forms.

            3.8       Assess Applicant’s Facilities

                        3.8.1    CPT‑Assess at least the following facilities using applicable EPIs:

·        Station facilities (EPI 5.1.5)

·        Main maintenance base (EPI 1.3.3)

·        Line station facilities (EPI 5.1.1)

·        Outsource maintenance facilities (EPI 1.3.7)

NOTE: EPI records may remain open until proving tests are complete.

NOTE: The CPT may accomplish these assessments prior to, or during proving tests by observing the applicant conduct their own internal safety assessment (step 3.1).

            3.9       Prepare for Proving Tests

                        3.9.1    CPM‑Confirm the show cause order has been issued.
                        3.9.2    CPM/CTL‑Verify that all other Gate III requirements are met (refer to Figure 10‑67, Gate Requirements.)
                        3.9.3    CPM‑Schedule the CPT for proving tests.
                        3.9.4    CPT‑Develop proving test scenarios that will facilitate the collection of data that will be used to complete the performance assessment. (Refer to 8900.1 Vol.3 Chap 29 and Paragraph 10-445, Proving Test Protocols.)

            3.10     CPT and Applicant Conduct Proving Tests

                        3.10.1  CPT and Applicant‑Meet to discuss the proving‑test protocols and the proposed flight schedule.
                        3.10.2  CPT‑Prior to each day’s proving tests, conduct an FAA meeting to review the day’s plan.
                        3.10.3  CPT and Applicant‑Prior to each day’s proving tests, conduct a briefing with the applicant to review the day’s plan.
                        3.10.4  CPT and Applicant‑Conduct proving tests.
                        3.10.5  CPT‑Collect data for assigned EPIs or ConDORs.
                        3.10.6  CPT and Applicant‑Debrief results after each flight.
                        3.10.7  CPT‑Document results of each scenario on the appropriate worksheet.
                        3.10.8  CPM‑When all test objectives have been met and the applicant has repeatedly demonstrated their ability to conduct line operations in compliance with regulations and safe operating practices, recommend that the proving tests conclude.
                        3.10.9  CHDO Manager‑Notify RFSD of normal completion of proving tests or proving tests that were terminated due to unsatisfactory performance. Early completion of proving tests requires RFSD approval.

            3.11     Data Reporting

                        3.11.1  CPT‑Enter EPI, ConDOR, and DOR data in accordance with data quality guidelines and save activities to final.
                        3.11.2  CPT‑Save the EPI to the master record when it is complete.

            3.12     DATA Review

                        3.12.1  CPM‑Ensure data meets data quality guidelines and save records to the ATOS database.

            3.13     Analysis and Assessment.

                        3.13.1  CPM‑Along with identified members of the CPT, conduct a performance assessment meeting to analyze EPI collected data by element.
                        3.13.2  CPM‑Make bottom‑line assessment and document on the ADI Tool.

            3.14     Action and Determination Using the Assessment Determination and Implementation Tool.

                        3.14.1  CPM‑Follow the ATOS module 8 process map in Order 8900.1 Vol 10, Air Transportation Oversight System Version 1.2, to determine the appropriate course of action for each element.

NOTE: If the air carrier’s system meets all performance standards, it is affirmed.

                        3.14.2  CPM‑If the air carrier’s system meets performance standards but with minor problems, determine whether additional data collection, monitoring, or action is needed.

            3.15     Phase 3 Review

                        3.15.1  CTL‑Document the services provided by AFS‑900 in the PMT.
                        3.15.2  CTL‑Solicit applicant and CPT feedback. (Refer to Certification Process Feedback Form, currently located at http://www.faa.gov/safety/programs_initiatives/oversight/atos/air_carrier/data_collection/
PHASE 4—ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS.

            4.1       Accomplish Administrative Requirements

                        4.1.1    CHDO Manager‑Confirm the CMT is in place.
                        4.1.2    CPM‑Obtain final certificate number from the Flight Standards Regulatory Support Division Aviation Data Systems Branch, AFS‑620, (405) 954‑9723.
                        4.1.3    CHDO Manager‑Schedule the first annual planning meeting with the CMT, AFS‑900 field support, and appropriate members of the CPT.

            4.2       Approve OpSpecs

                        4.2.1    CPM‑Verify final changes to the Vital Information Subsystem and draft OpSpecs are accomplished. Coordinate with PIs on approval/disapproval of the applicant’s OpSpecs.
                        4.2.2    PIs‑Review any OST limitations before signing the OpSpecs.
                        4.2.3    PIs‑Sign OpSpecs.

            4.3       Issue OpSpecs and Air Carrier Certificate

                        4.3.1    CHDO Manager‑Review and forward air carrier certificate and copy of OpSpecs to the RFSD division manager.
                        4.3.2    RFSD Manager‑Sign the air carrier certificate and return to CHDO.
                        4.3.3    CHDO Manager‑Issue OpSpecs and the air carrier certificate.

