




U.S. Department
of Transportation
**Federal Aviation
Administration**

AFS-600
Regulatory Support Division

ADVISORY CIRCULAR

43-16A

AVIATION MAINTENANCE ALERTS



**ALERT
NUMBER
363**



**OCTOBER
2008**

CONTENTS

AIRPLANES

CESSNA	1
HAWKER	3
PIPER	3

HELICOPTERS

SCHWEIZER	4
-----------------	---

POWERPLANTS

CONTINENTAL	4
-------------------	---

ACCESSORIES

ALTERNATOR	6
SLICK	7

AIR NOTES

INTERNET SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORTING (iSDR) WEB SITE	11
IF YOU WANT TO CONTACT US	12
AVIATION SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORTS	12

**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, DC 20590**

AVIATION MAINTENANCE ALERTS

The Aviation Maintenance Alerts provides a common communication channel through which the aviation community can economically interchange service experience, cooperating in the improvement of aeronautical product durability, reliability, and safety. This publication is prepared from information submitted by those who operate and maintain civil aeronautical products. The contents include items that have been reported as significant, but have not been evaluated fully by the time the material went to press. As additional facts such as cause and corrective action are identified, the data will be published in subsequent issues of the Alerts. This procedure gives Alerts' readers prompt notice of conditions reported via a Malfunction or Defect Report (M or D) or a Service Difficulty Report (SDR). Your comments and suggestions for improvement are always welcome. Send to: FAA; ATTN: Aviation Data Systems Branch (AFS-620); P.O. Box 25082; Oklahoma City, OK 73125-5029.

(Editor's notes are provided for editorial clarification and enhancement within an article. They will always be recognized as italicized words bordered by parentheses.)

AIRPLANES

CESSNA

Cessna: (Multiple Models); Pilot & Copilot Seat Tracks; ATA 2510 (+)

(The following maintenance admonition is provided by Aerospace Engineer Hieu Nguyen from the Wichita Aircraft Certification Office. Effected Cessna models are as follows: T303, 336, 337 and all legacy, pre-1986 single-engine models including 150, 152, 170, 172, 175, 177, 180, 182, 185, 188, 190, 195, 205, 206, 207, and 210. Relevant ATA codes include 5310 and 5347. Contact information can be found at the article's end.)

“This Aviation Maintenance Alerts article is written to encourage owners, operators, and maintenance technicians to adhere to the requirements of Airworthiness Directive (AD) 87-20-03R2. The AD was issued because of pilot/copilot seat slippage due to the latch pin not properly engaging in the seat rail/track. When the pilot/copilot seat's primary latch pin does not properly engage in the seat rail/track, seat slippage may occur, causing pilots to be unable to reach all the controls which could lead to loss of control of the airplane.

“Compliance with AD 87-20-03R2 should have eliminated accidents and Service Difficulty Reports (SDR's). However, in the past decade we have seen a resurgence in the number of accidents reported by the NTSB and in SDR's. This may indicate the inspections of the seat tracks are not being adequately performed or existing problems are not being corrected.

“Cessna has made available a secondary seat stop that can be installed for additional safety in the event the primary latch pin is not properly engaged in the rail/track. For airplanes not yet in compliance we recommend installation of the secondary seat stop on both the pilot and copilot seats in accordance with Cessna SEB07-5R1 or MEB07-1R1. For airplanes that already have the secondary seat stop installed, the FAA recommends inspection and replacement (if necessary) of P/N 505590-401 *Reel Assembly* in accordance with Cessna SEB07-8 or MEB07-2. Reports have been made of secondary seat stops that have malfunctioned; however, the reel is designed to prevent slippage if such an event occurs.

“For additional information on the seat rail/track parts inspections, we suggest reviewing AD 87-2-03R2. Cessna SEB07-5R1 or MEB07-1R1 covers secondary seat stop installation data. Cessna SEB07-8 or MEB07-2 provides information for the inspection/replacement of the *Reel Assembly*, P/N 505590-401. The following table describes the installations for various models; however, because of the limited 8 inch seat travel, Models 150 and 152 do not have service kits.”

Cessna Service Bulletin No. and Date	Cessna Service Kit No. and Date
MEB07-1, Original Issue: May 21, 2007, Revision 1, dated December 17, 2007	SK337-75, dated May 21, 2007; and SK337-76, dated May 21, 2007
MEB07-2, dated September 3, 2007	SK337-77, dated September 3, 2007; and SK337-78, dated September 3, 2007
SEB07-5, Original Issue: May 14, 2007, Revision 1, dated December 17, 2007	SK195-11; dated May 14, 2007; SK195-12; dated May 14, 2007; SK210-174A, Original Issue: May 14, 2007, dated December 10, 2007; and SK210-175, dated May 14, 2007
SEB07-8, dated September 10, 2007	SK195-13, dated September 10, 2007; SK195-14, dated September 10, 2007; SK210-177, dated September 10, 2007; and SK210-178, dated September 10, 2007

(This editor can personally testify one’s arms will spontaneously grow an amazing 4 inches to compensate for a loose seat’s backward acceleration during climb-out! Such was the quality of my flight instruction: better to fall out of the airplane than to even think of hanging on to the control column.... For further information contact Aerospace Engineer Hieu Nguyen, FAA Wichita ACO, 1801 Airport Road, Room 100, Wichita, KS. 67209; phone 316-946-4129; fax 316-946-4107; e-mail hieu.nguyen@faa.gov).

Part Total Time: (n/a).

Cessna: T210L; Erratic Operation of Flap Follow-Up Cable; ATA 2751

“I ordered a new, Cessna Flap Follow-up Cable (P/N 9860058-1), “ says a mechanic, “to replace the original cable (it had become defective due to normal usage and age). This cable is similar to a throttle cable—(having) an inside cable which slides in an outside housing. Upon installation of the new, Cessna Flap Follow-up cable the operation was (observed to be) very rough and intermittent. Smooth operation is critical to meet Maintenance Manual specifications (and the aircraft’s flight manual requirements for certain specified flight conditions). I contacted the Cessna Service Center...and then Cessna Technical Support direct. Cessna assured us (verbally) the cable has been manufactured to original specifications. From first glance the cable is obviously constructed in a different manner and of different material from the original part (for this and other aircraft utilizing the same part). Cessna Technical Support verbally stated the cable must meet a QC standard of operating smoothly with a 4 inch radius around a 90 degree bend. After (installation) of the new cable the operation (was observed) to be stiff, with ‘catches’ in its travel—as if the cable was snagging the cable housing when placed in one 6 to 8 inch radius bend. Multiple bends are required for installation in the aircraft. Each additional bend compounds the roughness of its travel. This cable operates travel limit switches for specified degree of flaps as set by the pilot at

the flap selector handle. The maintenance manual only allows for a couple of degrees variance from the flap selector settings and the actual flap position. Rough operation causes an inability to set switches and the cable to produce consistent results (*as required by*) the maintenance manual parameters and the flight manual for specified flight configurations. This is the second of two new cables in this condition ordered for this aircraft. Upon further contact with Cessna they could provide no other options or advice, (*indicating*) all new cables will perform in this same manner.”

A search of the FAA Service Difficulty Reporting System data base reflects four such entries for this part number. Thank-you for the detailed description—I've experienced the same difficulty in other applications. I'll forward this to engineering and see if I can peak some interest—Ed.)

Part Total Time: 0.00 hours.

HAWKER

Hawker: 800XP; Failed Hydraulic Line; ATA 2910

(The following combines two defect reports—the same failure occurring twice on the L/H and R/H sides of the same aircraft, but at two different times.)

This mechanic states, “The hydraulic flexible line to the right main landing gear door actuator ruptured during flight. Loss of fluid cavitated the right and left engine driven hydraulic pumps. This line ruptured in the sidewall near the swaged end fitting for the connector. Pressure is 3,000 PSI constant. No landing gear actuation was in progress. (*I*) suspect a manufacturing defect—the aircraft manufacturer has been notified. (*Two* months and 111.2 hours later the same part on the L/H side ruptured. Hydraulic line P/N: Aeroquip SA7670024-001. A search of the FAA Service Difficulty Reporting System data base provides 2 additional reports for the same part number.)

Part Total Times: R/H 2,258.7 and L/H 2,369.9 hours.

PIPER

Piper: PA32R-301T; Cracked Fuselage Skin; ATA 5330

An unidentified technician describes the following defect. “(*This aircraft's*) upper Comm/Nav antenna doubler and skin cracked—from the forward seam along both antenna mount nut-plate lines. The cracks are approximately six inches long with additional cracking radiating out from the forward nut-plates to the forward doubler mounting rivets. The antenna doubler (*P/N 99813-004*) is cracked completely through on the left side and 90 percent through on the right side.” “Damage appears to have been caused by prolonged oil-canning of the upper skin panel (*P/N 69904-000*) from aerodynamic loads against the antenna during flight. To prevent reoccurrence, repair with a flush patch per 43.13-1B, section 4. However, bend a ½ inch lip on the left, right, and aft edges of the backing patch to increase stiffness and reduce the oil-canning effect. Jog the front edge of the backing patch and tie into the forward skin seam (*and rib*), and extend the left, right, and aft edges 4 inches past the removed damaged area. An alternate repair would be to replace the entire effected skin section and remanufacture the antenna doubler to tie into the forward and aft ribs to stiffen the entire area.” (*Thanks for the methodical description. Note the 43.13 is at the -2B iteration—Ed.*)

Part Total Time: 1,520.5 hours.

HELICOPTERS

SCHWEIZER

Schweizer: 269D; Cracked Main Rotor Drive Shaft; ATA 6230

An A&P mechanic states, “During preflight, the Main Rotor (M/R) droop stop nut was found to be loose. Upon further inspection it was determined the M/R hub should be removed to look for signs of wear. Once the hub was removed and inspected, moderate wear (fretting) was found on the droop stop retainer plate (P/N 269A 1320), the droop stop retainer ring (P/N 269D 1329), the droop stop retainer (P/N 269A 1332), and the upper scissors support (P/N 269A1328-901) to thrust bearing tube spacer assembly (P/N 269A 1318-3). Once these parts were removed, the drive shaft was removed for inspection. *(After)* the drive shaft was removed, the drive shaft thrust bearing was removed for inspection—corrosion was found on the drive shaft thrust bearing journal. This corrosion was removed and further visual examination revealed a possible crack located radially along the journal’s surface. Dye penetrant of the suspect area was performed, revealing a 0.375 inch anomaly. Next, an eddy current test was performed that proved the anomaly was also below the surface with approximately 0.005 inches of separation. This part was returned to Schweizer for further examination and evaluation. Refer to Schweizer 269D Basic HMI Configuration ‘A’ section 8—and IPC section 3 for parts breakdown.” *(Main Rotor Drive Shaft P/N: 269D5308-5)*


Part Total Time: 674.1 hours.

POWERPLANTS

CONTINENTAL

Continental: A-65 Series; Canadian Certification Advisory; ATA 7100

(The following admonition is published here as received from Transport Canada.)



TP 7244

No. N°	AV-2008-06	1/2
Date	2008-08-15	

**SERVICE DIFFICULTY
ADVISORY**

This Service Difficulty Advisory brings to your attention a potential problem identified by the Service Difficulty Reporting Program. It is a non-mandatory notification and does not preclude issuance of an airworthiness directive.

**TELEDYNE CONTINENTAL ENGINE
MODEL A-65 SERIES**

This Advisory is issued to inform the aviation community of the possibility of an ineligible engine model that may be installed in aircraft operating under a standard Certificate of Airworthiness pursuant to *Canadian Aviation Regulations* (CAR) 507.02. This information is not relevant to aircraft operated under a special certificate of airworthiness in the owner-maintenance or amateur-built classification.

The Teledyne Continental Engine Model series A-65 is certified in accordance with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS) No. E-205, Revision 16, dated 1 November 1973. A copy of the TCDS can be reviewed at the following web site: http://www.airweb.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgAD.nsf/MainFrame?OpenFrameSet.

Aircraft manufacturers such as Aeronca, Luscombe, Piper and Taylorcraft, have Teledyne Continental Engine Models installed on certain models of their aircraft. Note 6, of FAA TCDS E-205, is of particular interest to owners of these aircraft models.

Note 6 is quoted below for your convenience.

Note 6: Approval for Models A-65-1, -3, -6, -6J, -7 and -7J expired November 17, 1941. No engines of these models manufactured after that date or with S/N's above the following, are eligible for use in certificated aircraft:

<u>Models</u>	<u>Serial No.</u>
A-65-1	379991
A-65-3	387593
A-65-6	389096
A-65-6J	373296
A-65-7	575897

To request a change of address, contact the Civil Aviation Communications Centre (AARC) at Place de Ville, Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0N8, or 1 800 395-2959, or [www.tc.gc.ca/civilaviation/communications/centre address.asp](http://www.tc.gc.ca/civilaviation/communications/centre%20address.asp)
24-0028 (01-2005)

**AVIS DE
DIFFICULTÉS EN SERVICE**

Le présent Avis de difficultés en service a pour but d'attirer votre attention sur un problème possible qui a été révélé par le Programme de rapports de difficultés en service. Il est une notification facultative et n'exclut pas nécessairement la publication d'une consigne de navigabilité.

