Unscoped DCT Report (Standard DCT)
MLF Label: 3.2 Flight Operations Engineering DCT Type: SP DCT Specialty: Operations Peer Group: E - Part 135 (HAA) DCT Revision: 24.0 on 12/30/21 (Released)
Summary Information

Purpose (Certificate Holder Responsibility): The CH is responsible to manage the safety of the Flight Operations Engineering processes within its operation.
Objective (FAA Responsibility): The FAA objective is to determine if the CH; (1) Met regulatory requirements, guidance, and safety performance objectives of its Flight Operations Engineering processes, and; (2) Managed safety of the Flight Operations Engineering processes by incorporating system safety principles which include safety attributes.

 Flight Operations Engineering Subsystem includes the following Element(s)
  3.2 Flight Operations Engineering
     3.2.1 (OP) Aircraft Performance Operating Limitations
     3.2.2 (OP) Use of Approved Areas, Routes, and Airports
     3.2.3 (OP) Special Navigation Areas of Operation
     3.2.4 (OP) RVSM Authorization

Questions Answers Comments
  3.2.1 (OP) Aircraft Performance Operating Limitations
1   
Did the certificate holder meet its regulatory and guidance requirements for Aircraft Performance Operating Limitations?


REFERENCES: 8900.1 Vol 3 Ch 25 Sec 5, 8900.1 Vol 4 Ch 3 Sec 1, 8900.1 Vol 4 Ch 3 Sec 2, 8900.1 Vol 4 Ch 3 Sec 5, 135 Subpart I, 135.181, 135.183, 135.211

Safety Attribute: Procedures,  Question Type: Process Observation,  

Scoping Attribute:  (FAR PART = "135" ) ,  Rev.  10  9/29/2021 10:31:42 AM, 

QID: 00013514, Response Details: Procedures SP DCTs (Both OP and AW),  Status: Released
◯  Met regulatory and guidance requirements
◯  Isolated instance(s) when guidance requirements were not met
◯  Several instances when guidance requirements were not met
◯  Regulatory noncompliance
◯  Not Observable
  3.2.2 (OP) Use of Approved Areas, Routes, and Airports
2   
Did the certificate holder meet its regulatory and guidance requirements for Use of Approved Areas, Routes, and Airports?


REFERENCES: 8900.1 Vol 3 Ch 18 Sec 5, 8900.1 Vol 3 Ch 18 Sec 7, A057, A014, A021, B032, B050, B450, C049, C070, B048, B049, B057, C080, H107, 119.49(a), H123, 135.3(a), 91.703, 135.229, 135.385(f), 136.1

Safety Attribute: Procedures,  Question Type: Process Observation,  

Scoping Attribute:  (FAR PART = "135" ) ,  Rev.  16  12/30/2021 11:54:51 AM, 

QID: 00013521, Response Details: Procedures SP DCTs (Both OP and AW),  Status: Released
◯  Met regulatory and guidance requirements
◯  Isolated instance(s) when guidance requirements were not met
◯  Several instances when guidance requirements were not met
◯  Regulatory noncompliance
◯  Not Observable
  3.2.3 (OP) Special Navigation Areas of Operation
3   
Did the certificate holder meet its regulatory and guidance requirements for Special Navigation Areas of Operation?


REFERENCES: B036, B037, B038, B039, B040, B050, B054, 8900.1 Vol 4 Ch 1 Sec 5, 135.23, 135.99, 91.703, 91.705

Safety Attribute: Procedures,  Question Type: Process Observation,  

Scoping Attribute:  (FAR PART = "135") AND ((OPSPEC = "B036") OR (OPSPEC = "B037") OR (OPSPEC = "B038") OR (OPSPEC = "B039") OR (OPSPEC = "B040") OR (OPSPEC = "B059") OR (OPSPEC = "B055") OR (AREA OF OPERATION = "POLAR AREA - SOUTH")) ,  Rev.  9  3/29/2019 8:22:54 AM, 

QID: 00013528, Response Details: Procedures SP DCTs (Both OP and AW),  Status: Released
◯  Met regulatory and guidance requirements
◯  Isolated instance(s) when guidance requirements were not met
◯  Several instances when guidance requirements were not met
◯  Regulatory noncompliance
◯  Not Observable
  3.2.4 (OP) RVSM Authorization
4   
Did the certificate holder meet its regulatory and guidance requirements for RVSM Authorization?