            4.4       Certification Report

                        4.4.1    CPM‑Assemble the certification report, include:

·        PASI

·        Formal letter of application

·        Proving test report

·        Emergency evacuation demonstration report

·        Ditching report·

·        Copy of the air carrier certificate

·        Final compliance statement

·        A copy of the OpSpecs issued

                        4.4.2    CPM‑Sign and retain the certification report.
                        4.4.3    CHDO Manager‑Forward a copy of the certification report to RFSD.

            4.5       Phase 4 Review

                        4.5.1    CPM/CTL‑Verify all steps in Phase 4 have been completed.
                        4.5.2    CPM‑Solicit applicant and CPT feedback. (Refer to Certification Process Feedback Form, currently located at http://www.faa.gov/safety/programs_initiatives/oversight/atos/air_carrier/data_collection/)
                        4.5.3    CTL‑Document the services provided by AFS‑900 in PMT.
                        4.5.4    CTL‑Comment in PMT project summary verifying that required PMT records are in the supporting documents per AFS‑900‑001‑WI‑02. Include the CTL’s name.
                        4.5.4    CTL‑Send message to AFS-900 Certification Section team members to remove company manuals from their computers.

Figure 10-61, Schedule of Events.

Name of Applicant:

 

Date:

Events

Date Proposed

Date Accomplished

Phase 1—Application

 

Submit Application Package

 

 

Formal Application Meeting

 

 

Phase 2—Design Assessment

 

Receive initial approval for ICCA training

 

 

Begin ICCA training

 

 

All manuals approved/accepted

 

 

Pilot Training

 

 

Begin Instructor Training

 

 

Begin Basic Indoctrination

 

 

Begin Emergency Training

 

 

Begin Aircraft Ground School

 

 

Begin Simulator/Aircraft Training

 

 

Begin Check Airmen Training

 

 

Flight Attendant Training

 

 

Begin Instructor Training

 

 

Begin Basic Indoctrination

 

 

Begin Emergency Training

 

 

Begin Aircraft Ground Training

 

 

Begin Competency Check Supervisor Training

 

 

Dispatch Training

 

 

Begin Instructor Training

 

 

Begin Basic Indoctrination

 

 

Begin Aircraft Ground Training

 

 

Begin Competency Check Supervisor Training

 

 

Begin Competency Checks

 

 


Figure 10-61, Schedule of Events (Continued)


Events

Date Proposed

Date Accomplished

Maintenance Training

 

Begin Instructor Training

 

 

Begin Basic Indoctrination

 

 

Begin Aircraft Ground Training

 

 

Begin Maintenance Inspector Training (RII)

 

 

Training completed for Phase 3 participants

 

 

Phase 3—Performance Assessment

 

Submit Operational Readiness Results

 

 

Submit emergency evacuation and ditching plan (as required)

 

 

Submit proving‑test plan

 

 

Submit completed aircraft conformity documentation

 

 

Aircraft ready for FAA Conformity Evaluation

 

 

Tabletop Exercise

 

 

Evacuation/ditching demonstration

 

 

Generate proving‑test operation specifications

 

 

Proving Test

 

 

Finish Proving Runs

 

 

10-436 INITIAL REVIEW INSTRUCTIONS.

Purpose: The purpose of the initial review is to determine the quality of applicant’s application package.

A.     Procedure:

1)      The Certification Project Team (CPT) will:
a)      Verify that all Preapplication Checklist (PAC) documents have been submitted.
b)      Verify that all manuals required to conduct the design assessment are available to the CPT.
c)      Verify the compliance statement includes applicable Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 119 and 121 rules.
2)      The certification project manager (CPM) will select a minimum of nine Safety Attribute Inspection (SAIs), distributed as evenly as practicable across air carrier systems and inspector disciplines. These SAIs will consist of six SAIs that pertain to programs that require approval or that are related to operations specifications (OpSpecs) and three other SAIs. (See the SAI chart below.)

10-437 Evaluation Criteria.

The system design must not include unacceptable safety issues.

B.     One hundred percent of the documents required by the PAC must have been submitted.

C.     The compliance statement must accurately list at least 90 percent of the part 119 and 121 rules that apply to the applicant.

D.    Ninety percent of the questions on each of the selected SAIs must have been answered correctly by the applicant, and contain accurate reference information. If the reference is to the manual system, it must be to the volume, chapter, and paragraph level (or equivalent)

E.     CTL should enter their results in the Project Management Tool (PMT) per the PMT instructions.


Figure 10‑62, Element Chart

AIRWORTHINESS

1.0 Aircraft Configuration Control

2.0 Manuals

1.1 Aircraft

2.1 Manual Management

1.1.1

Aircraft Airworthiness

2.1.1

Manual Currency

1.1.2

Appropriate Operational Equipment

2.1.2

Content Consistency Across Manuals

1.1.3 (R)

Special Flight Permits

2.1.3

Distribution (Manuals)

1.2 Records and Reporting Systems

2.1.4

Availability (Manuals)

1.2.1

Airworthiness Release/Log Book Entry

2.1.5

Supplemental Operations Manual Requirements

1.2.2

Major Repairs and Alterations Records

 