**MOTEUR TELEDYNE CONTINENTAL,
MODÈLES DE LA SÉRIE A-65**

Le présent Avis est diffusé afin d'informer le milieu de l'aviation de l'installation possible d'un moteur non admissible dans un aéronef exploité en vertu d'un certificat de navigabilité standard, conformément à l'article 507.02 du *Règlement de l'aviation canadien* (RAC). Ces renseignements ne visent pas les aéronefs exploités en vertu d'un certificat de navigabilité spécial de la catégorie de maintenance par le propriétaire ou de la catégorie de construction amateur.

Les moteurs de la série A-65, fabriqués par Teledyne Continental, sont certifiés en vertu de la Révision 16 de la Fiche de données de certificat de type (FDCT) n° E-205, datée du 1^{er} novembre 1973 et publiée par la Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Une copie de cette FDCT a été versée dans le site Web suivant aux fins de consultation: http://www.airweb.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgAD.nsf/MainFrame?OpenFrameSet.

Des constructeurs d'aéronefs, comme Aeronca, Luscombe, Piper et Taylorcraft, ont installé des moteurs Teledyne Continental dans certains de leurs modèles d'aéronef. Les propriétaires de ces modèles d'aéronef devraient porter une attention particulière à la Note 6 de la FDCT E-205 publiée par la FAA.


La Note 6 figure ci-après pour faciliter sa consultation :

Note 6 : L'approbation des modèles A-65-1, -3, -6, -6J, -7 et -7J a cessé d'avoir effet le 17 novembre 1941. Aucun des modèles de moteur susmentionnés, qui ont été fabriqués après cette date ou dont le numéro de série est supérieur que ceux qui figure dans le tableau ci-dessous, ne peut être installé dans un aéronef certifié :

<u>Modèles</u>	<u>Numéros de série</u>
A-65-1	379991
A-65-3	387593
A-65-6	389096
A-65-6J	373296
A-65-7	575897

Pour demander un changement d'adresse, veuillez contacter le Centre des communications de l'aviation civile (AARC), Place de Ville, Ottawa (Ontario) K1A 0N8, au 1-800-395-2959, ou à [www.tc.gc.ca/aviation/civilaviation/communications/centre address.asp](http://www.tc.gc.ca/aviation/civilaviation/communications/centre%20address.asp).



	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 60%; font-size: small;">No. N°</td> <td style="width: 30%;">AV-2008-06</td> <td style="width: 10%; text-align: center;">2/2</td> </tr> </table>	No. N°	AV-2008-06	2/2
No. N°	AV-2008-06	2/2		
<p>Any type-certificated aircraft having an installed engine, which meets the criteria of Note 6, does not meet the aircraft's certified type design and therefore is not eligible for the issuance of a standard Certificate of Airworthiness in accordance with CAR 507.</p>	<p>Les aéronefs ayant un certificat de type et dont le moteur est un des modèles figurant dans la Note 6 ne satisfont pas aux exigences de la définition de type certifiée pour cet aéronef, ils ne peuvent donc pas être admissibles à la délivrance d'un certificat de navigabilité standard, conformément à la sous-partie 507 du RAC.</p>			
<p>To ensure the Certificate of Airworthiness remains valid, Transport Canada recommends those affected aircraft owners review their aircraft documentation to ensure the affected engine models are not installed in their aircraft.</p>	<p>Pour vérifier si leur certificat de navigabilité est toujours valide, Transports Canada recommande aux propriétaires des aéronefs visés d'examiner les documents de leur aéronef pour s'assurer que les moteurs dont le modèle et le numéro de série correspondant ne sont pas installés dans leur aéronef.</p>			
<p>For further information, contact a Transport Canada Centre, or call Marcel Gauthier, Continuing Airworthiness, Ottawa. Telephone 613-952-4364, or facsimile 613-996-9178, or e-mail gauthmr@tc.gc.ca.</p>	<p>Pour obtenir de plus amples renseignements, communiquez avec un Centre de Transports Canada ou avec Marcel Gauthier, Maintien de la navigabilité aérienne, à Ottawa, par téléphone au 613-952-4364, par télécopieur au 613-996-9178 ou par courriel à gauthmr@tc.gc.ca.</p>			
<p>For Director, National Aircraft Certification</p>	<p>Pour le Directeur, Certification des aéronefs</p>			
 Philip Tang Acting Chef, Continuing Airworthiness Chef intérimaire, Maintien de la navigabilité aérienne				
<p>Note: For the electronic version of this document, please consult the following Web address:</p>	<p>Nota : La version électronique de ce document se trouve à l'adresse Web suivante :</p>			
<p>www.tc.gc.ca/CivilAviation/certification/menu.htm</p>				

Part Total Time: (n/a).

ACCESSORIES

ALTERNATOR

Alternator: E3FF10300AA; Low Voltage Output; ATA 2434

An unidentified submitter describes alternator difficulty for a Cessna P210N behind a Continental TSIO-520P. "During day flight the 'low voltage' light illuminated and the bus voltage dropped below 24 volts. The pilot minimized loads, did a manual gear extension, and landed without incident. The charging system was troubleshot by an A&P mechanic who found the alternator output to be 26 volts, unloaded. With 50% load on the bus the alternator voltage would drop below 24 volts. This alternator was *overhauled by Kelly Aerospace Power Systems.*" (Time since overhaul: 50.0 hours; read next for continuing saga. A search of the FAA Service Difficulty Reporting System data base returns 6 reports for this part number.)

Part Total Time: (unknown).

Alternator: E3FF10300AA; Low Voltage Output; ATA 2434

(The same aircraft and submitter continue here, a second alternator and 10 hours later....)

“During a night, instrument approach the *(aircraft’s)* low voltage light illuminated and the bus voltage dropped below 24 volts. The pilot recycled the alternator switch but was unable to keep the alternator on line. He reduced the loads and successfully executed an approach—landing without incident. The charging system was troubleshot by an A&P mechanic who found the alternator output to be 26 volts, unloaded. With 50% load on the bus the alternator voltage would drop below 24 volts. This alternator was overhauled by Kelly Aerospace Power Systems.” *(Time since overhaul: 10.0 hours.)*

Part Total Time: (unknown).

Alternator: DOFF10300; Broken/Missing Diode Studs; ATA 2434

(An A&P not associated with the previous two reports provides this description of another failed alternator. The engine is a Lycoming O-320 pulling a Cessna 172 through the clouds.)


“This alternator was overhauled by KELLY AEROSPACE. It operated less than 50 hours, then failed. The stud that holds the diode plate in the alternator was broken, and the second stud was loose. This has been an ongoing problem with Kelly Aerospace overhauls. We are a small shop, yet we have had many failures with this product in the past two years. Approximately 70% of the Kelly overhauls we have installed have gone back for warranty. Problems include loose drive pulleys, loose hardware, short circuits, dead field windings, and defective brushes....” *(Part time since overhaul: 46.0 hours.)*

Part Total Time: (unknown).


SLICK**Slick Magneto: 4370; Broken Point-Cam Shaft; ATA 7414**

(The following magneto defect was found on a Piper PA28R-200 sporting a Lycoming IO-360-C1C. Any missing verbal description is replaced with the photographs!)

The submitter says, “*(This engine’s magneto)* distributor/point cam shaft broke flush with the upper magneto gear inner race, causing total magneto failure. *The part was returned to the owner.*” *A search of the FAA Service Difficulty Reporting System data base includes 11 additional reports for the 4370 magneto.)*







Part Total Time: (unknown).

AIR NOTES

INTERNET SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORTING (iSDR) WEB SITE

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Internet Service Difficulty Reporting (iSDR) web site is the front-end for the Service Difficulty Reporting System (SDRS) data base that is maintained by the Aviation Data Systems Branch, AFS-620, in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The iSDR web site supports the Flight Standards Service (AFS), Service Difficulty Program by providing the aviation community with a voluntary and electronic means to conveniently submit in-service reports of failures, malfunctions, or defects on aeronautical products. The objective of the Service Difficulty Program is to achieve prompt correction of conditions adversely affecting continued airworthiness of aeronautical products. To accomplish this, Malfunction or Defect Reports (M or Ds) or Service Difficulty Reports (SDRs) as they are commonly called, are collected, converted into a common SDR format, stored, and made available to the appropriate segments of the FAA, the aviation community, and the general public for review and analysis. SDR data is accessible through the "Query SDR data" feature on the iSDR web site at: <http://av-info.faa.gov/SDRX/>.

In the past, the last two pages of the Alerts contained a paper copy of FAA Form 8010-4, Malfunction or Defect Report. To meet the requirements of *Section 508, this form will no longer be published in the Alerts; however, the form is available on the Internet at: <http://forms.faa.gov/forms/faa8010-4.pdf>. You can still download and complete the form as you have in the past.

*Section 508 was enacted to eliminate barriers in information technology, to make available new opportunities for people with disabilities, and to encourage development of technologies that will help achieve these goals.

A report should be filed whenever a system, component, or part of an aircraft, powerplant, propeller, or appliance fails to function in a normal or usual manner. In addition, if a system, component, or part of an aircraft, powerplant, propeller, or appliance has a flaw or imperfection, which impairs or may impair its future function, it is considered defective and should be reported under the Service Difficulty Program.

The collection, collation, analysis of data, and the rapid dissemination of mechanical discrepancies, alerts, and trend information to the appropriate segments of the FAA and the aviation community provides an effective and economical method of ensuring future aviation safety.

The FAA analyzes SDR data for safety implications and reviews the data to identify possible trends that may not be apparent regionally or to individual operators. As a result, the FAA may disseminate safety information to a particular section of the aviation community. The FAA also may adopt new regulations or issue airworthiness directives (ADs) to address a specific problem.

The iSDR web site provides an electronic means for the general aviation community to voluntarily submit reports, and may serve as an alternative means for operators and air agencies to comply with the reporting requirements of 14 Title of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Section 121.703, 125.409, 135.415, and 145.221, if accepted by their certificate-holding district office. FAA Aviation Safety Inspectors may also report service difficulty information when they conduct routine aircraft maintenance surveillance as well as accident and incident investigations.

The SDRS data base contains records dating back to 1974. At the current time, we are receiving approximately 40,000 records per year. Reports may be submitted to the iSDR web site on active data entry form or submitted hardcopy to the address below.

The SDRS and iSDR web site point of contact is:

Pennie Thompson
Service Difficulty Reporting System, Program Manager
Aviation Data Systems Branch, AFS-620
P.O. Box 25082
Oklahoma City, OK 73125
Telephone: (405) 954-1150
SDRS Program Manager e-mail address: 9-AMC-SDR-ProgMgr@faa.gov

IF YOU WANT TO CONTACT US

We welcome your comments, suggestions, and questions. You may use any of the following means of communication to submit reports concerning aviation-related occurrences.

Editor: Daniel Roller (405) 954-3646
FAX: (405) 954-4570 or (405) 954-4655

E-mail address: Daniel.Roller@faa.gov

Mailing address: FAA, **ATTN: AFS-620 ALERTS**, P.O. Box 25082, Oklahoma City, OK 73125-5029

You can access current and back issues of this publication from the internet at:
<http://av-info.faa.gov/>. Select the General Aviation Airworthiness Alerts heading.

AVIATION SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORTS

The following are abbreviated reports processed for the previous month, which have been entered into the FAA Service Difficulty Reporting (SDR) System data base. This is not an all-inclusive listing of Service Difficulty Reports. For more information, contact the FAA, Regulatory Support Division, Aviation Data Systems Branch, AFS-620, located in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The mailing address is:

FAA
Aviation Data Systems Branch, AFS-620
PO Box 25082
Oklahoma City, OK 73125

To retrieve the complete report, click on the Control Number located in each report. These reports contain raw data that has not been edited. Also, because these reports contain raw data, the pages containing the raw data are not numbered.

If you require further detail please contact AFS-620 at the address above.