REFERENCES: AC-91-85, B046, 91 Appendix G, 91.180

Safety Attribute: Procedures,  Question Type: Process Observation,  

Scoping Attribute:  (FAR PART = "135") AND (OPSPEC = "B046") ,  Rev.  3  3/29/2019 8:22:42 AM, 

QID: 00050298, Response Details: Procedures SP DCTs (Both OP and AW),  Status: Released
◯  Met regulatory and guidance requirements
◯  Isolated instance(s) when guidance requirements were not met
◯  Several instances when guidance requirements were not met
◯  Regulatory noncompliance
◯  Not Observable
  Safety Attributes
5   
Did the certificate holder's controls effectively mitigate unacceptable levels of risk(s) for the Flight Operations Engineering process?


REFERENCES: AC-120-92, 8900.1 Vol 17 Ch 3 Sec 3

NOTE: This question applies to all Elements within this Subsystem.

Safety Attribute: Controls,  Question Type: Process Observation,  

Scoping Attribute:  (FAR PART = "135" ) ,  Rev.  6  9/29/2020 1:40:10 PM, 

QID: 00013515, Response Details: Controls ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW),  Status: Released
◯  Controls were effective
◯  Isolated instance(s) when controls were not effective
◯  Several instances when controls were not effective
◯  Systemic or significant issues
◯  Not Observable
6   
Did the certificate holder's Flight Operations Engineering process ensure consistency of related processes between departments and employees (interfaces)?


NOTE: This question applies to all Elements within this Subsystem.

Safety Attribute: Interfaces,  Question Type: Process Observation,  

Scoping Attribute:  (FAR PART = "135" ) ,  Rev.  6  9/29/2020 1:40:10 PM, 

QID: 00013516, Response Details: Interfaces ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW),  Status: Released
◯  Interfaces were effective
◯  Isolated instance(s) when interfaces were ineffective
◯  Several instances when interfaces were ineffective
◯  Systemic or significant issues
◯  Not Observable
7   
Were financial and human resources provided to ensure the safety and quality performance for the Flight Operations Engineering process?


REFERENCES: AC-120-92, 8900.1 Vol 17 Ch 3 Sec 3

NOTE: This question applies to all Elements within this Subsystem.

Safety Attribute: Responsibility,  Question Type: Process Observation,  

Scoping Attribute:  (FAR PART = "135" ) ,  Rev.  6  9/29/2020 1:40:10 PM, 

QID: 00013517, Response Details: Responsibility ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW),  Status: Released
◯  Management of the process was effective
◯  Isolated instance(s) where management of the process was ineffective
◯  Several instances where management of the process was ineffective
◯  Systemic or significant issues
◯  Not Observable
8   
Did the person with authority over the certificate holder's Flight Operations Engineering process effectively plan, direct, control, or change procedures, and make key determinations, including safety risk acceptance decisions?


REFERENCES: AC-120-92, 8900.1 Vol 17 Ch 3 Sec 3

NOTE: This question applies to all Elements within this Subsystem.

Safety Attribute: Authority,  Question Type: Process Observation,  

Scoping Attribute:  (FAR PART = "135" ) ,  Rev.  7  9/29/2020 1:40:10 PM, 

QID: 00013518, Response Details: Authority ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW),  Status: Released
◯  Management of the process was effective
◯  Isolated instance(s) where management of the process was ineffective
◯  Several instances where management of the process was ineffective
◯  Systemic or significant issues
◯  Not Observable
9   
Were the certificate holder's process measurement(s) used to evaluate the performance of the Flight Operations Engineering process and if necessary, implement corrective action?


REFERENCES: AC-120-92, 8900.1 Vol 17 Ch 3 Sec 3

NOTE: This question applies to all Elements within this Subsystem.

Safety Attribute: Process Measurement,  Question Type: Process Observation,  

Scoping Attribute:  (FAR PART = "135" ) ,  Rev.  6  9/29/2020 1:40:10 PM, 

QID: 00013519, Response Details: Process Measurement ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW),  Status: Released
◯  Process measurements were effective
◯  Isolated instance(s) when process measurements were not used or ineffective
◯  Several instances when process measurements were not used or ineffective
◯  Systemic or significant issues
◯  Not Observable
10   
Did the certificate holder's personnel understand their role and contribute to the safety performance of the Flight Operations Engineering process?


