Unscoped DCT Report (Standard DCT)


MLF Label: 1.1 Safety Programs
DCT Type: SP DCT
Specialty: Operations
Peer Group: A - Part 121 Air Operators
DCT Revision: 12.0 on 03/28/19 (Released)
Summary Information

Purpose (Certificate Holder Responsibility): The CH is responsible to manage the safety of the Safety Management processes within its operation.
Objective (FAA Responsibility): The FAA objective is to determine if the CH; (1) Met regulatory requirements, guidance, and safety performance objectives of its Safety Management processes, and; (2) Managed safety of the Safety Management processes by incorporating system safety principles which include safety attributes.


The Safety Programs
  1.1 Safety Programs
     1.1.2 (OP) Safety Program (Ground and Flight)


Questions Answers References
  1.1.2 (OP) Safety Program (Ground and Flight)
1   
Did the certificate holder meet its regulatory and guidance requirements for Safety Program (Ground and Flight)?




Safety Attribute: Procedures,  Question Type: Process Observation,  

Scoping Attribute:
  (FAR PART = "121") AND ((SAFETY PROGRAMS = "ASAP") OR (SAFETY PROGRAMS = "FOQA") OR (SAFETY PROGRAMS = "IEP") OR (SAFETY PROGRAMS = "LOSA") OR (SAFETY PROGRAMS = "VDRP")) ,  Rev.  8  3/28/2019 2:23:02 PM, 

QID:
 00011471, Response Details: Procedures SP DCTs (Both OP and AW),  Status: Released

  Met regulatory and guidance requirements
  Isolated instance(s) when guidance requirements were not met
  Several instances when guidance requirements were not met
  Regulatory noncompliance
  Not Observable
8900.1 Vol 11 Ch 1 Sec 1, 8900.1 Vol 3 Ch 28 Sec 1, AC-00-58, AC-120-59, AC-120-66, AC-120-82, 119.65, 119.65(a), 119.65(d), 121.135(b), 117.9(a), 117.9(b), 117.9(c), 8900.1 Vol 10 Ch 3 Sec 1, A319, 8900.1 Vol 3 Ch 18 Sec 2
2   
Did the certificate holder's controls effectively mitigate unacceptable levels of risk(s) for the Safety Program (Ground and Flight) process?




Safety Attribute: Controls,  Question Type: Process Observation,  

Scoping Attribute:
  (FAR PART = "121") AND ((SAFETY PROGRAMS = "ASAP") OR (SAFETY PROGRAMS = "FOQA") OR (SAFETY PROGRAMS = "IEP") OR (SAFETY PROGRAMS = "LOSA") OR (SAFETY PROGRAMS = "VDRP")) ,  Rev.  5  3/28/2019 2:22:22 PM, 

QID:
 00011472, Response Details: Controls ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW),  Status: Released

  Controls were effective
  Isolated instance(s) when controls were not effective
  Several instances when controls were not effective
  Systemic, significant issues, or regulatory non-compliance
  Not Observable
5.51, 5.53, 5.55
3   
Did the certificate holder's Safety Program (Ground and Flight) process ensure consistency of related processes between departments and employees (interfaces)?




Safety Attribute: Interfaces,  Question Type: Process Observation,  

Scoping Attribute:
  (FAR PART = "121") AND ((SAFETY PROGRAMS = "ASAP") OR (SAFETY PROGRAMS = "FOQA") OR (SAFETY PROGRAMS = "IEP") OR (SAFETY PROGRAMS = "LOSA") OR (SAFETY PROGRAMS = "VDRP")) ,  Rev.  5  3/28/2019 2:22:22 PM, 

QID:
 00011473, Response Details: Interfaces ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW),  Status: Released

  Interfaces were effective
  Isolated instance(s) when interfaces were ineffective
  Several instances when FAA guidance was not met
  Systemic or significant issues
  Not Observable
4   
Were financial and human resources provided to ensure the safety and quality performance for the Safety Program (Ground and Flight) process?




Safety Attribute: Management Responsibility,  Question Type: Process Observation,  

Scoping Attribute:
  (FAR PART = "121") AND ((SAFETY PROGRAMS = "ASAP") OR (SAFETY PROGRAMS = "FOQA") OR (SAFETY PROGRAMS = "IEP") OR (SAFETY PROGRAMS = "LOSA") OR (SAFETY PROGRAMS = "VDRP")) ,  Rev.  5  3/28/2019 2:22:22 PM, 

QID:
 00011474, Response Details: Responsibility ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW),  Status: Released

  Management of the process was effective
  Isolated instance(s) where management of the process was ineffective
  Several instances where management of the process was ineffective
  Systemic, significant issues, or regulatory non-compliance
  Not Observable
5.23(a), 5.25(a), 5.25(b), 5.25(c), 5.21
5   
Did the person with authority over the certificate holder's Safety Program (Ground and Flight) process effectively plan, direct, control, or change procedures, and make key determinations, including safety risk acceptance decisions?




Safety Attribute: Management Authority,  Question Type: Process Observation,  

Scoping Attribute:
  (FAR PART = "121") AND ((SAFETY PROGRAMS = "ASAP") OR (SAFETY PROGRAMS = "FOQA") OR (SAFETY PROGRAMS = "IEP") OR (SAFETY PROGRAMS = "LOSA") OR (SAFETY PROGRAMS = "VDRP")) ,  Rev.  5  3/28/2019 2:22:23 PM, 

QID:
 00011475, Response Details: Authority ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW),  Status: Released

  Management of the process was effective
  Isolated instance(s) where management of the process was ineffective
  Several instances where management of the process was ineffective
  Systemic, significant issues, or regulatory non-compliance
  Not Observable
5.23(a), 5.23(b), 5.25(c)
6   
Were the certificate holder's process measurement(s) used to evaluate the performance of the Safety Program (Ground and Flight) process?