Federal Aviation Administration

Service Difficulty Report Data

Sorted by aircraft make and model, then engine make and model. This report derives from unverified information submitted by the aviation community without FAA review for accuracy. To view individual report go to the SDR query page and enter the control number of the record you wish to view: <http://av-info.faa.gov/sdrx/query.aspx>

Control Number Difficulty Date	Aircraft Make Aircraft Model	Engine Make Engine Model	Component Make Component Model	Part Name Part Number	Part Condition Part Location
COEA0802821 7/15/2008	AEROSP ATR72202			WARNING SYSTEM	MALFUNCTIONED NLG
RETURN TO FIELD. FLIGHT 100 GEG TO GEG. THE NOSE WHEEL UNLOCK LIGHT ILLUMINATED IMMEDIATELY UPON ROTATION ALONG WITH THE NOSE GEAR DOWN AND LOCKED LIGHT REMAINING ILLUMINATED. AFTER THE LANDING GEAR HANDLE WAS SELECTED "UP", BOTH MAINS RETRACTED NORMALLY. THE NOSE GEAR DID NOT RETRACT AND THE DOUBLE INDICATION CONTINUED SHOWING BOTH NOSE GEAR LOCKED AND UNLOCKED. THE CREW ELECTED TO RETURN TO GEG FOR LANDING. THE LANDING GEAR WAS SELECTED "DOWN" GIVING ALL SIX NORMAL GEAR DOWN INDICATIONS AFTER GEAR EXTENSION. A NORMAL AND SAFE LANDING WAS MADE. THE NOSE LANDING GEAR STRUT WAS SERVICED AND A LANDING GEAR FUNCTION CHECK WAS PERFORMED. THE LANDING GEAR CHECK FOUND NO SYSTEM FAULTS. (A)					
COEA0804816 8/5/2008	AEROSP ATR72212			BULKHEAD S53174000200	NICKED FUSELAGE
TOOL DAMAGE TO FWD SIDE OF FWD PRESSURE BULKHEAD. THREE SMALL NICKS FOUND AT THE LT UPPER RADOME BONDING CONTACT POINT. S/D HC AT COE. S/D SRM REPAIR, BLENDED OUT DAMAGE AND INSTALLED REPAIR DOUBLER TO THE BULKHEAD WEB. (S)					
COEA0805816 8/6/2008	AEROSP ATR72212			PANEL S5241055700000A	CORRODED CENTER WING
LEVEL 2 CORROSION. SURFACE CORROSION ON MATTING SURFACE OF PANEL 521DT. BLENDOUT OF CORROSION BLENDED BEYOND SRM LIMITS. S/D HC AT COE. REMOVED AND REPLACED DRY BAY ACCESS PANEL 521DT. (S)					
2008FA0000562 6/27/2008	BEECH 1900D	PWA PT6*		FRAME 12943003723	CRACKED FS 363.25
DURING STRUCTURAL INSP, FOUND LOWER FRAME WEB CRACKED AT FLANGE CORNER. TEE ATTACHED TO FRAME CRACKED THRU LOWER RIVET HOLE. DOUBLER ATTACHED TO LOWER AFT SIDE OF WEB WAS ALSO CRACKED. THE AFT CLIP, ATHAT ATTACHES THE LOWER FRAME TO THE SIDEWALL SEAT TRACK STRINGER, WAS LEFT OUT AT BUILD. THE STRESSES NOT BEING TRANSFERRED TO SUPPORTING STRUCTURE, BECAUSE OF THE MISSING CLIP, MAY HAVE ADDED TO THE FRAME FAILURE. THE DAMAGE WAS REPAIRED IAW SRM AND DER REPORT. (K)					
DJFA2008051 6/4/2008	BEECH 400A			INTAKE 45A35022601	CRACKED LT ENGINE

DURING ROUTINE MAINTENANCE THE LT INLET SKIN AT THE INLET TEMPERATURE PROBE WAS FOUND CRACKED. THE LT INLET WAS REPLACED. (A)

DJFA2008062	BEECH		CABIN PRESSURE	FAILED
7/6/2008	400A			

TEMPORARILY LOST PRESSURIZATION AT FL300. OXYGEN MASKS DROPPED. EMERGENCY WAS DECLARED. AIRCRAFT LANDED SAFELY. (A)

DJFA2008056	BEECH		SKIN	CRACKED
6/19/2008	400A			LT ENG INTAKE

DURING A ROUTINE SERVICE CHECK IT WAS NOTED THAT THE LT ENGINE INLET INNER SKIN WAS CRACKED AT THE 9 O'CLOCK POSITION. THE INLET WAS REMOVED, REPAIRED BY INTEGRITY AERO AND REINSTALLED. (A)

2008FA0000540	BEECH	PWA	WHEEL	CRACKED
5/2/2008	B200	PT6*	4088	MLG

CRACK INDICATIONS LOCATED IN BEAD AREA OF WHEELS, REVEALED BY FLUORESCENT PENETRANT. (K)

2008FA0000563	BEECH	PWA	FUEL CELL	PLUGGED
8/8/2008	B300	PT6A60A	5038903417	LT WING

PILOT REPORTED FUEL IMBALANCE OF 200 LBS AFTER TOPPING OFF TANKS. FUEL QUANTITY INDICATING AND FUEL VENT SYSTEM WERE CHECKED AND CONFIRMED GOOD. DURING DEFUEL, NOTED THAT LT WING TRANSFER TO LT NACELLE TANK WAS TOO SLOW TO ALLOW FULL SERVICING OF LT WING FUEL SYSTEM . ACCESSED FUEL TRANSFER TUBE FROM INSIDE OF LT IB AFT FUEL CELL, TO NACELLE FUEL TANK, AND FOUND IT PLUGGED WITH A RAG. REMOVED RAG, CLEANED WING FUEL STRAINER, AND SECURED FUEL SYSTEM. LT FUEL SYSTEM CAN NOW BE SERVICED TO FULL. (K)

2008FA0000543	BELL		HUB	CRACKED
7/28/2008	47G		471201171	MAIN ROTOR

BEAM - CRACK INDICATION AT EAR END (FPT). HUB - CRACK INDICATIONS AT RADIUS ON STUB ENDS. (K)

2008FA0000542	BELL		BEAM	CRACKED
7/28/2008	47G		471201281	MAIN ROTOR

BEAM CRACK INDICATION AT EAR END (FPT). HUB - CRACK INDICATIONS AT RADIUS ON STUB ENDS (FMT). (K)

PL92008F00000	BOEING	PWA	TURBINE BLADES	FAILED
8/16/2008	707330B	JT3D3B	J53D3B	TURBINE WHEEL

DURING CLIMBOUT FROM PHX NR 4 ENG EGT BEGAN TO CLIMB RAPIDLY AND NR 1 & NR 2 SPOOLED DOWN. ENG WAS SHUT DOWN FOLLOWING PUBLISHED PROCEDURES AND THE ACFT RETURNED TO PHX AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. AFTER LANDING THE ENG WAS INSPECTED AND FOUND THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL SECTIONS OF TURBINE BLADES HAD FAILED AND CAUSED ADDITIONAL DAMAGE TO THE TURBINE WHEELS AFT OF THE FAILED DISC BLADES. THE DAMAGE WAS

CONTAINED WITHIN THE TAIL PIPE AND NO EXTERNAL DAMAGE WAS NOTED TO ANY ADJACENT AREAS. (S)

MWE2008F00030	BOEING		STATIC INVERTER	INOPERATIVE
8/10/2008	717200		100201020752	

DURING INITIAL POWER UP OF AC, WHEN SELECTING EMERGENCY POWER TO ARM "BUSS AC EMERGENCY OFF" COMES ON AND BATTERY STARTS DISCHARGE. REMOVED AND REPLACED STATIC INVERTER. (K)

MWE2008F00031	BOEING	RROYCE	BATTERY PACK	INOPERATIVE
8/14/2008	717200	BR700715A130	6011779	EMERGENCY LIGHT

CEILING LIGHTS FWD OF THE CABIN DID NOT ILLUMINATE. REMOVED AND REPLACED BATTERY PACK. (K)

MWE2008F00033	BOEING	RROYCE	RELAY	FAILED
8/17/2008	717200	BR700715A130	R25159	EMERGENCY POWER

EMERGENCY POWER TEST FAILED. SHOWS NO POWER TO EMERGENCY AC. REMOVED AND REPLACED EMERGENCY POWER RELAY. (K)

TSAA0826023	BOEING		WARNING LIGHT	FALSE ACTIVATION
7/25/2008	737*			OVERHEAT

FLT 320, HNL-OAK: LT WING-BODY OVERHEAT LIGHT ILLUMINATED IN FLIGHT DURING CRUISE AT ABOUT FL350. LIGHT WENT OUT AFTER. ACCOMPLISHED QRH PROCEDURES AND RETURNED TO HNL. INSPECTED AIR CONDITIONING BAY DUCTS, LEADING FLAP DUCTS AND OVERWING DUCTS. NO LEAKS DETECTED. ALSO PERFORMED HIGH POWER RUN; SYSTEM CHECK GOOD. AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO SERVICE. (A)

2008UALA04056	BOEING	CFMINT	CONTROL PANEL	ILLUMINATED
7/28/2008	737322	CFM563C1	G718505	FIRE DETECTION

FAIL LIGHT ILLUMINATED ON B-LOOP AFT CARGO COMPARTMENT. FOUND CONTROL PANEL TO BE FAULTY. REPLACED CONTROL PANEL CARGO FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION REF 26-00-02 OP CHECKS GOOD. AC OK FOR SERVICE.

BJN2008F00000	BOEING		LAMP	BURNED OUT
8/15/2008	737400		1317	EMERGENCY LIGHT

ONE EMERGENCY AISLE LIGHT, ROW 12, RT SIDE, BURNED OUT. REPLACED EMERGENCY LIGHT BULB. (K)

AIEA200800256	BOEING	GE	FIRE DETECTOR	DIRTY
7/7/2008	747243B	CF650E2		CARGO BAY

RETURN TO BLOCKS INTERMITTENT FIRE WARNING DURING TAXI. FOUND EVIDENCE OF DE-GERM IN CARGO SNIFFED TUBE. CLEANED SNUFFER TUBES WITH CONTACT CLEANER. SYSTEM OPS CHECK NORMAL AS PER MM 26-16-00. (A)

AIEA200800257	BOEING	GE	FRAME	CRACKED
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7/7/2008 747243B CF650E2 BS 280 S26R

DURING C-CHECK FOUND FRAME CRACKED AT STATION 280 STRINGER 26R. FRAME REPAIRED AS PER SRM 53-10-04 FIGURE 10. (A)

[AIEA200800259](#) BOEING GE FRAME CRACKED

7/7/2008 747243B CF650E2 BS 320 S25R

DURING C-CHECK FOUND FRAME CRACKED AT STATION 320 STRINGER 25R. FRAME REPAIRED AS PER SRM 53-10-04 FIGURE 10. (A)

[AIEA200800258](#) BOEING GE FRAME CRACKED

7/7/2008 747243B CF650E2 BS 280 S26L

DURING C-CHECK FOUND FRAME CRACKED AT STATION 280 STRINGER 26L. FRAME REPAIRED AS PER SRM 53-10-04 FIGURE 10. (A)

[AIEA200800262](#) BOEING TIRE FAILED

7/8/2008 74747UF RT MLG

DURING ARRIVAL WALK AROUND INSPECTION FOUND NR 11 TIRE SEPARATION. REPLACED NR 11 AND 12 WHEEL ASSEMBLIES. ALSO ACCOMPLISHED TIRE TREAD LOSS CONDITIONAL INSPECTION AS PER 05-51-34-202-001. (A)

[AIEA200800263](#) BOEING FAIRING DAMAGED

7/8/2008 74747UF FUSELAGE

DURING ARRIVAL WALKAROUND INSPECTION FOUND LOWER RT AFT OF BODY GEAR FUSELAGE FAIRING DAMAGED. ACCOMPLISHED TIME LIMITED REPAIR AS PER EO 4453A188 DATED 7/8/08 ENTERED NON MEL DMI N08-037 FOR REPEAT INSPECTION OF PANEL AT EVERY A-CHECK. (A)

[AIEA200800260](#) BOEING GE ENGINE OIL CONSUMPTION

7/7/2008 74747UF CF680 NR 3

ENGINE NR 3 OIL QTY WENT TO 0 (3 HOURS AFTER TAKEOFF). ENGINE SHUT DOWN PRECAUTIONARY. FIM 79-00-00 FOLLOWED. INSPECTED FOR OIL LEAK. NO WETTING FOUND. REPLENISHED 22 QTS OIL AND LEAK AND OPS CHECK PERFORMED. NO LEAK FOUND. IDG AND STARTER DRAIN LINE CAPPED FOR MONITORING PER AMM 71-71-00. (A)

[ABXR080225](#) BOEING SKIN DAMAGED

7/29/2008 767223 BS 615 S34R

SCREW AND COUNTERSINK WASHER INSTALLED IN FUSELAGE SKIN OVER PREVIOUSLY BLENDED AREA AT APPROX STA 615 LONGERON STRINGER 34 RT. DAMAGED AREA COMPLIED WITH ON PREVIOUS REPAIR. (S)

[ABXR080228](#) BOEING SKIN DENTED

8/1/2008 767223 143T35211 BS 544 S30-31L

OUTWARD DENT STA 544, STRINGER 31-30 LT REQUIRES REPAIR. REPAIRED AREA IAW B767 SRM 53-00-01, FIGURE 201. (S)

[ABXR080226](#) BOEING SKIN DAMAGED

7/31/2008 767223 146T35111 BS 1510 S35-36L

APPROX 6 INCH CREASE AT STA 1510, LONGERON STRINGER 36-35 LT, BELOW BULK CARGO DOOR IS OUT OF LIMITS. REPAIRED SKIN IAW B767-200 SRM 53-60-1. (S)

[ABXA080224](#) BOEING LONGERON CRACKED

8/7/2008 767232 148T9120 EMPENNAGE

UPPER LONGERON ABOVE HORIZONTAL BOX WEB CRACKED AND DAMAGED STA 1734 LT SIDE. REPAIRED IAW REA B653-57691. (S)

[ABXA080221](#) BOEING SKIN CRACKED

8/1/2008 767232 148T31311 BS 1654 S13L

LT STA 1654.5, 2 EACH SKIN CRACKS STRINGER 13 LT. REPAIRED LT STA 1654.5 AT STRINGER 13 LT ON REA B653-57700. (S)