 

1.2.3

Maintenance Log /Recording Requirements

4.0 Personnel Training and Qualifications

1.2.4

Mechanical Interruption Summary Reports

4.1 Maintenance Personnel Qualifications

1.2.5

Service Difficulty Reports

4.1.1

Required Inspection Item Personnel

1.2.6  (R)

Aircraft Listing

4.1.2

Maintenance Certificate Requirements

1.3 Maintenance Organization

4.2 Training Program

1.3.1  (R)

Maintenance Program

4.2.1

Maintenance Training Program

1.3.2  (R)

Inspection Program

4.2.2

Required Inspection Item Training Requirements

1.3.3

Maintenance Facility/Main Maintenance Base

4.2.12

Hazardous Materials Training

1.3.4

Required Inspection Items

4.4 Mechanics and Repairmen Certification

1.3.5  (R)

Minimum Equipment List/Configuration Deviation List/Deferred Maintenance

4.4.1

Recency of Experience

1.3.6

Airworthiness Directive Management

4.4.2

Display of Certificate

1.3.7  (R)

Outsource Organization

4.4.3

Privileges Airframe and Powerplant

1.3.8

Control of Calibrated Tools and Test Equipment

4.4.4

Privileges and Limitations for Repairmen

1.3.9

Engineering/Major Repairs and Alterations

5.0 Route Structures

1.3.10

Parts/Material Control/Suspected Unapproved Parts

5.1 Approved Routes and Areas

1.3.11

Continuous Analysis and Surveillance

5.1.1

Line Stations (Service & Maintenance)

1.3.12

Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 36

5.1.2

Weather Reporting/Supplemental Aviation Weather Reporting System

1.3.13

Designated Alteration Station

5.1.3

Non‑Federal Navigational Aids

1.3.14

General Maintenance Manual or Equivalent

5.1.4

Altimeter Setting Sources

1.3.15  (R)

Reliability Program

5.1.8

Extended Operations

1.3.16

Fueling

5.1.9

Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum

1.3.17  (R)

Weight and Balance Program

  6.0 Airman and Crew Flight, Rest, and Duty Time

1.3.18  (R)

Deicing Program

6.2 Maintenance Personnel

1.3.19

Lower Landing Minimums

6.2.1

Maintenance Duty Time Limitations

1.3.20

Engine Condition Monitoring

7.0 Technical Administration

1.3.21  (R)

Parts Pooling

7.1 Key Personnel

1.3.22  (R)

Parts Borrowing

7.1.1  (R)

Director of Maintenance

1.3.23  (R)

Short‑Term Escalations

7.1.2  (R)

Chief Inspector

1.3.24  (R)

Coordinating Agencies for Suppliers Evaluation

7.1.3  (R)

Director of Safety

1.3.25

Cargo Handling Equipment, Systems and Appliances

7.1.6  (R)

Maintenance Control

 

 

 

 

(R): These elements pertain to manuals or programs that require approval or are related OpSpecs that should be assigned to certificate-holding district office (CHDO) inspectors.


OPERATIONS & CABIN SAFETY

1.0 Aircraft Configuration Control

4.0 Personnel Training and Qualifications

1.1 Aircraft

4.2 Training Program

1.1.2

Appropriate Operational Equipment

4.2.3 (R)

Training of Flight Crewmembers

 

 

4.2.4 (R)

Training of Flight Attendants

2.0 Manuals

4.2.5 (R)

Training of Dispatchers

2.1 Manual Management

4.2.6 (R)

Training of Station Personnel

2.1.1

Manual Currency

4.2.7 (R)

Training of Check Airman and Instructors

2.1.2

Content Consistency Across Manuals

4.2.8 (R)

Simulators/Training Devices

2.1.3

Distribution (Manuals)

4.2.9 (R)

Outsource Crewmember Training

2.1.4

Availability (Manuals)

4.2.10(R)

Aircrew Designated Examiner Program

2.1.5

Supplemental Operations Manual Requirements

4.2.11 (R)

Training of Flight Followers

 

 

4.2.12

Hazardous Materials Training

 

 

4.3 Crewmember and Dispatch Qualifications

3.0 Flight Operations

4.3.1

Pilot Operating Limitations/Recent Experience

3.1 Air Carrier Programs and Procedures

4.3.2 (R)

Appropriate Airman/Crewmember Checks and Qualifications

3.1.1

Passenger Handling

4.3.3 (R)

Advanced Qualification Program

3.1.2

Flight Attendant Duties/Cabin Procedures

5.0 Route Structures

3.1.3 (R)

Airman Duties/Flight Deck Procedures

5.1 Approved Routes and Areas

3.1.4 (R)

Operational Control

5.1.5

Station Facilities

3.1.5 (R)

Carry‑on Baggage Program

5.1.6 (R)

Use of Approved Routes, Areas and Airports

3.1.6 (R)

Exit Seating Program

5.1.7 (R)

Special Navigation Areas of Operation

3.1.7