REFERENCES: AC-120-92, 8900.1 Vol 17 Ch 3 Sec 3

NOTE: This question applies to all Elements within this Subsystem.

Safety Attribute: Safety Ownership,  Question Type: Process Observation,  

Scoping Attribute:  (FAR PART = "135") ,  Rev.  5  9/29/2020 1:40:11 PM, 

QID: 00013520, Response Details: Safety Ownership ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW),  Status: Released
◯  Individuals were knowledgeable
◯  Isolated instances where knowledge was lacking
◯  Several instances where knowledge was lacking
◯  Systemic or significant issues
◯  Not Observable


Response Details List  Authority ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW) (Released, 1.0)
1 Process oversight failure
2 Unacceptable safety risk acceptance
3 Ineffective planning of resources
4 Ineffective use of resources
5 Ineffective control of resources
6 Failure to implement safety risk processes
7 Process owner not clearly identified
8 Unqualified
9 Other
Response Details List  Controls ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW) (Released, 1.0)
1 Failure to identify hazards or ineffective risk controls
2 Failure to develop and maintain risk controls
3 Failure to effectively mitigate risk before applying risk controls
4 Risk controls ineffective
5 Unclear risk controls
6 Failure to assess risk for a new system
7 Failure to assess risk when revising an existing system
8 Failure to assess risk when developing operational procedures
9 Failure to maintain records of outputs of risk control assessments
10 Other
Response Details List  Interfaces ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW) (Released, 1.0)
1 Internal communication failure(s)
2 External communication failure(s)
3 Lack of interfaces
4 Inconsistent interfaces
5 Poor coordination between departments and employees
6 Failure of interfaces between processes or procedures
7 Other
Response Details List  Procedures SP DCTs (Both OP and AW) (Released, 1.0)
1 Unclear procedure(s)
2 Conflicting procedure(s)
3 Used workaround(s)
4 Skipped process step(s)
5 Personnel failed to follow process (procedures, guidance, etc)
6 Procedures/guidance not available
7 Procedures/guidance not current
8 Inconsistent procedure(s)
9 Undocumented procedure(s)
10 Minor typographical error(s) (i.e. record entries)
11 Information missing
12 Communication failure(s)
13 Personnel failed to perform task
14 Process failed to meet desired outcome
15 Process oversight failure
16 Equipment/tools not available
17 Equipment/tools not adequate
18 Equipment/tools not calibrated
19 Facilities not adequate
20 Other
Response Details List  Process Measurement ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW) (Released, 1.0)
1 Inadequate monitoring of operations processes
2 Ineffective evaluations of processes or systems
3 Undocumented or insufficient investigations
4 Failure to conduct audits
5 Ineffective audits
6 Failure to detect changes in the operational environment
7 Personnel failed to perform/follow process (procedures, guidance, etc.)
8 Process failed to meet desired outcome
9 Process oversight failure
10 Other
Response Details List  Responsibility ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW) (Released, 1.0)
1 Failed to provide financial resources
2 Failed to provide sufficient human resources
3 Individual not clearly identified
4 Failure to ensure safety of process
5 Failure to oversee operations conducted under the certificate
6 Failed to ensure quality performance of process
7 Process oversight failure
8 Communication failure(s)
9 Other
Response Details List  N/O Response Detail (Released, 2.0)
1 Personnel (e.g., key certificate holder personnel not present/available)
2 Equipment (e.g., equipment not present/available/in serviceable condition)
3 Event did not occur (e.g., did not observe an intoxicated passenger on the flight)
4 Time Constraints (e.g., resources/workload)
5 Weather (e.g., weather needed for observation not present or weather made observation impossible)
6 Other
Response Details List  Safety Ownership ED/EP/SP DCTs (Both OP and AW) (Released, 3.0)
1 Unaware of or ineffective safety policies or processes
2 Unaware of or ineffective safety related reporting tools
3 Unclear safety policy
4 Ineffective safety related training
5 Lack of safety culture
6 Unclear safety objectives
7 Other