[ABXA080223](#) BOEING SKIN CRACKED

8/5/2008 767232 114T0222 LT TRACK CUTOUT

FOUND CRACK AT NR 3 SLAT OUTBOARD TRACK CUTOUT ON LEADING EDGE OF LT WING. REPAIRED SPLICE PLATE IAW REA B65757685. (S)

[ABXA080212](#) BOEING WEB CORRODED

7/15/2008 767281 143T500418 BS 624

WEB CORRODED ON BOTTOM SIDE AT FS 624 AT RIGHT BUTT LINE 38.5. REMOVED AND REPLACED CORRODED WEB IAW B767 SRM. (A)

[ABXA080209](#) BOEING SEAT TRACK CORRODED

7/10/2008 767281 BS 412-423

SEAT TRACK CORRODED LT BUTT LINE 13.28, STA 412-423. REMOVED AND REPLACED SEAT TRACK IAW B767-200 SRM 51-40-2. (A)

[EYD2008F00001](#) BRAERO CONTROLLER MALFUNCTIONED

8/6/2008 HS125700A 10246429 CABIN PRESSURE

ON AUGUST 6TH, WHILE EN ROUTE AT AN ALTITUDE OF 35,000 FEET, THE CREW EXECUTED AN EMERGENCY DESCENT DUE TO A "CABIN ALTITUDE" LIGHT. THE CREW CONTINUED ON TO FXE UNEVENTFULLY. AFTER TROUBLESHOOTING THE PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE PRESSURIZATION CONTROLLER P/N 10-1443, THAT HAD BEEN INSTALLED IN OVERHAULED CONDITION THE PREVIOUS WEEK, HAD FAILED. THE CONTROLLER WAS REPLACED AND THE SYSTEM IS WORKING NORMALLY. (S)

[2008FA0000558](#) CESSNA FITTING CORRODED

8/1/2008 140 0425118 LT TE FLAP

THE PART WAS BEGINNING TO RUST THROUGH IN LOCATION RESPONSIBLE FOR ATTACHING THE LT FLAP TO THE FLAP CONTROL. THE DEFECT WAS FOUND DURING AN ANNUAL INSPECTION. PROBABLE CAUSE WAS RUSTING DUE TO AGE. A MORE THOROUGH INSPECTION OF THE AREA DURING PREFLIGHT SHOULD HELP DETECT THE PROBLEM SO THAT CORRECTIVE ACTION CAN BE TAKEN.

[2008FA0000574](#) CESSNA CONT IMPULSE COUPLING FAILED
8/15/2008 182N O470R MAGNETO
PILOT PERFORMED PRE-FLIGHT INSP DISCOVERED OIL ON FWD PORTION OF COWLING, SLIGHT OIL RESIDUE ON WINDSHIELD. MECHANIC REMOVED TOP COWLING TO INVESTIGATE, DISCOVERED MAGNETO HOUSING SHATTERED AT AREA IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO IMPULSE COUPLING. APPARENTLY IMPULSE COUPLING ENGAGING MECHANISM SOMEHOW CONTACTED ACTUATING PIN WHILE OPERATING (OR ENGINE BACKFIRED, WE DON'T HAVE FURTHER INFORMATION TO ASCERTAIN THIS CONDITION) SHATTERED MAGNETO BODY HSG. MAGNETO WAS STILL FIRING, FIXED TO ENGINE (NOT LOOSE) ENGINE OPS WAS REPORTED NORMAL UPON ARRIVAL OF LAST FLIGHT, WHICH SEEMS TO INDICATE THAT MAGNETO HAD OPERATED IN THIS CONDITION FOR WHAT APPEARS TO BE AT LEAST AN HOUR OR MORE. NO MISFIRE OR MAGNETO DROP DETECTED.

[COEA0801775](#) CESSNA TIRE FAILED
7/28/2008 208B 0253490 RT MLG
TIRE WENT FLAT AFTER LANDING, FLT 7689 SLE TO PDX. UPON LANDING IN PDX THE PILOT NOTICE THE RT MLG TIRE FELT SOFT. AS THE AIRCRAFT SLOWED THE TIRE WENT FLAT. AIRCRAFT SAFELY CLEARED RUNWAY AND STOPPED. REMOVED AND REPLACED RT MAIN WHEEL ASSEMBLY. (A)

[COEA0801752](#) CESSNA GYRO FAILED
7/19/2008 208B 0600001700 LT INSTR PANEL
RETURN TO BLOCKS. THE PILOT'S SIDE ATTITUDE INDICATOR WILL NOT ERECT. DISCOVERED DURING TAXI TO THE RUNWAY. REMOVED AND REPLACED, ARTIFICIAL HORIZON. (A)

[FPI2008F00000](#) CESSNA CONT CABLE BROKEN
8/21/2008 210M IO520* 505530401 UNKNOWN
MFG SERVICE KIT PN SK210174, CABLE ASSY BROKE AT THREADED END AFTER THE STOP NUT SEVEN WEEKS AFTER INSTALLATION APPEARS THREAD WALL IS TOO THIN LEADING TO FATIGUE. (K)

[XGN2008F00012](#) CESSNA CONT CYLINDER CRACKED
8/1/2008 402B TSIO520* AEC631397 ENGINE
REV 3, E=SERIES CYLINDER, CRACKED. (K)

[PI82008F00000](#) CESSNA CONT TURBOCHARGER FAILED
7/18/2008 402B TSIO520E 4066109025 RT ENGINE
TURBOCHARGER FAILED IN FLIGHT AT CRUISE. (A)

[YBS2008F00000](#) CESSNA CONT SELECTOR VALVE DAMAGED
7/11/2008 402C TSIO520* 9102011 LT WING FUEL
AT CLIMB POWER-RT FUEL FLOW DROPPED TO 90 PPH. AUX PUMP ON LOW FIXED PROBLEM TEMPORARILY. FUEL FLOW DROPPED AGAIN AND LT ENGINE SURGE. RETURNED TO DEPARTURE AIRPORT AND LANDING WITHOUT INCIDENT. MX REMOVED AND REPLACED LT FUEL SELECTOR VALVE. ALSO REPLACED AUX FUEL PUMP AND CROSSFEED VALVE AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE. (A)

[26N2008F00002](#) CESSNA PWC CONTROL CABLE FROZEN

8/4/2008 510 PW615FA 70611107 ELEVATOR

7/24/2008, AC TT: 461.8, TC:302 CREW REPORTED AILERONS FROZEN AFTER FLYING THROUGH MOISTURE (FROM FORM 26NA-210A, ATTACHED) 7/25/2008, AC REPOSITIONED TO MFG SERVICE CENTER FOR FURTHER EVALUATION AND RESOLUTION. 8/1/2008, AC TT: 462.3 MFG MTR FOR RESOLUTION. (K)

[842008N341CS](#) CESSNA BRAKE CONTAMINATED

7/30/2008 550 MLG

THE LOW BRAKE PRESSURE AND ANTI-SKID INOP ANNUNCIATORS ILLUMINATED IN FLIGHT. AN EMERGENCY WAS DECLARED. DURING LANDING ROLL OUT BRAKE PRESSURE CAME BACK AND LIGHTS EXTINGUISHED. THE BRAKES WERE BLED, A SMALL AMOUNT OF AIR NOTED. OPERATIONAL CHECK OK. ACFT MADE THREE TAKEOFFS AND LANDINGS WITH NO DEFECTS NOTED. ACFT RETURNED TO SERVICE. (S)

[2008FA0000584](#) CESSNA SEAT FRAME CRACKED

7/31/2008 550 551900921 COCKPIT SEAT

UPPER CHAIR BASE ASSY CRACKED AT CHAIR BACK ATTACH POINTS. STRESS ON CHAIR BACK AND METAL FATIGUE PROBABLE CAUSE. CHAIR WAS REPAIRED IAW STO-1042WI STRUCTURAL SEAT REPAIR. (K)

[2008FA0000545](#) CESSNA PWA BELLOWS RUPTURED

7/12/2008 560CESSNA JT15D5 65550384

THE BELLOWS INSIDE THE BRADED CONNECTION CRACKED OUT LEAVING A HOLE ABOUT .75 IN IN DIA AT THE UP STREAM SIDE OF THE FLEXIBLE CONNECTOR. THE PROBLEM WAS DISCOVERED ON A MAINT RUN UP AT WHICH TIME THE FIRE DETECTION SYS WAS ACTIVATED FROM AN OVERHEAT SITUATION. RECOMMEND REMOVING THE ELBOWS AND CHECKING THE BELLOWS FOR CRACKS WITH A BORESCOPE. (K)

[CWQR200808](#) CESSNA SUPPORT BRACKET CRACKED

8/21/2008 560XL 661503517 FUSELAGE

DURING A PHASE 1-4 INSP, FOUND THE SUPPORT BRACKET CRACKED, CRACK IS LOCATED IN THE SUPPORT BRACKET FOR THE ECU, THE CRACK INTERSECTS A HOLE FOR THE NUTPLATE THAT ATTACHES ONE OF THE ECU MOUNTING BOLTS. SERVICE CONDITION REPORT HAS BEEN FILED WITH MFG UNDER SCR# 376154.

[2008FA0000560](#) CESSNA VALVE DAMAGED

8/8/2008 R172K S18271 NOSE STRUT

A NEW VALVE WAS ORDERED AND INSTALLED TO CURE A SUSPECTED LEAK IN THE VALVE CORE. THE NEW VALVE ARRIVED WITH A BRIGHT APPEARANCE, EITHER CHROME OR NICKEL PLATED. WITH THE NEW VALVE INSTALLED, THE STRUT LEAK WORSENER. AN EXTERNAL INSP REVEALED THAT THE COSMETIC PLATING WAS FLAKING FROM THE HEX FLATS. THE VALVE WAS REMOVED AND IT WAS FOUND THAT THE PLATING WAS ALSO FLAKING IN THE THREAD-AREA, AND THIS RESULTED IN A LEAK AROUND THE VALVE. THIS VALVE EMPLOYS A NPT THREAD (1/4 INCH PIPE THREAD) AND THE THREADS FORM THE SEAL WHEN INSTALLED. THE REMAINING PLATING WAS EASILY SCRAPED FROM THE THREADS WITH A PICK AND THE VALVE WAS REINSTALLED WITHOUT FURTHER DIFFICULTY. SUBMITTER ADMITS THAT THE PLATING RESULTS IN AN ATTRACTIVE PART, HOWEVER THE MFG MAY WISH TO STOP PLATING THE THREADED AREA. (K)

2008FA0000580	CESSNA	PWA	BEARING	FAILED
8/27/2008	S550	JT15D4		STARTER GEN

FRONT BEARING FAILURE IN FLIGHT. (K)

2008FA0000546	CESSNA	CONT	CONTROL CABLE	DEFECTIVE
7/17/2008	T210L	TSIO520*	98600581	TE FLAPS

ORDERED NEW FLAP FOLLOW UP CABLE; TO REPLACED ORIGINAL CABLE WHICH HAD BECOME DEFECTIVE DUE TO NORMAL USAGE AND AGE.

2008FA0000554	CESSNA		INTAKE DUCT	CRACKED
8/13/2008	TU206G		125083029	INDUCTION BOX

MANUFACTURER SUPPLIED ENG INTAKE DUCT BEFORE THE AIR FILTER IS SUBJECT TO CRACKING IN MULTIPLE LOCATIONS. THIS PARTICULAR ACFT AND ANOTHER IDENTICAL MODEL ACFT THIS FACILITY MAINTAINS HAVE BEEN CONVERTED TO AN IO-550-F ENG. AFTER THE STC CONVERSION, THE CRACKING PROBLEM HAS INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY. CONTACTED THE STC HOLDER AND HAVE RESPONDED WITH A SCHEME TO REINFORCE THIS DUCT. THIS REPAIR STATION IS LOOKING INTO THIS ALTERATION TO THIS DUCT WHICH MAY REQUIRE PER SUPPORT. AT PRESENT, THE DUCTS ARE REQUIRING REPAIRS OR REPLACEMENT EVERY 50 HOURS. A PMA REPLACEMENT DUCT MADE FROM COMPOSITE MATERIAL IS NO LONGER AVAILABLE. (S)

2008FA0000565	CESSNA	CONT	INTAKE DUCT	CRACKED
8/13/2008	TU206G	IO550*	125083029	ENGINE

MFG SUPPLIED ENGINE INTAKE DUCT BEFORE THE AIR FILTER IS SUBJECT TO CRACKING IN MULTIPLE LOCATIONS. THIS PARTICULAR AC AND ANOTHER IDENTICAL MODEL AC THIS FACILITY MAINTAINS, HAVE BEEN CONVERTED TO ANOTHER ENGINE AFTER THE STC CONVERSION. CRACKING PROBLEM HAS INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY. HAVE CONTACTED STC HOLDER, THEY HAVE RESPONDED WITH A SCHEME TO REINFORCE THIS DUCT. THIS REPAIR STATION IS LOOKING INTO THIS ALTERATION TO THIS DUCT WHICH MAY REQUIRE DER SUPPORT. AT PRESENT, THE DUCTS ARE REQUIRING REPAIRS OF REPLACEMENT EVERY 50 HOURS. A PMA REPLACEMENT DUCT MADE FROM COMPOSITE MATERIAL IS NO LONGER AVAILABLE. (K)