Safety Attribute: Process Measurement,  Question Type: Process Observation,  

Scoping Attribute:
  (FAR PART = "121") AND ((SAFETY PROGRAMS = "ASAP") OR (SAFETY PROGRAMS = "FOQA") OR (SAFETY PROGRAMS = "IEP") OR (SAFETY PROGRAMS = "LOSA") OR (SAFETY PROGRAMS = "VDRP")) ,  Rev.  6  3/28/2019 2:22:34 PM, 

QID:
 00011476, Response Details: Process Measurement ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW),  Status: Released

  Process measurements were effective
  Isolated instance(s) when process measurements were not used or ineffective
  Several instances when process measurements were not used or ineffective
  Systemic, significant issues, or regulatory non-compliance
  Not Observable
5.75, 5.71, 5.73
7   
Did the certificate holder's personnel understand their role and contribute to the safety performance of the Safety Program (Ground and Flight) process?




Safety Attribute: Safety Ownership,  Question Type: Process Observation,  

Scoping Attribute:
  (FAR PART = "121") AND ((SAFETY PROGRAMS = "ASAP") OR (SAFETY PROGRAMS = "FOQA") OR (SAFETY PROGRAMS = "IEP") OR (SAFETY PROGRAMS = "LOSA") OR (SAFETY PROGRAMS = "VDRP")) ,  Rev.  2  3/28/2019 2:22:27 PM, 

QID:
 00051977, Response Details: Safety Ownership ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW),  Status: Released

  Individuals were knowledgeable
  Isolated instances where knowledge was lacking
  Several instances where knowledge was lacking
  Systemic, significant issues, or regulatory non-compliance
  Not Observable
5.23(a), 5.91, 5.93


Response Details List  N/O Response Detail (Released, 2.0)
1 Personnel (e.g., key certificate holder personnel not present/available)
2 Equipment (e.g., equipment not present/available/in serviceable condition)
3 Event did not occur (e.g., did not observe an intoxicated passenger on the flight)
4 Time Constraints (e.g., resources/workload)
5 Weather (e.g., weather needed for observation not present or weather made observation impossible)
6 Other
Response Details List  Procedures SP DCTs (Both OP and AW) (Released, 1.0)
1 Unclear procedure(s)
2 Conflicting procedure(s)
3 Used workaround(s)
4 Skipped process step(s)
5 Personnel failed to follow process (procedures, guidance, etc)
6 Procedures/guidance not available
7 Procedures/guidance not current
8 Inconsistent procedure(s)
9 Undocumented procedure(s)
10 Minor typographical error(s) (i.e. record entries)
11 Information missing
12 Communication failure(s)
13 Personnel failed to perform task
14 Process failed to meet desired outcome
15 Process oversight failure
16 Equipment/tools not available
17 Equipment/tools not adequate
18 Equipment/tools not calibrated
19 Facilities not adequate
20 Other
Response Details List  Controls ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW) (Released, 1.0)
1 Failure to identify hazards or ineffective risk controls
2 Failure to develop and maintain risk controls
3 Failure to effectively mitigate risk before applying risk controls
4 Risk controls ineffective
5 Unclear risk controls
6 Failure to assess risk for a new system
7 Failure to assess risk when revising an existing system
8 Failure to assess risk when developing operational procedures
9 Failure to maintain records of outputs of risk control assessments
10 Other
Response Details List  Interfaces ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW) (Released, 1.0)
1 Internal communication failure(s)
2 External communication failure(s)
3 Lack of interfaces
4 Inconsistent interfaces
5 Poor coordination between departments and employees
6 Failure of interfaces between processes or procedures
7 Other
Response Details List  Responsibility ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW) (Released, 1.0)
1 Failed to provide financial resources
2 Failed to provide sufficient human resources
3 Individual not clearly identified
4 Failure to ensure safety of process
5 Failure to oversee operations conducted under the certificate
6 Failed to ensure quality performance of process
7 Process oversight failure
8 Communication failure(s)
9 Other
Response Details List  Authority ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW) (Released, 1.0)
1 Process oversight failure
2 Unacceptable safety risk acceptance
3 Ineffective planning of resources
4 Ineffective use of resources
5 Ineffective control of resources
6 Failure to implement safety risk processes
7 Process owner not clearly identified
8 Unqualified
9 Other
Response Details List  Process Measurement ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW) (Released, 1.0)
1 Inadequate monitoring of operations processes
2 Ineffective evaluations of processes or systems
3 Undocumented or insufficient investigations
4 Failure to conduct audits
5 Ineffective audits
6 Failure to detect changes in the operational environment
7 Personnel failed to perform/follow process (procedures, guidance, etc.)
8 Process failed to meet desired outcome
9 Process oversight failure
10 Other
Response Details List  Safety Ownership ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW) (Released, 3.0)
1 Unaware of or ineffective safety policies or processes
2 Unaware of or ineffective safety related reporting tools
3 Unclear safety policy
4 Ineffective safety related training
5 Lack of safety culture
6 Unclear safety objectives
7 Other