2008FA0000639	CIRRUS	CONT	HINGE	CORRODED
9/2/2008	SR22	IO550*	13431003	TE FLAPS

FLAP HINGES IN ALL POSITIONS BOTH LT AND RT HAVE INTERGRANDULAR CORROSION NEAR THE POINT OF FAILURE. PN 13431-003, PN 13431-004, 13432-002, QTY 2, 13433-006, 13433-005. CONDITION WAS FOUND AT ANNUAL INSPECTION. (K)

IXX2008F00062	DOUG		SKIN	MISREPAIRED
7/9/2008	DC872F			RIGHT WING

DURING ROUTINE C CHECK INSPECTION, FOUND IMPROPER REPAIR RT WING OUTBOARD SLOT VANE LEADING EDGE AT STATION XOLDI 6.224. REMOVED FASTENERS AS NEEDED TO PERFORM REPAIR. REMOVED EXISTING REPAIR. REMOVED DAMAGED AREA. PERFORMED NDT INSPECTION. NO CRACK, NO CORROSION FOUND. FABRICATED REPAIR DOUBLERS, FILLERS, AND INTERNAL DOUBLERS. CLEANED, TREATED AND PRIMED AREA AND REPAIR PARTS. INSTALLED NEW FASTENERS AND REPAIR PARTS AT STATION XOLDI 6.224-XOLDO 67.000 IAW FAA FORM 8110-3 08378 DATED 07/11/2008, SEMAN DRAWING ED-4809 DATED 06/23/08, DC8 SRM 51-1-21, SRM 51-3-0, DC8 NDT SPM PART 06-10-01-001, DC8 SRM 51-1-8B, DC8 SRM 51-1-11, SRM 51-1-20D AND SRM 51-3-1. (S)

[IXX2008F00057](#) DOUG SKIN CRACKED
6/16/2008 DC872F BS 1604-1606

DURING ROUTINE C CHECK INSPECTION, FOUND AFT FUSELAGE EXTERNAL SKIN HAS A CRACK AT STATION 1606.000-1604.000 LONGERON 10 RIGHT. REMOVED FASTENERS AS NEEDED TO PERFORM REPAIR. REMOVED DAMAGED AREA. FABRICATED REPAIR DOUBLER, INTERNAL FINGER DOUBLER, AND FILLER. CLEANED, TREATED AND PRIMED AREA AND REPAIR PARTS. INSTALLED NEW FASTENERS AND REPAIR PARTS IAW DC8 SRM 53-2-1 FIGURE 7 SHEET 1,3, AND 5, SRM 53-5-2 FIGURE 1 ITEM "D", DC8 SRM 51-1-8B, SRM 51-1-11, SRM 51-1-20D, AND SRM 51-3-1. (S)

[IXX2008F00063](#) DOUG SKIN CRACKED
6/16/2008 DC872F BS 1606-1604

DURING ROUTINE C CHECK INSPECTION, FOUND AFT FUSELAGE EXTERNAL SKIN HAS A CRACK AT STATION 1606.000-1604.000 LONGERON 10RT. REMOVED FASTENERS AS NEEDED TO PERFORM REPAIR. REMOVED DAMAGED AREA. FABRICATED REPAIR DOUBLER, INTERNAL FINGER DOUBLER, AND FILLER. CLEANED, TREATED AND PRIMED AREA AND REPAIR PARTS. INSTALLED NEW FASTENERS AND REPAIR PARTS IAW DC8 SRM 53-2-1 FIGURE 7 SHEET 1, 3 AND 5 SRM 53-5-2 FIGURE 1 ITEM "D", DC8 SRM 51-1-8B, SRM 51-1-11, SRM 51-1-21, SRM 51-1-20D, AND SRM 51-3-1. (S)

[IXX2008F00064](#) DOUG SKIN DAMAGED
7/9/2008 DC872F RT WING

DURING ROUTINE C CHECK INSPECTION, FOUND ELONGATED HOLES ON RT WING INBOARD SLOT VANE LEADING EDGE AT STATION XILD 7095.000. REMOVED FASTENERS AS NEEDED TO PERFORM REPAIR. REMOVED DAMAGED PLATING. FABRICATED NEW SKIN. CLEANED, TREATED AND PRIMED AREA AND REPAIR PARTS. INSTALLED NEW FASTENERS AND REPAIR PARTS AT STATION XILD 7095.000-XS 247.000 IAW DC8 SR 57-3-2 FIGURE 10 PAGE 22 ITEM F, DC8 SRM 57-1-0 PAGE 1, SRM 51-1-21, DC8 SRM 51-1-8B, DC8 SRM 51-1-11, SRM 51-3-0 AND SRM 51-3-1. (S)

[IXX2008F00060](#) DOUG SKIN MISREPAIRED
6/13/2008 DC872F RT WING TE FLAP

DURING ROUTINE C CHECK INSPECTION, FOUND RT WING OUTBOARD FLAP PANEL UPPER PART HAS IMPROPER REPAIR AT STATION 360.000. REMOVED FASTENERS AS NEEDED TO PERFORM REPAIR. REMOVED EXISTING REPAIR. FABRICATED NEW SKIN. CLEANED, TREATED AND PRIMED AREA AND REPAIR PART. INSTALLED NEW FASTENERS AND REPAIR PARTS AT STATION XF345.000-360.000 IAW DC8 SRM 57-1-0 PAGE 1, SRM 51-1-21, DC8 SRM 57-7-1 FIGURE 4 ITEM "B" TR 57-94 DATED 10-01-2002, DC8 SRM 51-1-8B, DC8 SRM 51-1-11, SRM 51-3-0, AND SRM 51-3-1. (S)

[IXX2008F00069](#) DOUG SKIN CRACKED
6/12/2008 DC872F BS 188 L27L

DURING ROUTINE C CHECK INSPECTION, FOUND FUSELAGE EXTERNAL PART PRIMARY HEAT EXCHANGER LOWER AFT CORNER CRACKED AT STATION 188.000 LONGERON 27LT. REMOVED FASTENERS AS NEEDED TO PERFORM REPAIR. REMOVED DAMAGED AREA. PERFORMED NDT INSPECTION. NO CRACK, NO CORROSION FOUND. FABRICATED EXTERNAL REPAIR DOUBLER, EXTERNAL REPAIR TRIPLER, AND FILLER. CLEANED, TREATED AND PRIMED AREA AND REPAIR PARTS. INSTALLED NEW FASTENERS AND REPAIR PARTS IAW FAA FORM 8110-3 08378 DATED 7/11/08, SEMAN DRAWING ED4804 DATED 06/23/08, DC8 SRM 51-1-21, SRM 51-3-0, DC8 NDT SPM PART 06-10-01-001, DC8 SRM 51-1-8B, SRM 51-1-11, SRM 51-1-20D, SRM 51-3-0, AND SRM 51-3-1. (S)

[IXX2008F00059](#) DOUG SKIN MISREPAIRED
6/14/2008 DC872F RT WING AILERON

DURING ROUTINE C CHECK INSPECTION, FOUND RT WING OUTBOARD AILERON UPPER SKIN IMPROPER REPAIRS AT STATION XA 630.000-724.000. REMOVED FASTENERS AS NEEDED TO PERFORM REPAIR, REMOVED EXISTING REPAIR. FABRICATED NEW SKIN, DOUBLER. BONDED PARTS AS NEEDED WITH HYSOL. CLEANED, TREATED AND PRIMED AREA AND REPAIR PART. PERFORMED BALANCE, FOUND WITHIN LIMITS MOMENT = 3326.3 IN-LB. INSTALLED NEW FASTENERS AND REPAIR PARTS AT STATION XW 546.000-XA 724.000 IAW DC8 SRM 57-8-1 FIGURE 4 ITEM "F" AND "G", DC8 SRM 57-1-0 PAGE 1, SRM 51-1-21, DOUGLAS DRAWING 5763133, DC8 SRM 51-1-9 TR 51-142, SRM 51-1-9A TR 51-141, DC8 SRM 51-1-8B, IAW DC8 SRM 51-4-3 PAGES 1-6, DC8 SRM 51-1-11, AND SRM 51-1-21. (S)

IXX2008F00028	DOUG		ELEMENT	MALFUNCTIONED
7/17/2008	DC873F			NR 3 NACELLE

FLIGHT NUMBER: 744/ETAR TO OJAM - DESCENDING INTO OJAM NUMBER THREE FIRE WARNING LIGHT AND RED LIGHT IN FIRE HANDLE CAME ON. THE CREW DISCHARGED BOTH BOTTLES AND RED LIGHT IN FIRE HANDLE WAS STILL ON, AND FIRE WARNING WAS INTERMITTENT. THE CREW LANDED IN OJAM WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. MAINTENANCE REPLACED FIRE DETECTOR ELEMENT, LT FAN SENSING ELEMENT, AND BOTH FIRE BOTTLES. OPERATIONAL CHECK GOOD IAW DACO DC8 MAINTENANCE MANUAL 26-10-1, AND 26-20-1. AIRCRAFT WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE. (A)

ABXA080217	DOUG		BATTERY PACK	DISCHARGED
8/12/2008	DC941		60030451	EMERGENCY LIGHT

EMERGENCY LIGHTS INOPERATIVE. REPLACED EMERGENCY LIGHT BATTERY PACK IAW DC9 MM. OPS CHECKED GOOD. (S)

MEW2008F00000	DOUG	PWA	BATTERY PACK	INOPERATIVE
8/6/2008	DC981	JT8D*	B523	EMERGENCY LIGHT

EMERGENCY LIGHTS ABOVE, ON COCKPIT CEILING ARE INOPERATIVE. REMOVED AND REPLACED BATTERY PACK. (K)

MWE2008F00032	DOUG	PWA	WIRE	BROKEN
8/19/2008	DC981	JT8D217C		EMERGENCY LIGHT

EMERGENCY FLOOR LEVEL LIGHTS INOPERATIVE FROM ROW 9 TO 20. REPAIRED BROKEN WIRE IN CENTER SECTION OF LIGHT TRACK. (K)

2008FA0000575	DOUG		SHAFT	SEIZED
8/21/2008	MD9030			AC GENERATOR

GENERATOR UNIT SEIZED. THE GENERATOR FAILURE ROOT CAUSE WAS DETERMINED TO BE A ROTOR BAND SHAFT WHICH RESULTED IN AN OUT OF BALANCE CONDITION. THE OUT OF BALANCE ROOT CAUSED AN EARLY FAILURE OF THE ADE BEARING. ALL OTHER DAMAGE RESULTED FROM THE BEARING FAILURE. PENDING ENGINEERING EVALUATION. (K)

2008FA0000551	DOUG		BEARING	SEIZED
8/6/2008	MD9030			OIL PUMP

PUMP SEIZED, OIL PUMP BEARING BRACKET SHOWED SIGNS OF RUBBING WITH THE OIL PUMP GEAR. PENDING ENGINEERING EVALUATION. (K)

C2XA08IA192	EMB		SIGN	INOPERATIVE
8/10/2008	EMB135LR		7287580503	EMERGENCY

LIGHTS

IAH - DURING MAINTENANCE INSPECTION THE MID CABIN CEILING EMERGENCY LIGHT WAS FOUND TO BE INOPERATIVE. MAINTENANCE REMOVED AND REPLACED THE EXIT SIGN. OPERATIONALLY CHECKED WITH NO DEFECTS, AND THE ACFT WAS APPROVED FOR RETURN TO SERVICE. (S)

C2XA08IA191	EMB	INVERTER	INOPERATIVE
8/10/2008	EMB135LR	78241	EMERGENCY LIGHTS

IAH - DURING MAINTENANCE INSPECTION THE FORWARD FLOOR PROXIMITY LIGHT STRIP WAS FOUND TO BE INOPERATIVE. MAINTENANCE REMOVED AND REPLACED THE NR 2 EMERGENCY LIGHT INVERTER, OPERATIONALLY CHECKED WITH NO DEFECTS, AND THE ACFT WAS APPROVED FOR RETURN TO SERVICE. (S)

C2XA08IA182	EMB	BALLAST	BURNED
7/30/2008	EMB145	BR90002	GALLEY

IAH - FLIGHT 2247 - DURING POST FLIGHT INSPECTION THE CREW REPORTED AN ELECTRICAL BURNING SMELL FROM THE GALLEY AREA. MAINTENANCE REMOVED AND REPLACED THE GALLEY LIGHT BALLAST, OPERATIONALLY CHECKED WITH NO DEFECTS, AND THE AIRCRAFT WAS APPROVED FOR RETURN TO SERVICE. (A)

C2XA08IA180	EMB	BALLAST	INOPERATIVE
7/28/2008	EMB145EP	BR90002	CABIN LIGHTS

IAH - FLIGHT 2938 - DURING PRE-FLIGHT INSPECTION, THE CREW REPORTED A BURNING SMELL AT ROW 18. MAINTENANCE INSPECTED THE AIRCRAFT, FOUND A BAD BALLAST AT SEAT 18A. THE BALLAST WAS DISCONNECTED AND THE LIGHT PLACED ON MAL 33-20-00/1 CAT C CONTROL NUMBER 151397 AND THE AIRCRAFT WAS APPROVED FOR RETURN TO SERVICE. ON 08/03/08 MAINTENANCE REMOVED AND REPLACED THE LIGHT BALLAST FOR ROW 18, OPERATIONALLY CHECKED WITH NO DEFECTS, REMOVED THE MEL, AND THE ACFT WAS APPROVED FOR RETURN TO SERVICE. (S)

C2X2008F00014	EMB	BATTERY PACK	INOPERATIVE
7/28/2008	EMB145EP	20131A	EMERGENCY LIGHT

A/C WAS IN FOR A OVERNIGHT SERVICE CHECK AND NR 4 EMERGENCY LIGHT BATTERY WAS FOUND INOP. MAINTENANCE REMOVED AND REPLACED THE NR 4 BATTERY IAW EMB 145 AMM 33-50-04. OPS CHECKS GOOD AND WAS RELEASED BACK TO SERVICE. (A)

C2XA08IA196	EMB	BALLAST	INOPERATIVE
8/25/2008	EMB145LR	78241	EMERGENCY LIGHT

IAH FLIGHT 2312 DURING POST FLIGHT INSPECTION THE GALLEY EXIT LIGHT WAS FOUND TO BE INOPERATIVE. MX R&R THE GALLEY EMERGENCY LIGHT BALLAST, OPS CHECKED WITH NO DEFECTS, AND THE ACFT WAS APPROVED FOR RETURN TO SERVICE.

C2XA08CL097	EMB	MODULE	ODOR
8/24/2008	EMB145LR	7281000501	PSU

CLE FLIGHT NR2173 CREW REPORTED A STRONG ELECTRICAL SMELL NEAR THE MAIN CABIN DOOR. MX INSPECTED AND REPLACED THE PASSENGER SERVICE UNIT CONTROL MODULE OPS CHECKS WERE GOOD.

C2XA08RI115	EMB	INVERTER	INOPERATIVE
8/3/2008	EMB145LR	78241	EMERGENCY LIGHTS

RIC - DURING ROUTINE MAINTENANCE, RIC MX FOUND EMERGENCY LIGHT STRIPS INOPERATIVE. MAINTENANCE REMOVED AND REPLACED EMERGENCY LIGHT INVERTER AND PERFORMED OPERATIONAL CHECK SUCCESSFULLY. ACFT WAS APPROVED TO RETURN TO SERVICE. (S)

C2XA08SH107	EMB	BRACKET	WORN
8/17/2008	EMB145LR	14569009410	RT AILERON

SHV - DURING C-CHECK. THE RT AILERON TO PCA ATTACHMENT BRACKET WAS FOUND TO BE WORN AND WOULD NOT RETAIN THE HAT BUSHINGS. MAINTENANCE REMOVED AND REPLACED THE AFFECTED BRACKET IAW EMB 145 SRM 51-40-02. THE ACFT WAS APPROVED FOR RETURN TO SERVICE. (S)

C2XA08SH108	EMB	BRACKET	WORN
8/17/2008	EMB145LR	14567066401	LT SPOILER

SHV - DURING C-CHECK, THE LT GROUND SPOILER CENTER HINGE BRACKET WAS FOUND TO BE WORN AND WOULD NOT RETAIN THE HAT BUSHINGS. MAINTENANCE REMOVED AND REPLACED THE AFFECTED BRACKET IAW EMB 145 SRM 51-40-02. THE ACFT WAS APPROVED FOR RETURN TO SERVICE. (S)

C2XA08IA177	EMB	MODULE	MALFUNCTIONED
7/24/2008	EMB145LR	2014ABREVC	CABIN PRESSURE

IAH - FLIGHT 2656, THE CREW REPORTED THAT THE CABIN PRESSURIZATION RATE BELOW 20,000 FLUCTUATES WILDLY UP +/- 2500FPM, AND APPEARED TO BE AFFECTED BY THRUST LEVER SETTING. THE AIRCRAFT LANDED AT IAH WITHOUT INCIDENT WHERE MAINTENANCE INSPECTED THE AIRCRAFT AND RESET THE CABIN PRESSURE ACQUISITION MODULE (CPAM), OPERATIONALLY TESTED WITH NO DEFECTS. THE AIRCRAFT WAS APPROVED FOR RETURN TO SERVICE. (A)

C2XA08CL089	EMB	SWITCH	STICKING
7/23/2008	EMB145LR	14563000401	PITCH TRIM

CLE FLIGHT 2018 THE CREW REPORTED A MAIN PITCH TRIM FAIL MESSAGE IN FLIGHT. MAINTENANCE INSPECTED AND FOUND THE FIRST OFFICER'S PITCH TRIM SWITCH WAS STICKING. THE SWITCH WAS REPLACED AND OPERATIONAL CHECKS WERE GOOD. (S)

C2XA08SH106	EMB	SILL	CORRODED
8/17/2008	EMB145LR	14525480003	CARGO DOORWAY

SHV - DURING C-CHECK THE CARGO DOOR LOWER SILL CUTOUT WAS FOUND TO BE CORRODED. MAINTENANCE REMOVED AND REPLACED THE LOWER SILL CUTOUT STRUCTURE IAW EMB 145 SRM 51-40-02. THE ACFT WAS APPROVED FOR RETURN TO SERVICE. (S)

C2XA08RI109	EMB	OUTFLOW VALVE	DIRTY
8/10/2008	EMB145LR	2099L011100	CABIN PRESSURE

FLIGHT 3114 - RIC- AIR CREW REPORTED THAT DURING CRUISE, CABIN PRESSURE WAS AT 12,000 FT AT ALTITUDE OF 32,000 FT. FLIGHT WAS DIVERTED TO RIC. CREW LANDED ACFT UNEVENTFULLY. RIC MAINTENANCE CLEANED RT OUTFLOW VALVE AND PERFORMED OPERATIONAL CHECK

SUCCESSFULLY. ACFT WAS APPROVED TO RETURN TO SERVICE. (S)

C2X2008F00020	EMB	PUMP	LEAKING
8/14/2008	EMB145LR		HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

ACFT EN ROUTE FROM EWR TO TYS WHEN THE HYD 1 SYSTEM MESSAGE WAS HYD LOW QUANTITY. MAINTENANCE REMOVED AND REPLACED THE NR 1 ENG DRIVEN HYD PUMP IAW EMB 145AMM 29-10-03 AND REMOVED AND REPLACED THE NR 1 ELECTRIC DRIVEN PUMP IAW EMB 145 AMM 29-10-04. OPS AND LEAK CHECKS WERE GOOD AND WAS RELEASED AFTER A SERVICE ROUTINE WAS COMPLIED WITH. P/N FOR ELECTRIC DRIVEN HYD PUMP (971533, S/N MX683545). (S)

C2XA08IA193	EMB	APU	SMOKE
8/8/2008	EMB145LR		

IAH - FLIGHT 2749 - DURING PRE-FLIGHT THE CREW REPORTED SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT WHEN THE APU WAS STARTED, AND THE CREW SHUT DOWN THE APU. MAINTENANCE INSPECTED ACFT, OPERATIONALLY CHECKED THE APU WITH NO DEFECTS NOTED, AND THE ACFT WAS APPROVED FOR RETURN TO SERVICE. (S)

C2XA08IA179	EMB	INVERTER	INOPERATIVE
7/15/2008	EMB145LR	78241	EMERGENCY LIGHTS

MCI - DURING MAINTENANCE INSPECTION THE SECOND AND THIRD AISLE PATH LIGHT STRIPS WERE FOUND TO BE INOPERATIVE. MAINTENANCE REMOVED AND REPLACED THE NUMBER THREE EMERGENCY LIGHT INVERTER, OPERATIONALLY CHECKED WITH NO DEFECTS AND THE AIRCRAFT WAS APPROVED FOR RETURN TO SERVICE. (A)

C2XAA08IA172	EMB	INVERTER	INOPERATIVE
7/15/2008	EMB145LR	78241	EMERGENCY LIGHTS

IAH - DURING MAINTENANCE INSPECTION THE SECOND AND THIRD EMERGENCY FLOOR LIGHT STRIP WAS FOUND TO BE INOPERATIVE. MAINTENANCE REMOVED AND REPLACED THE NUMBER THREE EMERGENCY LIGHT INVERTER, OPERATIONALLY CHECKED WITH NO DEFECTS, AND THE AIRCRAFT WAS APPROVED FOR RETURN TO SERVICE. (A)

C2XA08SH109	EMB	FLOOR SUPPORT	CORRODED
8/19/2008	EMB145XR	14521700007	FUSELAGE

SHV - DURING C-CHECK LT OMEGA BEAM LOWER FLANGE HAS CORROSION BETWEEN FR 20-24. MAINTENANCE REPAIRED LT OMEGA BEAM LOWER FLANGE BETWEEN FR 20-24 IAW EMB 145 XR SRM 53-00-10 FIGURE 201 SHEET 2. THE ACFT WAS APPROVED FOR RETURN TO SERVICE. (S)

C2XA08SH112	EMB	THRESHOLD	CORRODED
8/19/2008	EMB145XR	14525480603	CARGO DOORWAY

SHV - DURING C-CHECK CARGO DOOR THRESHOLD HAS CORROSION IN MULTIPLE AREAS AROUND AND BOTTOM CUT OUT ANGLE. MAINTENANCE REMOVED AND REPLACED CARGO DOOR THRESHOLD LOWER BEAM IAW EMB 145 XR SRM 51-40-02. THE ACFT WAS APPROVED FOR RETURN TO SERVICE. (S)

C2XA08TY089	EMB	BRACKET	GOUGED
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8/25/2008 EMB145XR 1456900941050 RT AILERON

A/C WAS IN A C CHECK STATUS AND THE O/B BUSHION HOLE ON THE PCA BRACKET ATTACH POINT WAS FOUND OVERSIZE ON THE RT AILERON. MX REPLACED THE PCA BRACKET IAW EC 5750-01177. ALL WORK WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND WAS RELEASED BACK TO SERVICE.

[C2XA08SH111](#) EMB FLOOR SUPPORT CORRODED

8/19/2008 EMB145XR 14521713005 FUSELAGE

SHV - DURING C-CHECK CENTER OMEGA BEAM FR 18-23 HAS CORROSION. MAINTENANCE REMOVED AND REPLACED CENTER OMEGA BEAM 18-23 IAW EMB 145 XR SRM 51-40-02 AND EC 5320-01140. THE ACFT WAS APPROVED FOR RETURN TO SERVICE. (S)

[C2XA08ON167](#) EMB SMOKE WARNING FALSE ACTIVATION

8/9/2008 EMB145XR CARGO BAY

FLT 0023 - OKC - FLIGHT CREW REPORTED BAGGAGE SMOKE INDICATION ON EICAS. SYSTEM WAS RESET AS PER MAINTENANCE CONTROL INSTRUCTIONS. OPERATIONALLY CHECKED SATISFACTORY AND ACFT WAS RELEASED TO RETURN FOR SERVICE. (S)

[C2X2008F00021](#) EMB SKIN PUNCTURED

8/18/2008 EMB145XR FUSELAGE

EWR/TYS-ACFT WAS STRUCK IN EWR BY A BELTLOADER AND PUNCTURED THE SKIN UNDER THE CARGO BAY. THE ACFT WAS FERRY FLOWN TO TYS. TYS MAINTENANCE INSTALLED A DOUBLER, FILLER, AND SHIMS ON FUSELAGE SKIN BETWEEN FRAMES 64-65 AND STRINGERS 19L-21L IAW EC 5330-01830. THE PRESSURE CHECK WAS GOOD AND THE ACFT WAS RELEASED TO SERVICE. (S)

[C2XA08IA187](#) EMB CONTROL HANDLE INOPERATIVE

8/4/2008 EMB145XR 8271013 MLG

IAH-FLIGHT 2352 - THE CREW REPORTED THAT AFTER TAKEOFF THE LANDING GEAR DID NOT INITIALLY RETRACT, AND HAD THE ASSOCIATED DISAGREE MESSAGE ON EICAS. THE ACFT LANDED AT IAH WITHOUT INCIDENT WHERE MAINTENANCE REMOVED AND REPLACED THE LANDING GEAR LEVER. OPERATIONALLY TESTED WITH NO DEFECTS, AND THE ACFT WAS APPROVED FOR RETURN TO SERVICE. (S)

[C2XA08IA186](#) EMB SOLENOID INOPERATIVE

8/4/2008 EMB145XR 22250100003 NLG DOORS

IAH-FLIGHT 3044 - THE CREW REPORTED THAT THE NOSE GEAR DOORS WOULD NOT CLOSE. THE ACFT LANDED AT IAH WITHOUT INCIDENT WHERE MAINTENANCE REMOVED AND REPLACED THE NOSE LANDING GEAR DOOR SOLENOID VALVE. OPERATIONALLY TESTED WITH NO DEFECTS, AND THE ACFT WAS APPROVED FOR RETURN TO SERVICE. (S)

[COEA0802742](#) FOKKER CONNECTOR DIRTY

7/16/2008 F27MK600 LT ENG OIL IND

RETURN TO BLOCKS. FLT 8777. ON TAXI TO THE RUNWAY THE LT ENGINE OIL PRESSURE GAGE DROPPED TO AN INDICATION OF "0". THE LT ENGINE WAS SHUT DOWN AND THE A/C TAXIED SAFELY BACK TO THE RAMP. DISCONNECTED CONNECTORS AT THE OIL PRESSURE GAGE AND OIL PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FOR THE LT ENGINE. CLEANED CONNECTIONS AND RECONNECTED REMOVED CONNECTORS. SYSTEM CHECK AND ENGINE RUN FOUND SYSTEM OPERATION NORMAL. (A)

EHS2008F00000	GULSTM	LYC	PISTON	BURNED
7/2/2008	500S	IO540E1B5		NR 3 CYLINDER

WHILE FLYING A FIRE MISSION IN SUPPORT OF USFS, THE PILOT NOTICED THE RT ENG OIL PRESSURE FLOWLY STARTING TO DECREASE. THE DECISION WAS MADE TO RETURN TO THE AIRPORT. AS OIL PRESSURE CONTINUED TO DECREASE, THE DECISION WAS MADE TO SHUTDOWN, FEATHER, AND SECURE THE ENG. A SAFE LANDING WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND THE ACFT WAS TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE. UPON INSPECTION, IT WAS FOUND THAT THE NR 3 CYLINDER'S PISTON RINGS AND RING GROOVES WERE DAMAGED, WHICH PRESSURIZED THE CASE AND PUMPED THE ENG OIL OVERBOARD. THE ENG WAS REMOVED AND SENT FOR OVERHAUL AS A PRECAUTION. PROBABLE CAUSE: POSSIBLE BROKEN RING OR POSSIBLE DETONATION. (S)

WWQ2008F00003	GULSTM	RROYCE	TRANSCEIVER	SHORTED
8/2/2008	G1159	SPEY*	MI5853511	WX RADAR

AC WAS DISPATCHED, THE CREW CAPTAIN AND F/O DEPARTED AT 13:40 ENROUTE. AT APPROX 13:50, WHILE CLIMBING OUT OF 8000 FEET, PILOTS NOTICED THE RADAR SCREEN START TO FLICKER. CAPT IMMEDIATELY SHUT THE RADAR OFF. A SHORT WHILE LATER PILOTS SMELLED WHAT APPEARED TO BE SMOKE RELATED TO ELECTRICAL FIRE. PILOTS THEN SAW HEAVY SMOKE COMING OUT OF THE DASHBOARD. CAPT THEN DECLARED AN EMERGENCY, INITIALLY REQUESTED TO DIVERT, DUE TO THE AVAILABILITY OF LONGER RUNWAYS AND MUCH BETTER EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT IN CASE IT WAS NEEDED. AFTER PERFORMING CORRECT CHECKLIST AND ASSESSING THE SITUATION THE SMOKE HAD DISSIPATED AND CAPT DECIDED THAT THERE WAS NO LONGER AN EMERGENCY. AT THAT POINT REQUESTED TO FLY BACK TO DEPARTURE AND LANDED AT 14:05 WITH NO ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS. INSPECTED COCKPIT AND DETERMINED THE WEATHER RADAR CONTROL UNIT (CRT) HAD SHORTED OUT INTERNALLY. INSPECTED BEHIND THE INSTRUMENT PANEL AND ASSOCIATED WIRING GOING TO THE WEATHER RADAR CONTROL UNIT(CRT) AND NO DEFECTS NOTED. REMOVED THE BAD CRT AND INSTALLED INSPECTED CRT, PERFORMED OPS CHECKS OF THE SYS . ALL OPERATIONAL CHECK GOOD WITH NO DEFECT NOTED. (K)

2008FA0000572	GULSTM	GARRTT	ACTUATOR	LEAKING
8/18/2008	G159	TFE7314R	35380000000	RT MLG

RT MLG SIDE BRACE ACTUATOR LEAKING FROM SWITCH ASSY. SIDE BRACE ACTUATOR REMOVED, REPLACED WITH REPAIRED ACTUATOR ASSY.

WWQ2008F00002	GULSTM	RROYCE	GEAR	WORN
8/1/2008	GIV	TAY6118	YU10352	RT STARTER

RT ENGINE FAILED TO START, FOUND THAT THE STARTER WAS BAD. DURING THE STARTER REPLACEMENT, NOTICED ABNORMAL WEAR ON THE ENGINE GEAR BOX STARTER GEAR. CONTACTED ENGINEERING DEPARTMENTS TO AS FOR LIMITATIONS. AFTER ENGINEERING DEPARTMENTS REVIEWED PICTURES, THEY DETERMINED THAT THE STARTER GEAR BOX GEAR REQUIRED FURTHER EVALUATIONS. SPECIAL FLIGHT PERMIT (FERRY FLIGHT) AND FLEW THE AC FOR FURTHER EVALUATION. ENGINEERS DETERMINED STARTER GEAR IN THE GEAR BOX REQUIRED REPLACEMENT. A RENTAL ENGINE IS BEING INSTALLED AND ENGINE SN 16257 GEAR BOX STARTER WILL BE REPLACED. (K)

K2D2008F00000	HUGHES		PRESSURE SWITCH	LEAKING
8/6/2008	369E		369H81445	ENG FUEL PUMP

ON OR AROUND 5:00 PM, WEDNESDAY, 6 AUGUST, 2008, WHILE CONDUCTING A POST FLIGHT INSP, DISCOVERED SOME OIL LEAKAGE IN ENGINE COMPARTMENT. AS HE WAS INVESTIGATING LEAKAGE, NOTICED THAT THE FUEL FILTER PRESSURE SWITCH HAD PLAYED BETWEEN TWO BODY HALVES

AND HAD SOME FUEL LEAKAGE. AT WHICH TIME, GROUNDED HELICOPTER, RESCHEDULED OUR FLIGHTS FOR NEXT DAY, AND ORDERED THE PART TO REPAIR THE FAULT. AT THIS TIME, HAVE NO PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THIS INCIDENT BUT DID INFORM THE MECHANIC TO USE CAUTION IN TORQUING THE LINES AND FITTINGS THAT CONNECT THIS PART TO THE ENGINE. (K)

FOM2008F00000	LEAR	GARRTT	DOWNLOCK SWITCH	INTERMITTENT
8/9/2008	35A	TFE731*	P624007	MLG

ON FINAL APPROACH, DURING PART 91 FLIGHT FOR AC OWNER, CREW NOTED THA THE LT MLG WOULD NOT INDICATE REQUIRED "GREEN" DOWN-LOCK INDICATION. ALL OTHER GEAR INDICATED PROPERLY AFTER NORMAL EXTENSION. CREW PROCEEDED WITH EMERGENCY CHECKLIST ITEMS IAW MFG, INCLUDING EMERGENCY GEAR EXTENSION PROCEDURE, AND NO CHANGE IN SITUATION OCCURRED. LT MLG STILL DID NOT INDICATE DOWNLOCKED. CREW CONDUCTED SEVERAL FLY-BY MANEUVERS TO HAVE ATC CONTROL TOWER VERIFY GEAR POSITION. ATC REPORTED "GEAR APPEARS DOWN AND LOCKED". CREW COMPLETED ALL EMERGENCY CHECKLIST ITEMS AND BRIEFED OCCUPANTS ON UPCOMING "GEAR UNSAFE" LANDING. CREW DECLARED EMERGENCY AND PROCEEDED WITH APPROACH AND LANDING AT AIRPORT WITHOUT INCIDENT. GEAR HELD AND LANDING WAS UNEVENTFUL. THE FOLLOWING DAY (8/10/2008) CREW POWERED UP AC AND NOW DID NOTE PROPER GREEN DOWN LOCK INDICATION ON LT MAIN GEAR. FERRY PERMIT WAS OBTAINED AND AC WAS FERRIED. UPON INSPECTION AT MAINT FACILITY, REPORT NOTED THAT " DOWNLOCK INDICATOR SWITCH" LOCATED ON LT MAIN GEAR ACTUATOR WAS FAULTY. COMPONENT WAS REPLACED WITH NEW COMPONENT AND SYSTEM WAS SERVICED. AC WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE ON OR ABOUT 08/13/2008. ALL OPS CHECKS WERE NORMAL. PART IS ON CONDITION WITHOUT TBO/LIFE LIMIT REQUIREMENTS, ON CONDITION ONLY. NON SERIALIZED PART/COMPONENT. (K)

2008FA0000556	LEAR		TRANSDUCER	MALFUNCTIONED
7/2/2008	60LEAR		1240583000	HYD PRESSURE

HYDRAULIC PRESSURE GAUGE READ ZERO ON LANDING CHECK. FLAPS AND LANDING GEAR EXTENDED NORMALLY. GAUGE WAS SEEN TO FLUCTUATE BETWEEN NORMAL TO 1000 PSI TO ZERO PSI ON APPROACH. BRAKES AND THRUST REVERSERS OPERATED NORMALLY. GAUGE READS ZERO DURING TAXI. CREW DECLARED AN IFE AS A PRECAUTION. MAINTENANCE REPLACED THE HYDRAULIC PRESSURE TRANSDUCER. OPS CHECK AND LEAK CHECK PERFORMED SATISFACTORILY. (S)

2008FA0000547	MOONEY	LYC	DOWNLOCK	WORN
6/28/2008	M20B	O360A1A	560006	MLG

LANDING GEAR LEVER BECAME DISENGAGED FROM THE DOWNLOCK LATCHING ASSY ON THE PILOT'S LOWER CENTER INSTRUMENT PANEL. AC WAS ON THE GROUND DURING LANDING ROLLOUT. THIS ALLOWED GEAR TO COLLAPSE, SB M20-88B, 5-10-94. (K)

2008FA0000571	MTSBSI		CONTROL CABLE	BROKEN
7/22/2008	MU2B36A			ELEVATOR

PILOT COMPLAINED OF POOR ELEVATOR TRIM OPS. UPON INSP, FOUND ELEVATOR TRIM CABLE 311AS-14-7245 BROKEN (RT CABLE). 311AS-14-7362 (LT CABLE), 010A-61179-81 (RT AFT) CABLES FRAYED. IDLER PULLEY SHAFT ON PITCH TRIM SERVO SHEARED. REPLACED CABLES & SERVO, OPS CHECKED. RIGGED AS NEEDED.

2008FA0000559	PIPER	LYC	DRIVE SHAFT	BROKEN
8/10/2008	PA28R200	IO360C1C		MAGNETO

DISTRIBUTOR (POINT CAM SHAFT BROKE FLUSH WITH UPPER MAG GEAR INNER RACE CAUSING

TOTAL MAG FAILURE. PART WAS RETURNED TO OWNER. (K)

NTB2008F00001	PIPER	CONT	SPRING	BROKEN
8/8/2008	PA28R201T	TSIO360F		IMPULSE COUPLING

IMPULSE COUPLING SPRING BROKEN. EVIDENCE OF PRE-EXISTING CRACK AND CORROSION. VERY LOW TIME IS SERVICE. MAG TO ENGINE TIMING LOST. BOTH MAGS EXPERIENCED THE SAME FAILURE ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY. (K)

2008FA0000579	PIPER	LYC	RESERVOIR	LOW
6/10/2008	PA31325	LTIO540F2BD		HYD SYSTEM

ON FINAL APPROACH THE LANDING GEAR HANDLE WAS PLACED IN THE DOWN POSITION. THE GEAR WAS VIEWED IN THE MIRROR AT 45 DEGREE ANGLE. THERE WERE NO GREEN LIGHTS INDICATING GEAR DOWN AND LOCKED. THE PILOT TRIED TO RAISE AND LOWER THE GEAR AGAIN WITH NO MOVEMENT EITHER DIRECTION. THE PILOT THEN PROCEEDED TO MANUALLY PUMP THE GEAR DOWN. AFTER THREE GREEN LIGHTS WERE ON, THE AIRCRAFT WAS FLOWN BACK, WITH THE GEAR DOWN. MAINT NOTE: HYDR RESERVOIR WAS FOUND TO BE IMPROPERLY SERVICED. TRAINING WAS CONDUCTED FOR ALL MAINT ON PROPERLY SERVICING THE POWERPACK. THIS CAN BE TRICKY AS IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE THE FLUID LEVEL. (K)

2008FA0000549	PIPER	LYC	DOUBLER	CRACKED
8/4/2008	PA32R301T	TIO540*	99813004	FUSELAGE

UPPER COMM/NAV ANTENNA DOUBLER AND SKIN CRACKED FROM FWD SEAM ALONG BOTH ANTENNA MOUNT NUTPLATE LINES. CRACKS ARE APPROX 6 INCHES LONG WITH ADDITIONAL CRACKING RADIATING OUT FROM FWD NUTPLATES TO FWD DOUBLER MOUNTING RIVETS. ANTENNA DOUBLER IS CRACKED COMPLETELY THROUGH ON LT SIDE AND 90 PERCENT THROUGH ON RT SIDE. DAMAGE PICTURE AVAILABLE UPON REQUEST. DAMAGE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY PROLONGED OIL CANNING OF THE UPPER SKIN PANEL FROM AERODYNAMIC LOADS AGAINST THE ANTENNA DURING FLIGHT. TO PREVENT REOCCURRENCE REPAIR WITH FLUSH PATCH IAW 43.13-1B, SEC 4, HOWEVER BEND .5 INCH LIP ON LT, RT AND AFT EDGES OF BACKING PATCH TO INCREASE STIFFNESS AND REDUCE OIL CANNING EFFECT. JOG FRONT EDGE OF BACKING PATCH AND TIE INTO FWD SKIN SEAM/RIB AND EXTEND LT , RT AND AFT EDGES 4 INCHES PAST REMOVED DAMAGE AREA. AN ALTERNATE REPAIR WOULD BE TO REPLACE THE ENTIRE AFFECTED SKIN SECTION AND REMANUFACTURE ANTENNA DOUBLER TO TIE INTO THE FWD AND AFT RIBS TO STIFFEN THE ENTIRE AREA. (K)

2008FA0000548	PIPER	LYC	SKIN	CRACKED
8/4/2008	PA32R301T	TIO540*	69904000	FUSELAGE

UPPER COMM/NAV ANTENNA DOUBLER AND SKIN CRACKED FROM FWD SEAM ALONG BOTH ANTENNA MOUNT NUTPLATE LINES. CRACKS ARE APPROX 6 INCHES LONG WITH ADDITIONAL CRACKING RADIATING OUT FROM FWD NUTPLATES TO FWD DOUBLER MOUNTING RIVETS. ANTENNA DOUBLER IS CRACKED COMPLETELY THROUGH ON LT SIDE AND 90 PERCENT THROUGH ON RT SIDE. DAMAGE PICTURE AVAILABLE UPON REQUEST. DAMAGE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY PROLONGED OIL CANNING OF THE UPPER SKIN PANEL FROM AERODYNAMIC LOADS AGAINST THE ANTENNA DURING FLIGHT. TO PREVENT REOCCURRENCE REPAIR WITH FLUSH PATCH IAW 43.13-1B, SEC 4, HOWEVER BEND .5 INCH LIP ON LT, RT AND AFT EDGES OF BACKING PATCH TO INCREASE STIFFNESS AND REDUCE OIL CANNING EFFECT. JOG FRONT EDGE OF BACKING PATCH AND TIE INTO FORWARD SKIN SEAM/RIB AND EXTEND LT , RT AND AFT EDGES 4 INCHES PAST REMOVED DAMAGE AREA. AN ALTERNATE REPAIR WOULD BE TO REPLACE THE ENTIRE AFFECTED SKIN SECTION AND REMANUFACTURE THE ANTENNA DOUBLER TO TIE INTO THE FORWARD AND AFT RIBS TO STIFFEN THE ENTIRE AREA. (K)

[2008FA0000561](#) PIPER LYC WIRE BROKEN
5/13/2008 PA44180 O320* ALTERNATOR

INTERNAL FAILURE DUE TO BROKEN WIRES INTERNALLY, HEAVY SPARKING INSIDE ENGINE COMPARTMENT. (K)

[2008FA0000573](#) RAYTHN FLOAT VALVE SEPARATED
8/21/2008 390 1183810025 FUEL TANK

DURING 1200 HR INSP WHICH REQUIRES OPENING ALL WING AND FUSELAGE FUEL TANK ACCESS PANELS FOR INTERNAL INSPECTION IN BOTH LT & RT CTR FUSELAGE TANKS, FWD FLOAT VENT VALVES FLOAT SECTION OF VALVE ASSY WAS FOUND SEPARATED AND LAYING LOOSE INSIDE FUEL TANK AREA. RECOMMEND INSP OF LT & RT FWD VENT VALVE FLOAT ASSEMBLIES AT NEXT EARLIEST TIME OR INSP. REPLACE ALL SUSPECTED OR FAULTY FLOAT VALVES.

[2008FA0000552](#) RAYTHN LINE RUPTURED
5/21/2008 HAWKER800XP SA7670024001 HYD SYSTEM

HYDR FLEXABLE LINE TO RT MLG DOOR ACTUATOR RUPTURED DURING FLIGHT. LOSS OF FLUID CAVITATED RT AND LT ENGINE DRIVE HYDR PUMPS. LINE RUPTURED IN SIDEWALL NEAR SWAGED END FITTING FOR CONNECTOR. PRESSURE IS 3000 PSI CONSTANT. NO LANDING GEAR ACTUATION WAS IN PROCESS. SUSPECT MFG DEFECT. AC MFG NOTIFIED. THIS IS FIRST INSTANCE OF THIS FOR THS AC. LT MLG DOOR HYDR LINE RUPTURED 2 MONTHS BEFORE IN THE SAME EXACT WAY AND CAUSED THE SAME DAMAGE. MFG NOTIFIED AGAIN.

[2008FA0000553](#) RAYTHN LINE RUPTURED
8/8/2008 HAWKER800XP SA7670024001 HYD SYSTEM

HYDR FLEXIBLE LINE TO THE LT LANDING GEAR DOOR ACTUATOR RUPTURED DURING FLIGHT. LOSS OF FLUID CAVITATED LT AND RT ENG DRIVEN HYDR PUMPS. LINE RUPTURED IN SIDEWALL NEAR SWAGED END FITTING FOR CONNECTOR. PRESSURE IS 3000 PSI CONSTANT. NO LANDING GEAR ACTUATION WAS IN PROCESS. SUSPECT MFG DEFECT. AC MFG NOTIFIED. THIS IS SECOND OCCURRANCE FOR THIS AC. SAME LINE RUPTURED 2 MONTH PREVIOUSLY ON RT SIDE ACTURATOR CAUSING SAME DAMAGE. MFG AGAIN NOTIFIED. (K)

[DJF2008F00013](#) RAYTHN UNKNOWN SMOKE
8/25/2008 HAWKER800XP CABIN

THE A/C TAXIED IN AND CHALKED AS ENGINES WERE BEING SHUT DOWN. THE COCKPIT AND CABIN STARTED FILLING WITH SMOKE. THE CREW REPORTED THE SMOKE CLEARED AFTER ALL ELECTRICAL AND ENGINE AND APU WERE SHUT DOWN. OPEN

[2008FA0000541](#) RAYTHN GARRTT MODULE FAILED
8/1/2008 HAWKER800XP TFE7315BR 30753507 LPT

AIRCRAFT EXPERIENCED A VIBRATION IN FLIGHT. CREW SHUTDOWN NR 1 ENGINE AND LANDED. MAINT CREWS DETERMINED THE THIRD STAGE LOW PRESSURE TURBINE (LPT) MODULE HAD EXPERIENCED A BLADE FAILURE. ONE BLADE WAS MISSING A PIECE ABOUT ONE INCH LONG. MAINT ALSO DISCOVERED A CRACK IN THE THIRD STAGE STATOR WHICH EXTENDED BETWEEN ONE THIRD TO ONE HALF THE CIRCUMFERENCE OF THE HOUSING. NO OTHER ANOMALIES WERE NOTED DURING THE DISASSEMBLY OF THE ENGINE. PARTS WERE SENT TO MFG FOR INVESTIGATION AND REPAIR. (K)

[DGC2008F00001](#) RKWELL GARRTT PUMP INOPERATIVE

8/18/2008 NA26565 TFE7313R1D PF24390615BCES62 HYD SYSTEM

ON AUGUST 16, 2008, AT APPROXIMATELY 8:30 AM, AFTER LANDING, THE CREW HEARD AUDIBLE WARNING OF HYDRAULIC SYSTEM LOW PRESSURE. THE AC TAXIED TO THE RAMP OF DESTINATION, WITHOUT INCIDENT. UPON INVESTIGATION, THE HYDRAULIC PUMP WAS FOUND TO HAVE FAILED. (K)

[PNS2008F00008](#) SAAB GE SOCKET BURNED

8/14/2008 340B CT79B BVO33000250 CABIN LIGHT

WHILE ENROUTE, FLIGHT CREW WAS NOTIFIED BY THE F/A THAT THERE WAS SMOKE AND AN ODOR IN THE CABIN, THE FLIGHT CREW PERFORMED EMERGENCY PROCEDURES AND AN UNEVENTFUL LANDING WAS MADE AT THE DESTINATION AIRPORT. MAINT FOUND THE OVERHEAD LIGHT FIXTURE ABOVE SEAT 1A WAS BURNED AND MELTED. THE SYSTEM WAS DEFERED AND THE AC RETURNED TO THE MAINT BASE AND THE LAMP HOLDER WAS REPLACED AND THE LIGHTING SYS TESTED. WE HAVE HAD SIMILAR ISSUES WITH THESE LAMP HOLDERS WHICH ARE MADE OUT OF PLASTIC. IT WOULD BE BETTER IF THESE LAMP HOLDERS WERE MADE FROM CERAMIC OR ANOTHER MATERIAL THAT WOULD RESIST MELTING AND BURNING. (K)

[2008FA0000550](#) SCWZER ALLSN DRIVE SHAFT UNSERVICEABLE

7/29/2008 269D 250C20 269D53085 MAIN ROTOR

DURING PREFLIGHT, THE M/R DROOP STOP NUT WAS FOUND TO BE LOOSE. UPON FURTHER INSP IT WAS DETERMINED THAT M/R HUB SHOULD BE REMOVED TO LOOK FOR SIGNS OF WEAR. ONCE HUB WAS REMOVED AND INSPECTED, MODERATE WEAR (FRETTING) WAS FOUND ON DROOP STOP RETAINER PLATE (PN 269A1320), DROOP STOP RETAINER RING (PN 269D1329), DROOP STOP RETAINER (PN 269A1332) AND UPPER SCISSORS SUPPORT (PN 269A1328-901) TO THRUST BEARING TUBE SPACER ASSY (PN 269A13183). ONCE THESE PARTS WERE REMOVED, THE DRIVE SHAFT WAS REMOVED FOR INSP. ONCE DRIVE SHAFT WAS REMOVED THE DRIVE SHAFT THRUST BRG WAS REMOVED FOR INSP AND CORROSION WAS FOUND ON DRIVE SHAFT THRUST BRG JOURNAL. CORROSION WAS REMOVED AND FURTHER VISUAL EXAMINATION REVEALED A POSSIBLE CRACK THAT WAS LOCATED RADially ALONG THE JOURNALS SURFACE. DYE PENETRANT OF SUSPECT AREA WAS PERFORMED WHICH REVEALED A .375 INCH ANOMALY. DRIVE SHAFT WAS THEN SENT TO AN OUTSIDE NDT FACILITY WHERE A MAG PARTICLE INSP WAS PERFORMED VERIFYING THE ANOMALY. NEXT, AN EDDY CURRENT TEST WAS PERFORMED THAT PROVED THE ANOMALY WAS ALSO BELOW THE SURFACE WITH APPROXIMATELY .005 INCH OF SEPARATION. PART WAS RETURNED TO MFG FOR FURTHER EXAMINATION AND EVALUATION. (K)

[2008FA0000570](#) SNIAS TMECA BEARING WORN

7/29/2008 AS350BA ARRIEL1 704A33651158 M/R SWASHPLATE

COMPLIED WITH 2 YEAR / 500 HR INSP. TASK 62.30.00.601 M/R SHAFT INSP. WHILE PERFORMING INSP OF SWASHPLATE GUIDE UNIBALL FOUND WHILE ROTATING SWASHPLATE. UPPER SEAL FOR BRG WAS NOT ROTATING BECAUSE IT WAS NOT FIRMLY ATTACHED TO OUTER RACE OF BRG WITH THE SEAL BEING LOOSE & UNSECURED IT WORE INTO SWASHPLATE BRG OUTER STOP RING. REPLACED SWASHPLATE BRG, OUTER STOP RING WITH NEW. RECOMMENDATION WOULD BE WHILE GREASING SWASHPLATE BRG DURING 100 HOUR INSP, LIFT SWASHPLATE BOOT TO INSPECT BRG SEAL FOR MOVEMENT DURING ROTATION. (L)

[2008FA0000544](#) SOCATA LYC ALTERNATOR FAILED

7/30/2008 TB9 O320D2A ALU8521 ENGINE

ALTERNATOR WILL FAIL ABOVE 2500 RPM, LOW VOLTAGE LIGHT COMES ON AND THE VOLTMETER INDICATES BATTERY VOLTAGE. OPS CHECK DURING GROUND RUNS ARE NORMAL MAX RPM DURING GROUND RUN 2400 RPM. ALTERNATOR APPEARS TO BE RPM SENSITIVE. POSSIBLE CAUSE: BRUSHES NOT RIDING TRUE ON SLIP RING. OVERHAUL PROCESS MAY CONTRIBUTE TO PROBLEM. AN ADDITIONAN (2) ALU8521 ALTERNATORS FROM INVENTORY PRODUCE THE SAME SYMPTOMS, SN

E113128 AND F043304. BOTH ALTERNATORS FAILED WITHIN 2 HOURS OF OPERATION. BOTH WERE O/H UNITS. (K)
